A rare and concrete opportunity has emerged with a group of countries that includes Hungary, Argentina, and the Czech Republic, alongside other nations that have moved their official missions to Jerusalem. Together, they could help alter the status of Israel's sovereignty in the Golan and normalize the obvious - recognition of Israeli control over the area as part of a broader reconfiguration of the Middle East.

From the perspective of these countries, the time has come to lead a global shift in reaffirming a commitment to Israel's security, regional stability, and an overdue update to the "operating system" of diplomacy. An update that is sorely needed for the challenges of the second quarter of the 21st century.

Commitment to Israel's security

Recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan is a move of historic importance, and a tangible demonstration of commitment to Israel's security. Anyone familiar with Middle Eastern history, especially since the Arab Spring, understands that permanent Israeli control over the Golan is the only guarantee for securing its eastern border and preventing catastrophe in the event of an attack from Syrian territory. Imagine if the Syrian civil war had played out on the shores of the Sea of Galilee; if al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra had entrenched themselves on the border; or if on the morning of October 7, Syrian forces had observed Hamas's assault from the Golan Heights.

The recent shift in Syria underscores the need to stand firm against the long-term strategy of radical Sunni Islam, backed by Turkey and Qatar, to pressure Israel into indefensible borders on its Syrian front.

Today, more than ever, it is clear: securing the existence of the Middle East's only Jewish state requires recognition of its sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This guiding principle must be a priority in every meeting and conversation the prime minister and foreign minister hold with their counterparts around the world.

Middle East stability

Recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan would also contribute to regional stability - a clear international interest. Such recognition undermines the legitimacy of states and terrorist organizations that attempt to escalate tensions in the Golan as a means of pressuring Israel to withdraw. It reduces motivation for conflict and prevents war and bloodshed.

Furthermore, Israeli sovereignty over territory overlooking Damascus and southern Syria effectively deters internal Syrian actors and curbs the outbreak of uncontrolled massacres and mass killings of minorities within Syria. Curbing this violence is a prerequisite for halting the waves of migration from the region that are directly and indirectly destabilizing the political and social structures of host countries, especially in Europe.

Recognition of Golan sovereignty also sends a clear signal of disapproval to Iran's aggression via its proxies in the region - a move particularly relevant for countries like Hungary, Argentina, and the Czech Republic. It is a fitting and complementary response to the fall of the Assad regime, aligning with the biblical notion of justice: "Woe to the wicked; it will go badly with him; for what his hands have dealt out shall be done to him."

This cluster of countries has a strategic interest in aligning with the new US administration as much as possible and harmonizing their geopolitical worldview accordingly.

Recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan is not only a gesture toward Israel, it is primarily a gesture toward the US and its updated Middle East policy. With President Donald Trump entering his second term in the White House, it appears he is adopting a revised diplomatic framework. According to the Trump Doctrine, realities on the ground should shape diplomatic solutions, defusing points of contention and resolving political and territorial disputes.

Many Western countries are trying to align themselves with this revised doctrine. In this context, it is evident that supporting a US-brokered compromise between Russia and Ukraine is far more complex and contentious for the international community than aligning with US positions in the Middle East, particularly recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan.

It is important to emphasize that US recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan is a bipartisan legacy = one of the few Trump-era initiatives not reversed by the Biden administration. The American consensus on the Golan should serve as a guiding light for other countries, especially in countering the alternative historical narrative promoted by radical Islam.

Recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan carries none of the religious sensitivity that often accompanies discussions about recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Nor does it raise issues about dominion over another people, as in the context of Israeli control over the West Bank. The 25,000 Druze residents of the Golan who live on the Israeli side are entitled to full Israeli citizenship, and a growing portion of this population is choosing to exercise that right. Most importantly, there is no viable alternative to Israeli control of the Golan, not even in the long term.

This week, Netanyahu has a rare opportunity to persuade Hungary. The success or failure of his visit will be measured by this issue. Simply securing Hungarian agreement on general Israeli policy issues, including the collapse of Hamas's regime, the release of hostages, or the Iranian threat, is not enough. That would amount to nothing more than a warm press conference, without any real change on the ground.

The writer is the founding chairman of the "Coalition for the Israeli Golan". 

The post The surprising goal Netanyahu should pursue in Hungary appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Japan's ability to build economic bridges with nations worldwide, including in the Middle East, positions it as a crucial balancing force among the global powers operating in the region, especially in times of change, uncertainty, and upheaval. As the first non-Western nation to become a technological superpower, Japan offers an attractive model for growth and prosperity. In the decades following World War II, Japan proved that without wars or conquests, an ancient nation that transitioned into a modern democracy could lead an economic revolution based on trade and technology, without relying on significant natural resources.

Learning from the Japanese model

Japan's post-war economic "miracle" resulted from its ability to balance adaptation to change with stability, consistency, and a cautious yet sophisticated foreign policy. Many Asian nations have admired its achievements, and it stands to reason that Middle Eastern countries may also seek to learn from Japan's model, which is rooted in relentless technological and trade-focused development.

As we enter the second quarter of the 21st century, the world appears to need a more proactive and assertive Japan, one that fully realizes its position as the world's fourth-largest economy. Many nations strive for global influence without possessing the necessary capabilities or tools. Japan, by contrast, is an exception, a true global power that often refrains from exercising its full influence.

Now, with China's growing presence, particularly its strategic investments under the Belt and Road Initiative, Japan faces a critical mission: serving as a counterbalance to prevent Chinese influence from expanding at the expense of Western interests. Like India, Japan cannot afford to leave the United States to face this central challenge of the modern era alone.

Japan is a strategic ally of the United States. The cooperation between the two nations, demonstrated in the Indo-Pacific, can and should also be reflected in the Middle East. Such a move would serve both American and Japanese interests, strengthen the alliance between the two countries, and reinforce the United States' commitment to Japan. Given the current reality in the Middle East and the growing influence of the China–North Korea–Russia–Iran axis, this is a significant strategic necessity for Japan's and America's regional allies in general, and for the Gulf states and Israel in particular.

Japan has a track record of quiet involvement in the Middle East, primarily focused on a narrow view of its energy interests. In the summer of 2023, then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, signing a series of economic agreements that expanded regional cooperation. At the same time, Japan has maintained and developed ties with key Arab capitals in the region, as well as with Ankara, Tehran, and the Palestinians.

Japan-Israel relations, which were limited for many years, have taken a significant positive turn over the past decade. The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recognized the importance of Israeli-Japanese cooperation, particularly in the fields of innovation and technology. Abe was the first Japanese leader to view Israel as a strategic partner capable of contributing to Japan's industrial strength. Despite Japan and Israel lacking a significant shared historical background, they share a common future, one that is particularly defined by a mutual understanding that their power and prosperity depend on accelerating and upgrading their technological capabilities, as well as on scientific leadership.

However, Japan's presence in the Middle East remains limited, failing to fully leverage its capabilities and potential role. Japan now stands at a crossroads: Will it continue its traditional role as merely an economic player, or will it seize the opportunity to become a more significant global player in diplomacy?

Amidst strategic shifts in the Middle East, Japan has the potential to take on a more central role. The Middle East is no longer solely the concern of the world's superpowers, but rather multi-national, where economy, technology, and sophisticated diplomacy can redefine the rules of the game. The question is no longer whether Japan can contribute, but whether it will choose to do so.

This article is based on an original article published in the Japanese newspaper "Nikkei" by Zvi Hauser and Andrew Saidel.

The post The Middle East is waiting for Japan appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

After yet another failure in the ongoing negotiations between Israel and Hamas regarding the release of captives, it's clear that there is a fundamental disconnect between the two sides' perceptions of reality and their expectations for the aftermath of any potential deal.

Since the outbreak of hostilities on October 7, Hamas has been aiming for strategic gains, evident in both its military actions and its tough stance on prisoner exchanges. Prior to this date, Hamas typically demanded the release of imprisoned terrorists in exchange for captives; now, the group is seeking far-reaching concessions that go beyond massive prisoner swaps.

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar's minimum demand is a guarantee of continued Hamas control over Gaza following any ceasefire, a scenario that would be seen as a resounding victory in the eyes of Palestinians and the Arab world at large. Such an outcome would solidify Hamas' popular support and potentially pave the way for the group to seize control of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank in a Velvet Revolution.

Sinwar himself has drawn parallels between the current conflict and Algeria's bloody struggle for independence from France, revealing the scale of his aspirations for Palestinian statehood. Many in Israel seem reluctant to acknowledge the link between the recent escalation and Hamas' overarching strategy of independence.

Faced with Hamas' desire for a historic strategic achievement, Israel must make it clear that it will not be willing to pay strategic prices as part of an agreement with the group. Therefore, Israel has no choice but to update its war objectives.

An update is required

The alternative to destroying the guerrilla force is proving to be ineffective and has brought us to the current point in time with its many challenges. The defense establishment estimates that defeating Hamas, in an optimistic scenario, will take only two or three years. The numbers of uninvolved individuals losing their lives in the war are increasing international pressure and posing an unprecedented legitimacy challenge for Israel, while Hamas refuses any prisoner exchange deal.

In such a situation, Israel must realize that the idea of "collapsing Hamas" needs to be translated into an updated practice that includes real costs of defeat for the Palestinians. First, stop the fighting and declare a third of Gaza's land as an Israeli combat zone, from which Israel will not withdraw and to which residents will not be allowed to return until an agreement is reached – an agreement under which Sinwar and his 25,000 fighters will remain alive, but not in Gaza. They and terrorists released from Israeli prisons will be exiled from the Gaza Strip in the manner of the removal of PLO forces from Beirut in 1982.

The demand to remove the heads of terrorist organizations, led by Hamas leaders and members of its military wing, outside Gaza is the maximum compromise Israel can make without incurring a strategic cost. A gradual withdrawal from the Gaza Strip will take place in parallel with the release of living captives, the return of bodies, and the deportation of military wing members and terrorists who will be released.

This is the only realistic strategic goal that can divert Sinwar's strategic plan from its course, drive a wedge in the growing popularity he enjoys among the Palestinian public, save the Palestinian Authority, allow minimum conditions for the growth of an alternative force to Hamas in Gaza, form a broad and significant international coalition, and lead to the release of captives in the difficult path to victory.

The post Israel has to make it clear: No to a new Hamas paradigm appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

While the Palestinian cohesion fractured in 2007 into the Palestinian Authority's governance of the West Bank and Hamas' rule over the Gaza Strip, it did not disintegrate at one central junction. Rather, it has conducted a unified active operation against Israel. Hamas has spearheaded violent initiatives in Gaza, while the Palestinian Authority has taken the lead in another arena of conflict – the international legal domain.

For over a decade, Palestinian activities have been coordinated and complementary, akin to a pincer movement attempting to outflank Israel. As Hamas attacks Israeli civilians in a flagrant breach of international law, the Palestinian Authority strives to constrain the IDF's defensive operations against such assaults, endeavoring to undermine the legitimacy of Israel's defensive actions.  

The Palestinian Authority deliberately focused its efforts on Gaza, identifying the IDF's operations there as a propitious target due to prevalent precedents of international law violations during global conflicts. Thereby, it elected to articulate the Palestinian struggle against Israel through non-violent means – a struggle in which it is disadvantaged vis-à-vis both Israel and Hamas and one lacking international popularity.

The PA initially recognized this "potential" immediately following Operation Cast Lead. Since 2009, it has worked assiduously to attain an independent status enabling it to initiate legal proceedings against Israel and create a deterrent effect against proactive military action. Through a persistent process, the PA gained such status and, in 2014, filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court in The Hague alleging Israeli violations of international law.

This strategic course bore fruit in December 2019 when the prosecutor announced a full investigation was warranted – emphasizing IDF operations in Gaza (during Operation Protective Edge in 2014 and the 2018–2019 Gaza border protests). Israel had been complacent throughout those years, permitting the PA to arm itself with strategic legal weaponry unchecked.

The prosecutor's decision to investigate Israel represented a historic achievement for the Palestinian pincer movement: Hamas launched rockets and missiles from Gaza at Israeli urban centers and civilian populations; Israel, in response, defended itself through offensive military operations against Hamas. Simultaneously, the PA prompted an investigation of Israel's self-defensive measures, influencing Israel's future strategic decision-making and tactical battle management.  

Israel's strategic failure

The PA's accomplishment in The Hague directly and indirectly created a chilling effect on the Israeli leadership regarding proactive measures in Gaza. Restraint in force application raises battlefield risks, fostering aversion to decisive offensive action due to escalating casualties. This chilling impact was already apparent during Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, where the devastating component of Israel's operation was substantially diminished. Its full toll was exacted on Oct. 7. 

An inconceivable and unpardonable element of Israel's strategic failure in Gaza is the careless response to this resolute, organized, and effective Palestinian Authority campaign. Successive Israeli governments failed to deem it a casus belli, neglecting to make it a core issue in relations with the PA. The sole proactive measure was a temporary freezing of roughly half a billion shekels in funds in 2015, responding to Palestinian accession to the ICC and appeal to the UN Security Council – funds eventually unfrozen.

The Israeli leadership turned a blind eye to this blatant breach of accords with the Palestinian Authority. Rather than issuing a real-time ultimatum and imposing crippling sanctions over the PA's efforts to gain ICC standing, the Israeli establishment preferred willful blindness.

The IDF and Shin Bet security agency compounded this myopia, clinging to tactical Palestinian cooperation against terrorism while dismissing the strategic threats posed by the PA's maneuvers as a meaningless nuisance. The political echelon enthusiastically embraced this strategic short-sightedness. Instead of holding Mahmoud Abbas, whose tenure depended on Israeli backing, accountable, a futile tactic was adopted, focusing efforts on the prosecutor, court, and judges. Another conception collapses in broad daylight amidst resounding failure.

The Palestinian strategy is reaching near-full fruition during the Sword of Iron War. The Palestinian Authority's success alternated between The Hague's two tribunals – the International Criminal Court (where arrest warrants were sought against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant) and the International Court of Justice (whose Rafah pronouncements constrained Israel's actions and fostered unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state). Via proxies like South Africa, the Palestinians cast doubt on Israel's patently defensive operations, tainting them with insinuations of genocide.

This PA-directed theater of the absurd proved an inconceivable historic success. Though not directly involved in Gaza's violent front, the PA essentially shaped the war's trajectory over the years. Ironically, violently expelled from Gaza, it became Hamas' most effective shield there.

The strategic de-legitimization battle has been waged negligently for years. Israel deferred confronting the issue and now must pay the steepest of costs at the most inopportune juncture. The Palestinians may yet attain their coveted prize – an independent state.

The post The Hamas-PA pincer movement: A twin campaign of terror and delegitimization appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

On the night of September 14, 2019, the sound of explosions echoed through the oil fields of Saudi Arabia's state-owned oil company, Aramco. An attack by around 30 cruise missiles and drones evaded Saudi radar systems, struck gas storage tanks, and forced their shutdown, causing a dramatic reduction in Saudi oil production. In one fell swoop, Saudi oil exports were slashed by more than 50%.

The attack, orchestrated by Iran, was described as "the most severe" since the burning of Kuwaiti oil fields by Iraq in 1991, during the Gulf War. After a week of anticipation for a significant American response, the Trump administration announced it would assist the Saudis and Emiratis with defensive forces and ammunition. This sealed the possibility of an American military strike following an assault on their Middle Eastern ally.

The Americans preferred to focus solely on future defense rather than an offensive strike. A feeble voice echoed across the Middle East, reverberating from Tehran to Moscow and Beijing.

Incidentally, the Aramco incident should have also highlighted that Iran was establishing a direct conventional threat against Israel, not just a future nuclear threat. It's doubtful whether Israel and the US understood this five years ago, but this week, that lesson finally sunk in.

Since the ayatollah regime took control of Iran, it has been patiently and ingeniously implementing a strategy aimed at creating a reality where the question mark over Israel's existence becomes real, not just theoretical.

On the night of April 14, 2024, it seemed that two chinks appeared in the armor of Iran's "strategic patience." The first was Iran's decision to attack from its sovereign territory rather than through proxies. The second was the choice of a complex timing when its proxies in Iraq and Syria had not completed the necessary force buildup for a perfect multi-front campaign against Israel on the one hand, while Iran itself lacked even minimal nuclear capability on the other.

Iran chose to respond to an Israeli offensive move with a massive barrage from its territory that was 10 times larger than the attack on Aramco. More significantly, Iran stopped being fearful. It engaged in a direct confrontation with Israel at a time that seemed suboptimal for itself and defiantly acted against an explicit American presidential warning not to proceed.

Iran's overnight missile attack is a strong reminder of the loss of Israel's and America's strategic deterrence. The loss of Iranian fear is the most significant aspect of the Iranian missile attack – and it must be addressed. The "Don't" threat from the world's strongest man on the eve of the Iranian attack was met with indifference in Tehran, echoing the familiar Arabic expression "kalam fadi" (empty words). This is bad news for the US and even worse news for its allies in the region.

Let's not be mistaken – the 99% interception rate is impressive, but it is a tactical achievement that does not restore Western deterrence or restore the strategic balance of power. However, conversely, an opportunity also emerged this week. The Iranian attack created a "do-over" for the failure to launch an offensive response after the Aramco incident, which led to the erosion of America's standing in the region.

The overnight attack on Israel with over 330 airborne objects must not go down in the annals of Middle East history as "Aramco B". Israel and the US must seize this attack to emerge from "strategic slumber." The US has a strategic opportunity to restore its standing in the Middle East and reshape the global geopolitical order.

The free and moderate world looks up to the American superpower in three conflict zones: Russia-Ukraine, China-Taiwan, and Israel-Iran. 

The first two conflict zones involve nuclear-capable powers, severely limiting American freedom of action. The US did not prevent the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it is doubtful whether its conduct in the Middle East so far deters China from changing the strategic reality in the Indo-Pacific region. However, projecting American power against Iranian aggression would significantly bolster American deterrence in the inter-bloc struggle and signal to its allies, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, that they have someone they can count on.

The free world was handed a rare opportunity on Saturday night to significantly slow down Iran's nuclear race. A robust and combined offensive would establish a credible American threat against a nuclear Iran and signal to the Iranians that the free world will not accept a new North Korea in the Middle East. The US and the West have an opportunity to act against Iran in its role as Russia's number one weapons partner. A just strike against the missile and drone facilities used in the attack on Israel and Saudi Arabia would indirectly damage capabilities aimed at Ukraine and improve the West's position on that front as well.

Israel must strive to change the geopolitical status quo in the Middle East and stop the bleeding of its deterrent power in the region. The fact that Israel's enemies fear it less could lead to war in the Middle East, which runs against both Israeli and Western interests. Israel should prioritize and focus efforts on trying to enlist the US, together with a significant Western coalition, to confront Iran's current aggression, not just the emerging nuclear threat. This is necessary to restore the deterrence equation, ensure long-term stability, and prevent bloodshed and wars in the Middle East.

The post What Iran's lack of fear means for the West appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Itamar Ben-Gvir chose to attack US President Joe Biden on the pages of The Wall Street Journal. The position of the minister of national security and the head of the party called Otzma Yehudit towards the US president is not only interesting, but also representative – of the government in which he sits, not in the formal sense of "joint ministerial responsibility", but in the essential-public sense. 

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram

Ben-Gvir has increasingly become the "face of the government." Time and again he takes responsibility for the showcase window of the "full right-wing government," not infrequently as the only show doll in the window.

Ben Gvir has not made any dramatic changes in his ways since being appointed minister, and perhaps this can be said to his credit. Perhaps this is the man who has run long distances in Israeli politics and wholeheartedly believes that in another three or four election campaigns there will be no government without him. But currently, it seems that after the events of October 7, he will not be a member of any government that is formed. He is not Tzachi Hanegbi or Yisrael Katz, who began their political careers with harsh confrontations on campus against Arab students and knew how to quickly move into the depth of the Israeli consensus. Ben-Gvir can't even put on a facade in that regard. 

Ben-Gvir mainly talks. His working assumption is that this is enough to increase his power in the next Knesset, and he is probably right. The question is at what cost? What price will the state pay and what price will the right-wing camp pay? His words resonate not because they are considered "words of the wise", but because most of them cause damage – especially to the right-wing camp. Ben-Gvir is the hottest commodity on the Israeli Left, a mouth that does not stop giving gifts to the battered camp whose vision of two states for two peoples is drenched in regional blood, sweat, and tears.

Therefore, Ben-Gvir is one of the engines that arouse vitality and hope on the Israeli Left for the vision of the two states. From the Left's point of view, he is the optimal flammable material for fueling international motivation to push for the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is not difficult to explain why Palestinians need to be protected from Israeli policy as currently presented in the showcase window where the fiery Ben-Gvir is its presenter. And if salvation does not come from international pressure, Ben-Gvir's performances push more and more Israelis who define themselves as "right-wing" to vote for Yair Lapid or Benny Gantz. They are not convinced that the logic of the minister adds strength, security, or honor to Israel. On the contrary.

Ben Gvir's damage to the Israeli Right is multiplied sevenfold because of the faint sound of silence heard after his remarks. Government members surrounding him grumble, at best, and even this grumbling undergoes filtering by media advisors and electoral calculators. These days, there is no Jewish power (the literal meaning of Otzma Yehudit) to fully express what most government ministers think in their bellies in the face of his recurring performances. There are no statements of values. There is no polemic and no condemnation. Ben Gvir's words are like the hum of an invisible mosquito on the government floor in Jerusalem. Everyone hopes someone else will deal with the annoying buzz. Ben-Gvir is the only one who really says what he thinks, he knows Bibi won't do to him what Yitzhak Rabin did to Shulamit Aloni because of "her big mouth."

It seems that the right-wing camp may end up paying full price for the fizzy drink being served to the Israeli public in Ben-Gvir flavor and with Netanyahu and the ministers' bubbles of silence. If all this culminates with the doubling of Ben-Gvir's electoral power perhaps the right-wing camp will know how to digest this, but if it this results in determining the results of the next elections and lead to the end of right-wing dominance as it has been for the past forty years, the historical price will be heavy.

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

The post Ben-Gvir is the gift that keeps on giving for the Left appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

The meaning of the October 7 default is not only the loss of the lives of about 1,200 Israelis but mainly the potential transformation of how Israel is perceived in a regional-strategic sense. Namely, that is Israel would no longer be feared by Middle Eastern actors. 

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram

In October 1973, the Middle Eastern fantasy of "throwing the Jews into the sea" was abandoned in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. In October 2023 – the Toyota and RPG gunmen from Gaza once again captured the imagination of the masses among the half billion Muslims surrounding the Jewish state, which comprises just about 10 million people. More and more people in the region think it's time to stop being afraid of Israel. This is a worrying development caused by the Oct. 7 attack. 

In analytical terms, we may describe this as "a certain unraveling of Israel's deterrence in the region." This fear narrows Israel's flexibility regarding the outcomes of the campaign. Israel now needs a victory. Decisive victory. A draw would be a dangerous defeat.

The Israeli leadership must internalize that we can no longer be content with a "sense of victory" among the Israeli public. The focus must be on the feelings of the millions around us, who must have the Israeli victory seared into their consciousness. We must not create a situation where no one fears us in the region, as this would lead to chronic instability, which would ultimately lead to wide-scale bloodshed in the region. Anyone who wants peace and stability must strive for a clear Israeli victory at this time.

The task of defeating Hamas in Gaza is becoming more complex in light of the fact that the Israeli leadership refuses to set expectations vis-à-vis the Israeli public and our friends around the world. 

The leadership has not provided clearly defined measures for achieving the goal of toppling Hamas, which should include (at the very least) the expulsion of the remaining members of the military arm, the demilitarization of Gaza from heavy weapons, and the holding on to long-term security buffer zones.

The lack of clear expectations has resulted in the US increasing its pressure to end the war, and what's worse – it contributes to public and media pressure to downgrade the goals of the war to secure the release of the captives at any cost. 

It is doubtful whether victory in Gaza is enough to restore the fear of Israel to the levels we had vis-a-vis our enemies. A victory that boils down to just the release of the captives and confidence-building measures to establish a Palestinian state would not be enough in shoring up Israel's image in that regard. 

Even those who have subscribed to a governing paradigm over the past 30 years that has been based on the idea of Palestinian independence as a core component of Israel's security cannot ignore the implications of establishing such a state as a result of an Israeli military defeat in Gaza. This is not how deterrence is restored; this is not how one survives in the Middle East.

If the quagmire of the Gaza tunnels, US pressure, and the issue of the captives bring the leadership to the realization that there is no ability to present a clear victory on this front, one that will lead to a strategic change in the region, they must consider switching fronts and reasserting Israeli deterrence through the removal of the strategic threat in Lebanon.

Initiative and victory against one of the richest and most powerful terrorist organizations in the world, Hezbollah, can restore deterrence in the region in general, and vis-à-vis the pro-Iranian axis in particular. Israel cannot be satisfied with tactical achievements on both fronts while the axis of evil led by Iran enjoys huge strategic achievements and continues to establish a growing threat around Israel.

Israel must remove the threat from the north and dismantle the power structure Hezbollah has built in Lebanon regardless of the situation in the south; but without victory in the south, a significant achievement in the north becomes that much more important. It has become abundantly clear that removing the threat in the north is not a question of "if" but a question of "when." We are required to remove a clear and present danger in the north, and let us not be fooled – the withdrawal of Radwan forces beyond the Litani River would not make this threat go away.

Disrupt the Iranian plan

Israel must disrupt Iran's plans for a future major multi-front war against it at a time convenient for Tehran and when its capabilities mature. Waiting for the timing at which the Iranians decide to create such a flare-up would be a strategic mistake and would incur higher costs than the current confrontation. More than anything – we need to restore Israeli deterrence and fear of a determined Israeli response. In Gaza, we have not yet achieved this.

The October War must end with the strategic transformation that PM Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant committed to at the outset of the fighting. Strategic deterrence is more important today than current security achievements or revenge. We must not create a situation in which the failure of the IDF top brass and our political leaders to meet the challenge now would result in the current 8th graders facing the same security problems when they reach conscription age. 

 Today one cannot be content with anything less than victory, at least on one front. And if there is no victory in Gaza, it is time to prepare the public for a campaign in the north.

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

The post Victory is incomplete without deterrence appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

One of the troubling insights I have as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee was that Israel "is gifted with impressive tactical capabilities, but it repeatedly mistakes that for an adequate substitute for the absence of a national strategy."

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram

For over a quarter century, Iran has attempted to consolidate its military presence in various territories to develop the capability to inflict devastating and paralyzing damage on Israel. Alongside the effort to obtain non-conventional military capabilities, Iran is building, through proxies, conventional capabilities in the region, which, when matured, will enable effective cumulative firepower strikes, equaling in effect a nuclear strike. Israel's response to this methodical Iranian strategy is a partial series of tactical operations that try "to delay the inevitable" and cover up the lack of adoption of a counter geopolitical strategy. This was the state of affairs up until October 7, and there is concern it will continue to be so on our northern border.

Israel decided a decade ago to operate in the Syrian arena to foil the consolidation of the Iranian axis, in what later became known as the "Campaign Between the Wars." It undertook tactical actions only, without trying to influence the structure of the ruling system in Syria. It had made do with a series of tactical strikes, instead of trying to achieve a single strategic achievement. In Lebanon and Gaza, it relinquished even continuous tactical activity, and took an irresponsible decision to enable significant military force buildup and turning terror organizations into terror armies.

In Gaza we assumed the Iron Dome system provided an answer for the missile threat, while the intelligence would identify a ground invasion force, and the smart fence would block it. On October 7 this paradigm was shattered, resulting in the deaths of about 1,200 Israelis. This collapse significantly eroded Israeli deterrence and regional standing.

In Lebanon, over the past decade, we tried to kick the can down the road. We should have initiated an offensive operation against Hezbollah's capabilities while it was mired in the Syrian mud, thus reducing it to merely a tactical threat. Lack of leadership and shortsightedness led to the ongoing decision not to act, allowing the almost-uninterrupted buildup of significant military forces. In literature, we could have called this "Israel's march of folly." Instead of preemptive action, we adopted the thesis that the balance of terror vis-à-vis Hezbollah would eventually lead to the "rusting away" of the terror organization's missile stockpile, and therefore – so the thinking went – there was no need to take proactive measures and pay the price.

Additionally, we took the geo-political gamble that blood covenants between Hezbollah and Hamas are improbable, hence Israel would not have to face both fronts with high intensity. That strategy, although seemingly no longer popular, remains deeply embedded in the minds of many leaders to this day. They are still willing to accept a situation in which Iran gets to decide how and when to utilize its accumulated capabilities in Lebanon.

The defeat we suffered on October 7 on the Gaza border disabused Israel of obsolete views in its national security policy. Israel is learning the hard way the price of relinquishing the "pre-emptive strike" tools and belittling the threat of a multi-theater conflict. It needs to realize that "intention-predicting technologies" can only go so far, as do purely defensive capabilities developments. First and foremost this requires a paradigm shift in the upper levels of government and adopting strategic proactive steps rather than just a tactical approach.

The challenge in the north puts Israel in a dilemma: Is it time to change the strategic reality in Lebanon, as promised by the leadership at the beginning of the war, or will our leaders be deterred and suffice with tactical achievements in the border area?

Hamas' success created the perception in Israeli society that the key strategic problem on the northern border is Hezbollah's Radwan force, which could invade border-adjacent communities. Pushing the Radwan force back from the border would be a tactical achievement, especially given the IDF's lessons learned from Gaza border communities. But the significant threat from the north is Hezbollah's capabilities to fire rockets and missiles from Lebanon – a threat Israel continues to treat as something that can be dealt with, and this threat would remain as is even if Hezbollah tactically retreats beyond the Litani River.

Meaning the balance of power in the north has not been disrupted, and it is doubtful that the displaced Israelis would be allowed to return home. Paradoxically, this would enable Iran to preserve capabilities for future strikes against Israel despite Israel changing the rules of the game in the Middle East, and despite the US standing by it, including militarily. 

Israel risks again basking in the limelight of a tactical achievement, while the Iranians resume building strategic capabilities that will in short order be used against us.

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

The post Israel's Russian roulette on the northern border appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

At the deserted Ben Gurion International Airport, the announcement "This is the final call for passengers boarding the flight" is heard regularly despite there being scant volume of travelers. Perhaps the person making those announcements should be tapped so that they could make a different kind of announcement in the War Cabinet: "This is the final call for War Cabinet members to align expectations with the Israeli public and world public opinion regarding the meaning of 'toppling Hamas'."

Israeli leadership has adopted a tactic aimed at keeping the Israeli public and international public opinion in the fog of war, which does not include a concrete realization of victory and has run its course. 

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram

The statement "We came to topple Hamas" is just too vague. The lack of clarity as to this goal is becoming counterproductive and allows the creation of a cooling effect, which will weigh on the fighting.

We are witnessing these days the "trickling" of a narrative that "there is no more hope for continuing the fighting in Gaza – "the number of casualties is increasing"; "the benefit of continued fighting is marginal"; "Hamas has been dealt a mortal blow and the only real Israeli interest left is freeing the captives".

 This trickling will turn into a flood if the Israeli leadership continues to obscure the goals of the operation and does not set a concrete goal that specifies what victory is, and what "toppling Hamas" means.

There is a clear danger regarding our continued unity as a society that is imbued with a fighting spirit the longer the fighting in Gaza continues and the victory goals remain unclear. The Israeli leadership must make a public decision that the idea of ​​"toppling Hamas" is first and foremost about removing the remaining living members of Hamas' military wing from Gaza. Removing them in a manner similar to that used to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization forces from Beirut in 1982. 

This is a clearly defined goal, which would reflect a clear Israeli victory. To this should be added two additional goals: The demilitarization of Gaza from heavy weaponry and rockets  – a goal that the prime minister has only started repeating in the last two weeks – and the establishment of a security buffer within the Gaza Strip.

Ending the fighting without removing Hamas' military wing personnel from Gaza will allow contradictory interpretations as to whether there was an Israeli victory. An Israeli victory is a must given the defeat we suffered in the fighting on October 7. It is necessary to create regional deterrence, and so that the Saudis, and other countries in the region after them, will aspire to a regional strategic alliance with Israel.

A clear Israeli victory is a necessary condition if the residents of the border towns are to return to their homes. Any other outcome of the fighting that does not include removing Hamas' military force from Gaza will be interpreted as a victory for Hamas, even at the cost of heavy losses to the organization.

 From there, the way to Hamas' rehabilitation in Gaza is short. Leaving an organized and trained military force in the Strip will prevent any real possibility of forming an alternative force that will rule Gaza. Sooner or later, Hamas will return to rule the Strip, to our chagrin, to the chagrin of the Americans and the Palestinian Authority. Hamas retaking control of Gaza will be faster and easier than the Taliban retaking Afghanistan. Ask in Washington.

Israel has no other choice but to remove Hamas from the Strip in the manner of removing the PLO from Lebanon. The alternative is the destruction of this force, the meaning of which is the killing of enormous numbers of non-combatants. In 1982, IDF forces besieged Beirut, a siege that led to the departure of about 12,000 terrorists from Lebanon. The IDF of 2023 is a much more powerful military than in 1982. The removal of the PLO members back then prevented a spiraling humanitarian disaster in Lebanon. Removing Hamas' organized military arm from Gaza today will prevent a spiraling humanitarian disaster in the Strip. This should be Israel's declared policy. This should be the American aspiration. This should be the rationale for having America put pressure on Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey to remove Hamas from Gaza.

On the margins of this substantive discussion, it is important to emphasize – let us not be misled or confused: The killing of Yahya Sinwar will not be proof that Israel had won. Every leader has a replacement. Killing Sinwar without removing the rest of Hamas' military wing from Gaza can serve as a tool to shape the Israeli consciousness as if we had won. Such narratives will fade much faster than expected. Let's hope our leadership will not be tempted to settle for a "victory image", but will insist on bringing the victory itself.

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

The post Victory means expelling Hamas' fighters from the Gaza Strip appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

The goal of the war as defined by the political echelon is "toppling Hamas." We must not settle for such vague wording. Clear and measurable benchmarks need to be adopted to clarify the meaning of "toppling." Otherwise, we will find ourselves in another aggressive cycle with the attempt to create within the Israeli consciousness, not the Palestinian one, the narrative as if this was an overwhelming Israeli victory.

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram

"Toppling of Hamas" has a clear and specific meaning. Israel needs to announce a four-part plan that will make it clear to our enemies and friends that we are committed to the goal we set for ourselves on October 8. Namely, a strategic change in the region. Here are the four points.

1. Hamas's military wing comprises roughly 30,000 people. Those who survive will leave Gaza permanently, following a similar model to the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon in the 1980s. This should be Israel's clear and unequivocal position from the beginning of the conflict. The sooner Hamas surrenders, the more of its people's lives can be spared. This is also the only deal that is feasible in relation to the Israeli captives. When Yahya Sinwar understands that he can leave the Strip "alive or dead," he and his colleagues in leadership will choose to save their lives and be willing to exchange the captives. The IDF in Gaza in 2023 is more lethal and powerful than the IDF in Beirut in 1982. Israel needs to make sure the region knows this. Around 11,000 PLO members left Lebanon after more than a month of siege in Beirut. The military wing members of Hamas in Gaza cannot stay either, even if it requires a three-month siege. This is also a necessary condition for the return of the people of Sderot and Netivot to their homes. Just like the PLO went to Qatar, so too will Hamas members go to Qatar or Turkey.

2. The remaining heavy weaponry in Gaza, after the battles, will be transported in convoys towards the Sinai Desert. There, Israel can afford to let the rockets "go rusty," as was hoped during the pre-Oct. 7 massacre and its flawed misconception. Every humanitarian aid convoy that enters will be followed by a truck loaded with rockets that exits the enclave – no more rockets and missiles in Gaza.

3. Gaza will be declared a demilitarized area where the existence of rocket weapons will be prohibited. The term "demilitarization" is the only international term that allows for aggressive action to preserve peace and security. Demilitarizing Gaza from rockets and missiles will remove the Israeli population from the battlefield, where they have been for over a decade. From this point forward, Israel will act disproportionately against any force-buildup activity that undermines the demilitarization principle. No longer will there be sporadic "mowing of the grass" with a new cycle of escalation every few years; instead, a daily weeding of the garden will happen.

4. Israel will pre-announce its intention to maintain a security zone in Gaza to ensure no further ground incursions into Israeli territory. The October 7 events require an Israeli military takeover of the buffer zones between settlements and Gaza, in Gaza's territory. In the residents' language, this would be described as "removing Gaza from the border." Israel must declare its intention to maintain these areas under its control for at least a decade as a guarantee for peace. If calm and tranquility prevail in the area for a decade, Israel may consider a unilateral withdrawal to the current border. It should be remembered that Israel withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in 2005, with hopes of seeing Gaza flourish. Instead, we received rocket fire. Instead of Singapore, we have a violent Iranian Somalia next door. After more than a decade of missile strikes on our towns and cities and 1,400 fatalities in a single day, Israel is entitled and even obliged to reconsider its unilateral step to withdraw to the 1949 border, which did not provide sufficient security.

It should be emphasized that our current agreements with the Palestinians leave the final delineation of the border, including in Gaza, to the last stage of the negotiations. As Israel has withdrawn unilaterally, it can and must unilaterally change the deployment of its forces and prepare more effectively and securely on a different line.

Some of us also contemplate the historical-philosophical necessity for revenge for the bloodbath we suffered because of the enemy on that cursed Shabbat. For those who hold that view, I say that the territorial acquisition, even if its sole purpose is, as mentioned, to secure security and prevent violence, is the most appropriate response in the language of the Middle East to those who raped our women and murdered crushed skulls of our infants near our border. Neither killing the innocent nor extensive property damage will deter them. Our neighbors and enemies must know that an attack on Israel means a loss of their territory.

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram

The post The 4-point plan for toppling Hamas appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.