Lebanon is facing an additional catastrophic crisis, as it already suffers from political, economic, and security problems. In this context, the reception of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi at Beirut airport has raised surprise and concern. Araghchi, leading a parliamentary delegation, met with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Najib Mikati, sending a clear message of defiance to Israel. This visit raises questions about the judgment of Lebanese leaders and their understanding of the existential challenges facing their country. Lebanon did not need to add another layer to its crisis by welcoming the Iranian minister, who was fully aware of the consequences this visit could have beyond what the small country could handle.

The claim that the Iranian minister's plane carried around 10 tons of humanitarian aid does not justify the Lebanese officials' decision to receive him, giving Iran a chance to deepen its involvement in Lebanese affairs. At a time when Iran should have been told to stop meddling in Lebanon and retract its influence, Lebanon instead facilitated this visit, particularly after the killing of Hassan Nasrallah.

Despite the deep-rooted nature of Hezbollah and its sectarian influence within Lebanon, some believed that Nasrallah's assassination and Hezbollah's resulting chaos would offer Lebanese authorities an opportunity to regain control and reduce the party's influence. However, Lebanese officials remain captive to the fears and threats of violence that Nasrallah instilled, and these fears overshadow any attempts to free Lebanon from Hezbollah's grip.

The Lebanese prime minister's praise for Iran's support "in these difficult circumstances" during his meeting with Araghchi appears to be a tragic comedy. He overlooks the fact that Iran, through its agents, is responsible for much of Lebanon's current turmoil, yet he lauds Iran for its assistance in these conditions that it helped create.

Another important dimension of Araghchi's visit is its contradiction in Lebanon's official stance. The Lebanese government is appealing to the world to stop Israel's military operations in the south, while simultaneously welcoming a key player in the conflict. How can the world understand Lebanon's position when its government receives the Iranian foreign minister, who challenges Israel from Lebanese soil, yet claims to support UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the disarmament of armed groups, including Hezbollah, and full respect for the Blue Line, which the Iranian-backed Hezbollah completely rejects? Araghchi's visit implicitly conveys rejection of this resolution, reinforced by the Iranian Supreme Leader's speech advocating continued armed resistance during Araghchi's time in Beirut.

Lebanon's disaster is not limited to Hezbollah but extends to its cowardly politicians, who prioritize their positions over the future of their people. They express concern about Lebanon becoming like Gaza but still welcome those responsible for Gaza's downfall. The Lebanese government's decision to risk receiving Araghchi's plane, fully aware of the potential danger due to his country's undeclared war with Israel, reflects its alignment with Iran, even as it tries to present itself as wanting to escape Hezbollah's influence. This duality and deception fool no one.

The reception of Araghchi in Beirut at such a tense moment is symbolic of Lebanon's broader crises. This Arab country can only emerge from its predicament by completely breaking free from the political figures responsible for the catastrophe it now faces.

Lebanon, which has been without a president for nearly two years and is governed by a caretaker government, struggles to manage its crises, with the current situation in the south being the most dangerous. Since Nasrallah's assassination, no Lebanese official has demonstrated a desire to move forward and address the Iranian influence, even by seeking the help of the international community and Arab powers that genuinely wish to assist Lebanon and its people.

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The current events unfolding in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip mark a crucial turning point in shaping the rules of the new world order. The Middle East, a key area of conflict and influence, extends beyond the immediate terror actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. These organizations are essentially puppets controlled by regional powers aiming to change the game's rules and establish the "axis of resistance" as a major player in the region.

While it is challenging to predict the exact outcomes in southern Lebanon and Gaza, the situation is not solely about military conflicts. It is intrinsically linked to ongoing negotiations, both public and private. What is certain is that a new strategic reality is emerging in the Middle East. This shift must be understood within a broader geostrategic and geopolitical framework, including other regional hotspots like Sudan, Libya, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa.

One potential scenario is Israel successfully neutralizing threats from Hezbollah. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said, "The tentacles of that octopus are severely wounded – now's the time to aim for the head." Israel has made significant progress, notably eliminating key Hezbollah leaders. This will inevitably impact the organization's effectiveness and decision-making capabilities, requiring considerable time to restructure and fill the leadership void. Despite ongoing fierce fighting in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah's combat infrastructure remains largely functional, making its complete elimination through leadership targeting alone unlikely.

By limiting Hezbollah's threat and neutralizing the Houthis, Israel may proceed to the next strategic phase: dismantling Iran's nuclear infrastructure to fully eliminate the threats facing Israel. Netanyahu's government might view the current climate as ideal for this move, considering both combat dynamics and the curbed response capabilities of Iran's proxies.

Additionally, unwavering American support, driven by US presidential election calculations, may embolden Israel as the Biden administration seeks to demonstrate resolute backing ahead of the November vote.

From Israel's cost-benefit perspective, there's a temptation to target Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Israel may not rush until conditions are fully prepared. A key prerequisite would be provoking Iran into significant attacks against Israel, providing legitimacy for a proportionate response to address perceived threats.

Israel has effectively leveraged Hamas' October 7 terror attack to pursue broader, more comprehensive goals beyond the narrow concept of victory sought by terrorist militias. This reflects the disparity between Israel's deep strategic thinking and the short-term, media-oriented victories pursued by militant groups.

The likely outcome is a new Middle Eastern landscape that Israel did not necessarily seek but successfully shaped and expedited by exploiting the conditions created by Iranian-backed terror militias in Yemen, Gaza, Lebanon, and Iraq.

The emerging rules in the Middle East may, for the first time in decades, exclude non-state actors, with Iranian proxy organizations potentially facing obsolescence. However, this outcome depends on regional and international efforts to complement Israel's military actions with political and diplomatic initiatives. These conflicts will ultimately be resolved through negotiations, presenting a rare opportunity to address the regional chaos caused by terrorist militias that not only threaten Israel but also undermine the sovereignty of countries like Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

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There is no doubt that the Iranian regime finds itself in an existential crisis unlike any it has faced since the 1979 Khomeini Revolution. This crisis surpasses even the eight-year war against Saddam Hussein's regime. With Israel's intense military strikes targeting Iran's proxies in the Middle East, the pressing question is: Can the Iranian regime navigate this crisis with minimal losses, or is its future at risk?

To answer this, we must consider several key factors. Prior to terror Hamas' bloody attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Iran held a strong negotiating position. Western, particularly US, efforts were focused on "appeasing" Iran to resume compliance with the nuclear agreement. Iran also benefited from the Russia-Ukraine war, supplying drones to Russia, which allowed it to showcase its military capabilities, especially its advanced drone technology.

However, the Iranian regime appears to have misread the conflict between the Hamas terror group and Israel. It saw Israel's failure to quickly defeat Hamas as a sign of its own military strength. This was a strategic miscalculation, ignoring the complexities of asymmetric warfare. Iran's Revolutionary Guards may have drawn misguided parallels from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and Israel's 2006 war in Lebanon, hoping to replicate similar outcomes by using Hamas's terrorist attacks inside Israel, backed by Iranian forces in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

A critical turning point could be the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, which would have far-reaching consequences for Iran. Such an event would impact Iran more than the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh due to sectarian factors and Nasrallah's importance to Iran's regional strategy. Iranian leaders might feel personally threatened, not just because of Nasrallah's strategic value but also due to the method of the assassination.

Israel sent a clear and direct message to the Iranian regime's leaders that it can reach them in a similar manner, including the potential to target highly fortified Iranian nuclear facilities. The bombs that hit Nasrallah's headquarters penetrated tens of meters underground. Hezbollah's leader was not killed directly by the Israeli bombardment of about 85 bombs, each weighing around a ton, but by the destruction of approximately eight underground floors, along with six additional floors above ground.

The intelligence infiltration and assassination of Hezbollah leaders, notably Nasrallah, was a shocking blow to Iran. It placed the regime in an unprecedentedly vulnerable position, both internally and externally. For the first time, Iran was unable to fall back on its usual "strategic patience" due to the magnitude of the event, which severely damaged its national pride. In response, Iran launched a missile attack on Israel – a move seen as necessary to maintain the regime's image amid growing foreign and domestic contempt.

This missile strike temporarily breathed life back into the regime. Now, Iran is desperately trying to avoid an Israeli retaliation, which could involve strikes on its nuclear facilities or the assassination of key figures like Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or Revolutionary Guards commanders. Any such retaliation would force Iran into a direct military conflict, something it seeks to avoid at all costs.

Israel has now exposed the Iranian regime's proxy strategy, pushing Tehran to either engage directly in military conflict or face undesirable outcomes. This situation presents the Iranian regime with two unfavorable scenarios.

The first scenario is to confront Israel directly, trying to minimize the consequences and avoid heavy losses. The outcome will depend on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's decision – whether to strike a decisive blow to the regime or merely weaken and disarm it.

The second scenario is to pursue diplomatic channels with the US, hoping to convince Israel not to retaliate for Iran's recent attack in exchange for Iranian promises to restrain its proxies, disarm them, and scale back its proxy warfare strategy. This could be part of a broader agreement that includes the Iranian nuclear program. However, this option is unlikely, as the Biden administration and Israel, given Israel's current strategic advantage, would probably reject such a deal.

There is strong momentum to seize the opportunity to neutralize the Iranian threat without conceding to Iran's nuclear ambitions, which remain a core issue in the conflict with both the US and Israel.

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The selection of Yahya Sinwar, known for his extremist views, as the new head of Hamas's political bureau, following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran at the end of last July, has sparked considerable debate and surprised many experts and analysts. Sinwar was not initially considered a likely successor to Haniyeh, suggesting that this choice may mark a turning point in the future of the terrorist movement and its overall trajectory.

In my opinion, several factors influenced Sinwar's selection. One key factor is the absence of a prepared alternative to fill the void left by Haniyeh's assassination promptly. This is particularly relevant given that Khaled Meshaal has distanced himself from leading the terrorist movement and is no longer internally supported, in addition to his strained relationship with Iran since he sided with the Syrian opposition in 2012.

Another factor is the charged atmosphere resulting from Haniyeh's sudden assassination amidst the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip. This explains the haste with which Palestinian factions "endorsed" Sinwar's selection and considered it a "logical response" to Haniyeh's assassination, as stated by Jibril Rajoub, Secretary of Fatah's Central Committee. This endorsement is not unrelated to the Palestinian factions' relationship with Sinwar, who had previously attempted to bridge the gap between Hamas and Fatah, and is known for his radical hostility towards Israel. The Palestinian Authority may view him as a bulwark against the strong pressures exerted by Israel and regional powers for reform and addressing rampant corruption within it.

Sinwar's selection carries several messages, but the most significant implication is the absence of a political face for the terrorist movement. Sinwar is essentially a field commander whose location is unknown and who cannot move freely even if he manages to leave Gaza alive. Israel will pursue him relentlessly and eliminate him, making it impossible for him to exist on the soil of any country, even those known for their relationship with Hamas, given the escalating conflict with Israel.

Therefore, Sinwar's presence means merging the political and military wings of the terrorist movement and confining them together in Gaza's sewers and tunnels, without any presence in inter-Palestinian political interactions or in the movement's relations with the outside world, let alone managing its complex alliance relationships with countries like Iran, Qatar, and Turkey. In this regard, he resembles Hassan Nasrallah, the permanently hidden leader of Hezbollah. 

The dilemma resulting from Sinwar's selection does not lie in his radicalism, as some observers suggest. Often, peace has been achieved through the efforts of hardline politicians. The real problem is that Sinwar cannot exercise his political role effectively, especially at the height of the conflict with Israel. This makes him extreme in his demands and less inclined to make concessions, particularly since he fully realizes that his life is constantly threatened, regardless of whether ceasefire deals are reached.

Hamas's messages behind Sinwar's selection, as officially expressed by Osama Hamdan, one of the terrorist movement's leaders, are that the movement wants to demonstrate its unity and cohesion, which have been questioned, and its ability to make decisions regardless of circumstances. It also wants to show that it can transfer power and produce new leadership cadres, and prove that the killing of its leaders at a high rate and the resulting pressures do not affect the movement and will not push it to make any concessions or submit to any bargains.

These are not surprising to Israel or others. The reality is that the terrorist movement suffered a heavy loss with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh. Sinwar may indeed be a subject of internal consensus at the current stage, but he does not have the ability to unite the movement internally and externally in later stages, even if he manages to stay alive or reach a settlement that allows him to leave the Strip safely, which is doubtful given current indicators and evidence.

Hamas has made a grave strategic error that will strongly affect its future by choosing a leader described as "deranged" by sources close to him, in addition to being pre-condemned to death. While Hamas could have chosen a more realistic alternative, the moment charged with fear and anxiety played a prominent role in tipping the balance in Sinwar's favor, to avoid any divisions or disagreements or even delay in the process of choosing a replacement for Haniyeh, which could have exposed the movement's decisions to confusion and turmoil at a time when it is supposed to continue the desperate fighting in parallel with the negotiation process with Israel through Egyptian and Qatari mediations.

The terrorist movement's leaders also preferred to appear falsely in a deceptive show of strength and perhaps believed that choosing the "deranged" Sinwar would be a provocative step for Israel, which has failed in its efforts to find him so far and to send a message of the terrorist movement's strength and ability to survive in light of regional and international understandings that completely exclude the terrorist movement from the Palestinian equation or scene in the day after the war. Although this choice may push in the opposite direction of its intended purpose for the movement, it doubles the conviction of regional parties and confirms beyond doubt the terrorist movement's lack of ability to coexist peacefully with Israel and its insistence on pursuing the path of terrorism and bloodshed.

It is impossible, of course, to replicate Haniyeh's experience, who was confined to the Gaza Strip for two years, during which he headed the terrorist movement and then left to reside in Qatar and move with relative comfort between Doha and some regional capitals. Sinwar will not repeat this experience due to the difference in his situation in Gaza's sewers and tunnels. Moreover, even if Israel were to consider allowing his exit as part of a negotiated agreement, it's doubtful that Qatar or other nations would bear the responsibility for his safety and residence.

It is more likely that the rush to choose Sinwar was merely a solution to get out of the circle of division and disagreements over choosing a successor to Haniyeh, as the connection with Iran has come to play an important role in choosing who takes over the presidency of the terrorist movement's political bureau, given the military wing's adherence to this relationship at the expense of the movement's original relationship with the international terrorist organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.

This is in addition to the insistence of the Gaza leadership on managing the movement, escaping from the continuous pursuit of the terrorist movement's leaders residing abroad, solving the crisis of hosting these leaders after it was proven that the chances of the terrorist movement's leaders staying hidden in Gaza's sewers and tunnels have become better than abroad, and avoiding potential pressures on external leaders to make concessions regarding stopping the war or demands for the terrorist movement to completely distance itself from the day-after scene in the Gaza Strip.

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No analyst would doubt that the Iranian regime is facing its worst crisis since it came to power after Supreme Leader Ali Khomeini's revolution in 1979. In previous eras, the regime faced tribulations but possessed strategic alternatives that enabled it to navigate them without catastrophic losses or, more precisely, with constrained detriments.

However, this time, the crisis appears altogether distinct. The Iranian regime has been subjected to a total national humiliation and degradation with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the political bureau of the Hamas terrorist movement in the heart of Tehran, without possessing the capability to confront or retaliate in a manner that would restore even a modicum of its prestige and dignity without such a response having more severe ramifications.

The Iranian regime's bewilderment after Haniyeh's assassination was more acute than the repercussions of the downing of the helicopter of former President Ebrahim Raisi and confirmation of his demise along with his companions. The challenge in this assassination operation is manifest, and the intelligence confrontation is direct and overt, striking at the regime's ability to safeguard the country and undermining all its repeated assertions over recent years about the level of military and technological advancement.

After all, a regime that cannot protect a diminutive room in a central residential complex guarded by its militias that spread terror across the Middle East cannot be trusted to protect its senior leaders at home and abroad, let alone protect its allies and armaments dispersed across the region. The reactions that Haniyeh's assassination has opened the floodgates to derision of the Iranian regime, renowned for its iron grip on its citizens, within the country itself. Its image has crumbled, and its national face has been debased, rendering its continuous rhetoric of defending Iran a subject of mockery for millions of ordinary people suffering from economic conditions and security restrictions.

For the first time, the Iranian regime finds its hands bound from a genuine military response that would restore its pride, especially since the theatrics it carried out in response to targeting the Iranian consulate in Damascus did not convince anyone. Instead, it devolved into a subject of ridicule and mockery of the Iranian regime and its leaders. How can it respond, this time, to an intelligence breach by Israel that targeted the Iranian interior?

Patently, the senior Iranian leaders, headed by Khamenei, have a profound, authentic desire to retaliate and exact revenge. However, this desire is completely separate from the ability to translate it into actions on the ground, given the magnitude of the potential costs of any actual retaliation that would ensure the restoration of national pride for this regime, whose sole concern is survival and continuity. The fate of the regime is the true lodestar for any Iranian conduct.

There is no solace here for the victims, whether a leader of its Revolutionary Guards, the de facto second man in the Iranian regime, a president who fell victim to a mysterious plane crash, or the leader of one of Iran's most vital militia arms in the Middle East region. In such arduous predicaments, the mullahs typically resort to the principle of Taqiyya, or political realism and pragmatism, invoking the public interest and political and strategic balances. They show the opposite of their intentions, taking refuge in their thoughts and fantasies that depict for them what they desire instead of confronting the reality from which they flee.

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After nearly six months of the war sparked by the terrorist Hamas movement following the bloody and terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, Iran's role in this war seems clear, and Iran's goals appear more evident by its own admission, not just analysis and conclusions that weren't lacking evidence and proof. But as they say, confession is the most potent form of evidence.

In his Iranian New Year speech, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, "The patience of the Palestinian people, Hamas, and all the factions in Lebanon and Iraq destroyed the Americans and their calculations in the region." Khamenei went on, "The resistance front was formed to confront the ongoing injustice of the Zionist criminals." "The resistance unveiled its capabilities and confused the enemy... The resistance power confused America's miscalculations about the region.'

This is Iran's real aim in this war: confusing America's calculations in the Middle East and forcing the US to recognize Iran's influence and its terrorist militia proxies. The goal isn't liberating Jerusalem or Palestine, as terrorist militia leaders claim or propagandize. Otherwise, the Supreme Leader would have proclaimed that openly, aware it would resonate and gain Iran sympathy in the Arab and Islamic worlds. But he didn't mention it. It's all about proving the "resistance" capabilities funded and armed by Iran and shaping new strategic realities while awaiting negotiations with the US and West over dividing Middle East influence per Iranian designs.

Certainly, the Iranian regime doesn't care about the bloodshed in Gaza. But it cares about the confrontation between the Israeli army and the terrorist Hamas to measure this" resistance" arm's performance and whether its investment achieved set goals, ultimately trying to influence regional and international dynamics reflecting its power to gain more trust from allies like China and Russia.

Iran's vision of influencing international dynamics isn't new or fleeting. Khamenei identified three features of the changing world order: US isolation, Asia's rising power, and spreading "resistance" ideology. He believes in global power transition, with a new order emerging that Iran wants to shape serving its interests.

The spread of the narrative and the front of the so-called resistance are now at a crucial moment in Gaza, Yemen, and southern Lebanon, as Iran's proxies confront Israel and the US to counter the normalization of Israeli-Arab relations and destabilize the isolation of its radical resistance axis. Tehran sees this pivotal moment as a bottleneck determining the strategic struggle between moderation and extremism, pushing hard behind the scenes, hoping to win this proxy war and declare the start of a post-American era in the Middle East that it has long awaited.

What's going on with the Houthi threats in the Red Sea, the actions of sectarian militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as the terrorist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, falls under Iran's proxy conflicts. Tehran asserts that all of these are "resistance" factions that form the "strategic depth" of the Iranian regime. Khamenei himself affirmed this in a meeting with Qassem Soleimani's family.

This means the terrorist militia groups act as an advanced defensive wall for the Iranian regime, fighting proxy wars on its behalf, even if only some of their goals align, as with Hamas not seeking a Palestinian state but rather conditions like prisoner releases and a return to how things were before the October 7th terrorist attack. All the bloodshed of innocent men, women, and children in Gaza was a paltry price to pay in Hamas's pursuit of a prisoner swap deal.

Some analysts of Iranian ideology argue that the regime's patience in realizing its goals explains much of what is currently happening: It consolidates the pillars of Iran's expansionist project while undermining the efforts of strategic adversaries, such as efforts toward Israeli-Arab normalization. This is also part of Iran's response to key events such as the killing of Soleimani.

However, the leadership in Tehran would not jeopardize the regime with military operations that could lead to a retaliatory strike by the US and Israel. In Iranian strategic thinking, rooted in the historical Persian patience embodied in the famous Iranian handmade carpet weaving, the focus is on achieving goals quietly by indirect means - with arms and proxies, as is the case now.

In this way, the regime is slowly building up sources of power and deterring opponents. For one, while the US and Israel are preoccupied with the Gaza war and Red Sea threats, Iran's nuclear capabilities are reportedly advancing at a rapid pace.

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After the brutal attack carried out some time ago on the Crocus Town Hall in a suburb of Moscow, the world is once again reminded of the Daesh terrorist organization. The name Khorasan Daesh emerged as one of the branches of the terrorist organization that the world knows all too well.

Even though the coverage of Daesh's crimes in Syria and Iraq has diminished since the collapse of its self-proclaimed caliphate and its defeat by the international anti-terror coalition, the menace of terror has not disappeared from our world. The danger from terrorist organizations remains, and the attack in Moscow is a new warning that brings this threat back to the forefront, especially as many expect the crises the world is experiencing to spawn new generations of extremists even more vicious than Al Qaeda and Daesh.

In this context, reference is made to the ongoing conflict in Gaza and the expected consequences for terrorist recruitment and ideological attraction emanating from organizations that have shifted their main activities from Syria and Iraq to other areas of West Africa.

Khorasan Daesh operates in Afghanistan and is an offshoot that wants to establish a new caliphate state, similar to what Al Baghdadi tried to establish in Iraq and Syria. It advocates an ideology based on global jihad.

One of their most famous acts was the bombing of Kabul airport on 26 August 2021. However, the most important conclusion in dealing with these organizations is that they are multiple faces of one idea, differing in their brutality, bloodshed, goals and specific tactics, but united in their hostility towards humanity.

Terrorism is not limited to Khorasan Daesh. There are terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and Daesh that are spreading in West Africa and the Sahara desert. There is also the Al Shabaab movement in Somalia, and there are many international warnings that Sudan is becoming a haven for terrorism due to the current conflict in the country, as it is located between the Horn of Africa and the coastal region where terrorist organizations are spreading.

There is also ongoing terrorist activity in Afghanistan, where Khorasan Daesh and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan movement operate. The latter has recently engaged in mutual bombings between the Pakistani army and the Taliban movement, accused by Islamabad of harboring hostile terrorist elements, leading to the recent crisis.

American expectations point to the expansion of Daesh and Al Qaeda offshoots in Africa. The terrorist groups in Syria are looking for a new vacuum to exploit by escaping their persecution there. This vacuum could be found in the East African region. The Al Shabaab movement and the Daesh organization are visibly active there.

Most dangerous is the security chaos caused by the actions of the Sudanese army using militias fighting alongside them under the name of "Popular Resistance" or shadow battalions. These are mostly military formations under the command of the so-called Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, who are trying to regain power while hiding behind the army. This is not mere speculation, but has been mentioned in published statements by Muslim Brotherhood leaders who confirmed that they are not willing to negotiate solutions and that they will return to power "whether anyone wants it or not."

This is their stated position, so knows what is really happening to Sudan and its people behind closed doors. All this is happening right in front of the army. The army seems to be driven by a desire for personal revenge and retribution, far removed from the interests of the millions of displaced refugees. No one has learned the lessons of the recent past and is repeating the same mistakes that have led to Sudan's future being jeopardized.

One reason for the surge in terrorist activity in various parts of the world, including West Africa, is surely the declining interest in combating this scourge and the intensifying international conflicts that have divided the major powers.

The competition between the major powers has contributed significantly to the fact that the fight against terrorism has not been the focus of attention and armed groups have had the opportunity to reorganize themselves. All in all, the lack or decline of international cooperation, especially in counter-terrorism, serves the interests of terror organizations.

Worse still, the decline comes at a time when conditions conducive to the risk of radicalism, recruitment, and ideological mobilization into conflicts are increasing in various regions and countries around the world.

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The scenario of Ukraine's defeat is the catastrophic scenario that NATO members have feared since the outbreak of the war. However, it seems that this scenario is becoming more and more likely given several clear military indicators.

The most striking development, in my opinion, is the increase in talk and insinuations about the possibility of Ukraine's defeat among Western officials, experts, and pundits. French President Emmanuel Macron has warned of a Russian victory in the war in Ukraine, while some believe that averting defeat by sending alliance troops to Ukraine has become very likely, although this move is dangerous.

Others see that the West no longer has a choice but to send troops into battle or admit Ukraine's defeat and deal with it realistically. The Ukrainian army is facing the problem of manpower and equipment shortages after a series of recent defeats. Macron's comment that he would not rule out the deployment of Western forces in Ukraine, even if there was no NATO consensus, was not just a glib remark.

It mirrors an opinion that is gaining momentum in Europe and is triggering a fierce debate between supporters and opponents. However, no one questions the motives for seeking foreign troops to support Ukraine, which means that there is agreement that Kyiv is in a strategically difficult situation. Macron's words were not the only thing explaining the seriousness of the Ukrainian predicament.

Josep Borrell, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU, confirmed that the end of the conflict in Ukraine will be decided in the coming months. Therefore, the West should not postpone military assistance to Kyiv. Borrell added: "It's this spring, this summer before autumn that the war in Ukraine will be decided."

He discussed the possible consequences of a Russian victory at meetings in the US, warning that Moscow will not stop at this border and calling for haste in providing aid. Another issue is the suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine because Republicans refuse to pass the military aid package proposed by the White House.

One relevant point is that the US presidential elections are coming up in a few months Donald Trump is likely to be re-elected, which will have a bearing on Europe and NATO. The assessments of a Russian victory have not stopped there.

William Burns, the director of the US Central Intelligence Agency who returned from Ukraine, said at a hearing before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that time is running out for aid. Ukraine will lose large territories in 2024 if it does not receive substantial financial and military aid from the West, he explained.

Burns estimates that additional US funding will help the Kyiv regime to hold out in 2024 and 2025, regain the initiative in offensive operations, and negotiate from a position of great strength. Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto also announced that Ukraine would not win the confrontation with Russia and pointed out that the Russian army was gaining momentum on the front.

Douglas Macgregor, former advisor to the US Secretary of Defense, said that the resignation of US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland could indicate a US withdrawal from Ukraine. Macgregor said Nuland was] forced to resign. He added that her departure can be seen as a signal of the administration's readiness to move on from the disaster as quietly and quickly as possible in the months ahead.

He suggested that Washington could repeat the Vietnam scenario in Ukraine by giving up everything and leaving the country. He added: "So, we all understand that we will leave because we have no choice. The main thing is that we do not have the military power to resist the Russians in Ukraine. We could never do that."

In other words, a Russian military victory is no longer a matter of analysis and inference, but a hypothesis that is officially discussed in order to pursue crisis management, as this scenario was largely ruled out in the West as aid flowed heavily into Ukraine.

The West is in a critical situation forcing it to fast-track the settlement of mechanisms to support Ukraine and strengthen its defense capabilities, taking into account the expansion of the war outside Ukraine. Borrell confirmed that "analysts expect a major Russian offensive this summer, and Ukraine cannot wait until the result of the next US elections."

The real problem for the European members of NATO is not the defeat of Ukraine, the possibilities of its partition, or how to reach an agreement with Russia, but the consequences of Russia's military victory in Ukraine, how to deal with the Kremlin afterward and the impact of that victory on the fate of NATO, on US-European relations and on Europe's failure to provide for its security without the US.

Things are moving towards greater clarity, pushing for a European acceptance of the reality of the outcome of the war. Evidently, the Biden administration wants Ukraine to hold out until the election date and avert a decisive result in Russia's favor in the coming months. That is why it wants to give the Ukrainian army new momentum until next November.

Increasing prospects of a Russian military victory, however, may prompt the Biden administration to seek a way out to save face and negotiate with Russia rather than let it claim complete military victory, which could reduce President Biden's chances of a second term in the White House.

This explains the retreat or decline in American rhetoric about Russia's strategic and military defeat, and the discussion is now turning to other issues unrelated to the outcome of the war. Russia, for its part, is aware of the Western quandary.

Recently, President Vladimir Putin put the ball in the West's court by expressing Moscow's willingness to engage in serious negotiations to peacefully resolve differences, particularly in Ukraine. He added that these negotiations should not be an opportunity for the enemy to rearm. He continued: "We are, however, ready for a serious conversation, and we want to resolve all conflicts, especially this conflict, through peaceful means." Putin reaffirmed Russia's willingness to negotiate on this matter on the basis of the actual situation on the ground and not based on wishes expressed under psychological pressure.

Russia, also affected by the war, seems to be more ready for a political solution that would allow the West to give up its conditions and come to terms with and accept the reality rather than increase casualties as the fighting continues. Looking at the big picture, NATO faces a fateful test over the coming period.

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Perhaps the optics of an American president have never been quite like those of current President Joe Biden. The falls and gaffes of the White House resident continue, with his presidential performance on the decline in a damaging way to the status and global influence of the US.

The Gaza crisis is the global crisis that has most thrust the American president into the media spotlight, where he is immediately in the limelight given the world public's interest in developments in this war and the attention to the American position as the one most able to exert pressure to end the fighting.

In his recent State of the Union address, Biden touched on several foreign issues, most notably Ukraine and Gaza, where he sought to convince Congress to vote for approved aid to Ukraine, brandishing the danger to democracy and speaking of the potential chaos that could engulf Europe and beyond in the event of Ukraine's defeat.

He said, "If anybody in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you: He will not." He again raised the possibility of Ukraine stopping Russia "if we stand with Ukraine and provide the weapons that it needs to defend itself.," denying that Ukraine needs American soldiers, and linking aid to Ukraine to American leadership in the world.

He spoke against a backdrop of increasing reports about the decline of the Ukrainian army and its shift from the offensive to the defensive under pressure from the advance of Russian troops into several Ukrainian cities and the sparking of a debate in Europe about sending troops to Ukraine. This suggests that to defeat Russia, it is no longer just a question of providing weapons, but now also of sending troops from NATO countries to fight alongside Ukraine, potentially bringing with it grave strategic consequences.

Biden's rhetoric on the need to defend NATO, support Ukraine, and stop Putin's plans to control Europe is in total contradiction with the ideas of his Republican rival Donald Trump. But the biggest obstacle to the credibility of this rhetoric is that US military aid, which reached around $44 billion at the end of last year, has not achieved the desired objective and has failed to halt the advance of the Russian army, let alone defeat it militarily.

Biden also spoke about the ongoing war in Gaza, where he tried to be balanced by affirming his full and unwavering support for Israel to defend itself and take the necessary steps to do so, while stressing the importance of protecting civilians and his efforts to free hostages, particularly Americans, and focusing on providing humanitarian aid.

In this context, he spoke of ordering the US military to lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary dock in the Mediterranean Sea off the Gaza coast that can receive large shipments loaded with food, water, medicine, and temporary shelter, stressing that there are no US forces on the ground in Gaza for this new mission.

Biden also spoke of the two-state solution, which he sees as the only guarantee of security, stability, and coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. His stance on the Gaza war has changed somewhat since October.

The speech also touched on economic achievements, including growth and the reduction of the trade deficit with China, and the US President praised the strength of his country's economy and its recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic crisis.

Biden said, "I inherited an economy that was on the brink. Now, our economy is literally the envy of the world. Fifteen million new jobs in just three years. A record. A record. Unemployment at 50-year lows." He did not mention the level of US inflation.

Biden also sought to respond to criticism of his presidential candidacy at his age (82), declaring before both houses of Congress: "I know I may not look like it, but I've been around a while. When you get to be my age, certain things become clearer than ever," in a sarcastic reply to his opponents to avoid his critics accusing him of not addressing the elephant in the room.

However, his answer was not convincing enough to allay most voters' concerns about the effects of his advanced age, especially given the constant flubs that suggest a decline in his cognitive functions. Critics of the State of the Union address, led by his predecessor and potential rival Trump, described the speech as a disgrace to the country and the "Worst State of the Union Speech ever made."

Claiming that Biden could not even stand alone on the dais, Trump once again drew attention to the president's advanced age and the USA's declining standing in the world, going on to say that the USA had been humiliated under Biden. Trump also pointed to record inflation rates.

From the House rostrum, Biden tried to dispel the stereotype of the weak president by speaking in a strong, lively voice and, above all, avoiding the slightest blunder in his speech, as his critics watched for the slightest misstep on his part, knowing that it could deal a serious blow to his public image as a president who could run for a second term.

Some also challenged Biden's insistence that Ukraine could stop Russia, deeming this a new "lie." But on the whole, Biden talked a lot about Trump, referring to him as his "predecessor," turning the speech into more of a campaign speech than a State of the Union address. The main point in my opinion, however, is that Biden did not address any real achievements, especially in foreign policy.

For example, issues such as Iran were only briefly touched on in the speech, and the African continent was not broached at all. This sums up President Biden's performance of no real progress in American foreign policy, as the State of the Union speech was more of a State of the President speech, without any deliverables.

The post Between the State of the Union and the state of Biden appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

The Iranian elections are no longer attracting the usual interest, both externally and internally, for several reasons and considerations.

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One of them is that the regime has robbed the election of its meaning by the Guardian Council's exclusion of most of the candidates of the so-called reformist current so that the contest is limited to the hardline current, or rather between the hardliners and the even more hardline currents.

Regardless of the officially announced turnout figures, the scenes at the ballot boxes – according to reliable media reports and numerous testimonies – have not achieved the regime's goal, which hoped that the actual turnout would surpass that of the 2020 elections, which was the lowest in the history of Iranian parliamentary elections with only about 42% of the total vote.

Iranian elections are generally a means of gaining popular legitimacy and not, as usual, a mechanism for transferring power, as power in the Velayat-e Faqih system is limited to those who are loyal to the regime and its basic principles.

Therefore, we do not tend to adopt the prevailing division into conservatives and reformists, as all belong to the same theocratic school of government, with variations. These are allowed by the regime's leadership in order to give foreign policy some formal flexibility and maneuverability to achieve the regime's goals by switching between positions and policies.

This is to suggest that Iranian behavior and orientations are changing. In reality, however, this change is nothing more than a political tactic to achieve strategic goals. What is certain is that the reins of Iranian political positions remain in the hands of the top of the power pyramid, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in any case.

Notwithstanding this, the recent Iranian elections were not without significance, especially the exclusion of former President Hassan Rouhani from the Assembly of Experts elections, which were held in parallel with the Shura Council elections.

This exclusion raised several question marks but seems an understandable move given the powers of this council (composed of 88 members of the clergy elected by direct popular vote for a term of eight years) and its constitutional duties, notably the appointment and selection of the Supreme Leader.

It is expected that in the next term (8 years) a successor will be elected for the current leader Ali Khamenei (83 years old), who is suffering from a difficult health condition. The regime's leading elite of regime scholars is keen to exclude any vote that might contradict their consensus in choosing the leader.

There have been similar experiences in previous Assembly of Experts election cycles, including the rejection of the candidacies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Larijani. It is striking that the Guardian Council recognizes Hassan Rouhani as ineligible to run, even though he has been a member of the council for 24 years, which means that it is a political exclusion of the former president.

Iranian politics is no longer in the hands of the institutions concerned, as the Revolutionary Guards and their leaders have clearly taken the lead in recent years, while the role of elected institutions has diminished, notwithstanding the selective control mechanism of these elections.

The Shura Council has merged with the regime and fully embraced its policies given the dominance of the hardline current over the council's seats, and lacked any counter-voice, except one that uses other tactics to achieve the regime's goals.

Given the geopolitical tensions surrounding Iran, it was difficult for the Iranian regime to admit the decline in its popularity by revealing the actual turnout in the recent parliamentary elections, especially after voting was extended by two additional hours to attract more voters.

The Iranian leadership showed an unusual interest in voter turnout, as Khamenei considered voting a "national duty" and said that "Iran's enemies are closely watching the presence of the Iranian people," suggesting that poor turnout "threatens national security."

The Revolutionary Guards argued that a strong turnout in the parliamentary elections would prevent "foreign intervention" related to the Gaza war, suggesting that the regime wants to suggest to the United States and Israel that the Iranian people are rallying around the Iranian regime.

These are things that do not follow any real logic, because the West knows very well what is happening in Iran and it is not fooled by the statistics and indicators that the regime proclaims, be it about voter turnout or other things.

In fact, this is the second election cycle for the Iranian Shura Council, in which the marginalization of the so-called moderate or reformist current continues in order to consolidate the dominance of the hardliners. It can also be said that the regime is playing a major role in the decline of voter turnout by eliminating any competition.

Regardless of the results, the political composition of the new council will not change much after everyone in the Iranian political scene belongs to a single ideological and political spectrum that embraces the same ideas and orientations with slight variations in the degree of hardliner tendencies depending on their interests and vision for their political future.

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