With an Israeli flag hanging on the wall behind him, the detainee detailed trips to Iran, voyages across Africa, clandestine meetings with Hezbollah's chief military commander Fuad Shukr, and directives flowing directly from the organization's leader Hassan Nasrallah.

Throughout the year he remained in captivity, Imad Amhaz, known as "The Captain," systematically laid out the complete picture behind one of Hezbollah's most secretive and organized operations – a strategic, creative, and ambitious project dubbed "The Clandestine Maritime File." Only now can the existence of this underground initiative be disclosed for the first time, along with fresh details about the commando mission to abduct Amhaz from the heart of Lebanon – a bold and extraordinary operation that remained submerged in the depths of memory due to the torrent of wartime events.

This narrative, which could easily become a Hollywood film, might begin on the night of November 2, 2024, when a handful of Shayetet 13 commandos silently raided the Lebanese coastal town of Batroun, located 87 miles from the Israeli border, and removed Amhaz while he slept in his bed without firing a single shot. Alternatively, the story could open with a close-up of Colonel A., head of Naval Intelligence, standing on the dock at the Shayetet base in Atlit, welcoming the fighters returning home from the successful operation, merely patting their shoulders and verifying everyone's health and safety. The account might also start with a scene unfolding in the basements of Dahieh, starring Secretary-General Nasrallah, Chief of Staff Shukr, and "The Captain," where the three architects weave a hair-raising conspiracy.

However, the story begins with A., a quiet, slender 23-year-old woman who, had you passed her on the street, you would never imagine was primarily responsible for one of the war's most astonishing operations.

A. started her path as an "Arabist" (an Arab world specialist) in Unit 8200, subsequently transferring to serve as an analyst in Naval Intelligence. Today, she serves as a permanent staff member with the rank of Sergeant First Class, whose role is to track anyone who could pose a threat to Israeli Navy vessels. "We have, in Naval Intelligence, operational methods and capabilities that allow us to search for almost anyone in the fringes," she stated.

At the end of 2021, A. began monitoring a mid-level Hezbollah operative named Imad Amhaz, whose organizational nickname was "Jarich." Amhaz, 39, a Shiite native of the Bekaa Valley, joined Hezbollah in 2004. In 2007, he completed a several-month military course in Iran, and upon his return to Lebanon, joined Unit 7900 as a radar operator – Hezbollah's coastal missile unit that has deeply troubled Naval Intelligence personnel since the Second Lebanon War and the deadly strike on the INS Hanit.

The interrogator asked Amhaz: Who knew about the project?

The operative responded: "Who was aware of this was the team itself, Nur al-Din, the operator, Male,k who was the head of the bureau of Fuad Shukr (Hezbollah's Chief of Staff who was eliminated in July 2024), Fuad Shukr himself, and Abu Musa, who came after Fuad Shukr but didn't stay for long. All were killed except Nur al-Din. I don't know if he was also killed while I wasn't (in Lebanon)."

Q: Did you meet with senior officials? For example, with Fuad Shukr?

Amhaz answered: "The first time we returned from the file, he asked to meet with us... This file is related to the maritime domain ... These can be defensive or offensive operations... As long as you have a ship, money, and people, you can operate against anything. Israel is the main target."

Q: Does Hezbollah operate against other targets as well?

Amhaz confirmed: "The organization sees the US as an enemy, for example."

To all appearances, Imad Amhaz was just another Hezbollah operative among dozens who appeared on A.'s radar. Yet something about him was unusual. Despite being a devoted operative who was educated in the Hezbollah youth movement, Amhaz was not a devout Shiite. He spent much of his time at the gym, his body decorated with muscles and tattoos. One of these was a portrait of his wife, who was herself tattooed. "She had tattoos of roses," A. said. "During his interrogation, he shared that he and his wife had many fights, and at one point, they separated. After that, he had to hide the tattoo with her portrait until they eventually reunited. He is not the perfect partner – one who likes to play the field and loves to live the bachelor life, even when he is not single. He cultivates his muscles, a true hedonist. In short, he was not the conservative operative. During this period, I tracked several figures, but Amhaz was always at the back of my mind. Each time I returned to him to see what was new. I tried to understand why he was exposed, what his value was as a Hezbollah operative."

Q: It sounds as though you knew him well.

"Yes. I knew his daily routine, his weaknesses, his character – everything."

Q: And what can you say about his character?

"That he is a good soldier. When he is given an order, he says 'yes' and executes it."

To identify a big fish

I met A. in the office of the Head of the Naval Intelligence Department, Rear Adm. A., who has held the most senior position in Naval Intelligence for the past year. Several floors below us is the unit's "Pit" (underground command center), from which the operation to abduct Amhaz was managed. Joining the conversation was Lt. Col. D., who began her military career as a combat soldier in the Snapir Unit (naval port security unit), fell in love with the sea, and rose through the ranks to become head of the Targeting and Direction Branch in the Naval Intelligence Department.

The branch's production floor is filled with analysts like A., all of whom are Arabic speakers who serve as intelligence detectives. "Fishermen," as the veteran seaman Rear Adm. A. phrased it. "It is like casting a line and seeing which fish is caught on the hook. The point is to identify, amid the blur of people on the other side, who could be a 'big fish' and then focus on him. This is exactly what happened with Amhaz."

From the moment she began to take an interest in Amhaz and to focus more and more of her intelligence resources on him, A. discovered that he held mysterious meetings with senior Hezbollah officials. One of them was Ali Abed al-Hassan Nour al-Din. Nour al-Din is married to the daughter of Fuad Shukr, who, until his assassination in July 2024, served as the Hezbollah Chief of Staff and the right-hand man of Hassan Nasrallah. As such, Nour al-Din managed several of Hezbollah's secret projects, those directed personally by Shukr and Nasrallah. And now, for some reason, it turned out that he was meeting secretly with the muscular and tattooed Amhaz. "They sat at the same table and passed messages," Lt. Col. D. said. Later, during his interrogation in Israel, Amhaz would reveal that he also met Fuad Shukr himself. "This was a great excitement for him," D. said. "The connection to senior officials gave him pride and motivation."

During the interrogation, the goals of these secret meetings were also fully clarified. It turned out that several months before A. began to focus on him, Amhaz was chosen to be the central axis in an ambitious Hezbollah venture – the kind of secret projects that Nour al-Din managed for Shukr and Nasrallah. Amhaz, the organization's leadership decided, would become the captain of the "Secret Naval File."

"A very, very secret strategic project, an event that could have changed the situation against us and also against other countries," Rear Adm. A. said. "This is the big fish we caught on our hook."

"The big surprise"

The "Secret Naval File" germinated sometime in 2016. From fragments of information that reached Israeli intelligence over the years, it became clear that the goal was generally to create a Hezbollah "terror ship" – an infrastructure that would allow the organization to independently operate a large civilian merchant vessel that could roam the seas without suspicion, enter civilian ports, and carry out attacks that would change the balance of terror against Israel and its allies. "To take a civilian vessel under cover and place offensive capabilities on it as far as the imagination can go," Rear Adm. A. said. "Think about September 11 – you take a civilian platform and use it to carry out a strategic terror act. This was the goal."

The project, which, due to its importance, was directed personally by Hassan Nasrallah and Fuad Shukr and whose management passed to Nour al-Din after their elimination, was, as stated, highly compartmentalized and included only a small handful of secret partners. "Nasrallah and Shukr treated this as their big surprise," A. said. "Because of this, everything was managed in a very centralized manner, without intermediate ranks."

After several years of delays due to budget difficulties and internal organizational problems, in 2021, by order of Nasrallah, the project gained momentum. One of the first steps was to choose the captain of the future terror ship, someone who could manage the project from a maritime perspective. The Captain.

Amhaz was the one chosen for the role. Beyond his mysterious meetings with Nour al-Din, he began sailing between European and African countries and gained experience as a worker on cargo ships, all under the guise of an innocent civilian. "He simply boarded ships as a civilian and sailed with them with the aim of gaining maritime experience," D. said. "The ambition was to log enough sea time, rise through the ranks, and eventually become a civilian captain who could lead a civilian merchant ship himself. Alongside the practical hours, he also studied theory, and he progressed. This path gave him both operational experience and civilian cover so that once he became a certified captain of a civilian ship, he would not be suspected. In fact, he was operating under cover."

What kind of attacks did the leadership plan to carry out using the terror ship that Amhaz would sail? One can only imagine – the hijacking of a passenger ship, an attack on the Karish gas field, a raid by dozens of armed operatives through Israel's Haifa or Ashdod ports. "In the interrogation, we insisted with Amhaz, saying to him, 'Come on, tell us what you planned,'" D. said. "But then we realized the goal was still only to build the capability, this muscle. He said, 'Whatever the organization decides, we will know how to do.' For them, everything was on the table – from hitting strategic points to striking the soft underbelly of Israel."

As part of his training as a civilian captain, Amhaz was absent from his home in the village of Qmatiye for many long months, where he lived with his wife and children. "In the process, he received a salary from Hezbollah, and while he was absent from home, the one who took care of his family was Nour al-Din," A. said.

In 2024, he returned to Lebanon, and in September, he began studying for a captain's degree at the Maritime Sciences and Technology Institute, a civilian institution located north of Beirut in the town of Batroun, a Christian-majority area where Hezbollah has only a minimal presence. Amhaz also rented a vacation cabin in Batroun, even though his home was about an hour's drive away. "He could finish the school day and drive home, yet he chose to rent an apartment in Batroun and sleep there," Lt. Col. D. said. "This is part of his hedonism, perhaps also part of his desire to concentrate on his studies." And Amhaz concentrated very much on his studies. "A diligent student," D. said. "Even in the interrogation, you see that he is an educated person, not a peasant who just came to fight."

In December 2024, after three years of preparation and several more weeks of study in Batroun, Amhaz was supposed to receive his coveted captain's diploma. He never received it. "The moment Amhaz moved to live in the coastal town of Batroun, I realized there was an opportunity here," A. said. "I understood that he could be plucked."

Setting out

Part of the role of analysts like A. in the Targeting and Direction Branch is not only to research the enemy on the other side of the border but also to direct operations toward them. When A. realized that she had indeed caught a big fish on her hook, she began to pull. "A. is the one who brought the initiative, the tug on the sleeve to set out on an abduction operation," her commander, Lt. Col. D., said. "She came and said, 'Someone is interesting here, let's bring him.' And from the moment this idea was thrown into the air, we, as commanders, said, 'There is a cool idea here, let's examine it.'"

The idea, which A. first raised during September 2024, progressed through the chain of approvals at a dizzying speed. "Everyone understood that there was someone privy to the secret, who was part of a strategic capability that Hezbollah is building," D. said. "Beyond that, the timing was good. We were already in Operation Northern Arrows (the military offensive against Hezbollah) and amidst an escalation in the campaign against Lebanon, and it was possible to dare more and challenge the boundaries and carry out operations of this type."

Naturally, the unit chosen to carry out the abduction was Shayetet 13, the elite commando unit of the Navy, which was practically born for operations of this kind. In the Shayetet, they took the mission with both hands, drew on all the intelligence A. had to provide about Amhaz and his daily routine, and within a few short weeks, they prepared a detailed raid plan. "The Shayetet enlisted immediately; they were very enthusiastic," D. said.

Although this was a dangerous move intended to take place deep in enemy territory, within a short time, the operation to abduct "The Captain" had received all required approvals, including that of the prime minister. "It was necessary to convince the appointed levels that the risk level for the force justified this operation," Rear Adm. A. said, who was present at some of these dramatic meetings. "These are places where you feel the weight of responsibility."

When A. received the news that "her" operation was moving forward, she found it hard to believe. "I was in shock, they were so on board," she smiled with embarrassment.

The operation was carried out on the night between November 1 and 2. Around 1:00 a.m., a small force of Shayetet soldiers positioned themselves at the entrance to Amhaz's vacation cabin in Batroun. The operation was accompanied by Naval Intelligence personnel from within the Navy's Pit in the Kirya (IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv). "It is as if you are part of the force," A. recalled. "We are not physically with them, but we understand exactly what is happening on the ground. Many times, the executing force looks to intelligence for guidance, asking whether the target is at the objective and whether everything is working according to the plan. When you answer 'yes, he is there,' it is a moment with a lot of responsibility, but also a moment of a dream coming true."

According to reports in the Lebanese media, the abduction operation was carried out by a force of about 25 combat soldiers and lasted only four minutes. In a short video recorded by a security camera in the area of the operation, Shayetet personnel can be seen in their combat gear leading Amhaz down one of the streets, his head covered by a shirt.

In an urgent military inquiry conducted in Lebanon in the days following the abduction, it was claimed that the Lebanese Navy did not identify the Israeli infiltration into Batroun and that German naval forces, who are supposed to secure the maritime arena in the area under the UNIFIL mandate, did not report any suspicious movement during the night. "The army cannot identify small boats that slip under the radar," the Lebanese Chief of Staff Joseph Aoun, today the President of the State, was quoted as saying in a local newspaper.

By the time the inquiry was published, Amhaz was already deep in Israeli territory, having vomited several times on the way from Batroun and shown signs of anxiety. "I held my breath until the moment the commandos returned to the country's territory," A. said. "It was a sense of relief. I have been on this thing for two years, and here – we finally reached that moment."

Lt. Col. D. said, "If it were possible to open champagne in the army, we would have done it."

Rear Adm. A. said, "For me, in this event, there were two moments of satisfaction. The first was when they realized the force had arrived in Israel along with Amhaz, and we knew our soldiers had returned safely. I waited for them on the beach at the Shayetet base in Atlit, and it was a great pride. Shayetet 13 is a wonderful, mission-driven unit. It is a cliché, but there is no mission they cannot meet. The second moment of satisfaction came after several days of interrogations, when we realized we had not caught a small fry. The moment he spoke about the 'Secret Naval File,' about what he knows how to do – and it took several days – we realized we had done something valuable that truly contributed to the security of the State of Israel."

Not exactly an "innocent civilian"

The interrogation of Amhaz indeed revealed new details to Naval Intelligence that they had not known about the "Secret Maritime File" and the extent of Hezbollah's seriousness in implementing the project. "At first, he completely denied any connection to Hezbollah," A. related. "But slowly, as time passed, he began to open up. He gave us a lot of information about the file and also revealed to us the meetings with Shukr."

Rear Adm. A. said, "Before that, we knew a general story, and he not only confirmed it for us but fleshed out the details for us. This gave us the understanding that there was a real, actual project here, with intentions."

The publication of details from Amhaz's interrogation, for the first time, may certainly change the narrative built in Lebanon around his abduction. His family took the trouble to demonstrate and be interviewed wherever possible to claim that Amhaz is merely a civilian seaman who was abducted through no fault of his own. "My son is a civilian maritime captain who took a course at the Institute of Marine Sciences in Batroun," his father, Fadel, said in a newspaper interview. "My son is at sea most of the time and has no connection to parties. He is not connected to politics."

The Prime Minister of Lebanon at the time, Najib Mikati, also announced the day after the operation that Lebanon would file an official complaint with the UN Security Council regarding the abduction of Amhaz, and the Lebanese Transport Minister said that Amhaz was a "captain of civilian ships."

"We are now sending a clear message," Lt. Col. D. said in response. "The Navy is not bored and does not abduct innocent civilians. This is an exceptional operative in Hezbollah who was entrusted with a secret project that was supposed to surprise Israel completely. He is as far from innocent as possible."

The Lebanese attempt to attach a civilian image to Amhaz fit well with another move that took place about a year after his abduction – the release of the Israeli Elizabeth Tsurkov from captivity in September 2025, who was kidnapped in Iraq and held there by a pro-Iranian terror organization. The official Iranian news agency Tasnim claimed then that Tsurkov was released in exchange for two Lebanese figures held by Israel, including Amhaz.

In the Naval Intelligence Department, they are not aware of any such thing, and in any case, Amhaz is still in Israeli hands while Tsurkov is at her home. In our conversations, we were unable to confirm that the release of Amhaz was part of the move to release Tsurkov.

Despite Amhaz being in our hands, the analyst A. and her commanders are not at rest. "For us, the operation is not over," D. said. "We are still following the 'Secret Naval File,' and Nour al-Din, who stands at the head of the file, is still with us. To our understanding, he is still promoting this project, and perhaps other secret files as well, and it is important to us that he knows the account with him is open."

Q: By the way, did you meet Amhaz after he was brought to Israel?

D. said, "A. and I were in the same corridor with him, but we only looked at him. Interrogation is less our field. The unit responsible for his interrogation is 504, and there is a clear division between us. Even if Amhaz noticed us, he has no idea who we are and what our connection to him is."

A. said, "We saw him from a distance, but we did not speak with him."

Q: And how did it feel to see "The Captain" like that, face to face, after two years in which you tracked him from afar?

"Shocking," A. said. "Absolutely shocking."

The post How Hezbollah's 'September 11' was thwarted appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Throughout the year he was held captive, Imad Amhaz, "The Captain," methodically laid out the complete picture behind one of Hezbollah's most secret and well-funded initiatives – a strategic, creative, and ambitious project that received the name "The Secret Maritime File." Only now can the existence of this underground project be revealed for the first time, along with new details about the commando operation to kidnap Amhaz from the heart of Lebanon – a daring and extraordinary operation that, due to the torrent of war events, remained buried in the depths of memory. Until now.

Nothing about the apparent IDF naval commando raid on Batroun to capture a single mid-level Hezbollah commander Imad Amhaz adds up.

The IDF doesn't seem to lack info from inside Hezbollah, and they have not been shy about eliminating targets with F-16s as they find them. Could… pic.twitter.com/MVVNbozbG4

— Saul Sadka (@Saul_Sadka) November 2, 2024

The codename: Jarih

A. is a 23-year-old woman, slim and quiet. If you passed her on the street, you wouldn't imagine she was the primary person responsible for one of the war's most impressive operations. She began her career as an "Arabist" in Unit 8200 and later transferred to Naval Intelligence as an analyst. Today, she's a permanent service member with the rank of staff sergeant, whose job is to track anyone who could pose a threat to Israeli Navy vessels.

The Israeli Navy's Shayetet 13 commando unit carried out a raid in northern Lebanon last night, capturing a Hezbollah official, the military confirms.

The Hezbollah operative, Imad Amhaz, is considered by the IDF to be a "significant source of knowledge" in the terror group's… pic.twitter.com/21GZJGcgkh

— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) November 2, 2024

 "At Naval Intelligence, we have operational methods and capabilities that allow us to search for almost anyone's traces," she says.

At the end of 2021, A. began tracking a mid-level Hezbollah operative named Imad Amhaz, whose codename in the organization was Jarih. Amhaz, 39, a Shiite native of the Bekaa Valley, joined Hezbollah as an operative in 2004. In 2007, he completed a several-month military course in Iran, and upon returning to Lebanon, joined Unit 7900 – Hezbollah's shore-to-sea missile unit – as a radar operator. Since the Second Lebanon War and the fatal strike on the INS Hanit, this unit has greatly troubled Naval Intelligence personnel. He managed to assist the Assad regime forces in the Syrian civil war, and his brother was also a Hezbollah operative as a fighter in the Radwan Force.

In retrospect, it would become clear that a few months before A. began focusing on him, Amhaz was chosen as the central axis of Hezbollah's ambitious and secret project. Amhaz, it was decided at the organization's leadership level, would become the captain of "The Secret Maritime File" – "a strategic project, very secret, an event that could have changed the situation against us and also against other countries," says Colonel A., head of the Intelligence Division in the Navy.

"We can grab him"

After two years of surveillance, Naval Intelligence understood there was an opportunity to kidnap Amhaz and bring him for interrogation in Israel. "I realized we could grab him," says A., who initiated the idea. Her proposal advanced up the approval ladder with dizzying speed and received the prime minister's approval as well.

Naturally, the unit chosen to execute the kidnapping was Shayetet 13, the Navy's elite commando unit, which seemed born precisely for operations of this type. The Shayetet took the mission with both hands, extracted from A. all the intelligence she had to provide about Amhaz and his daily routine, and within just a few weeks prepared a detailed raid plan.

The plan was executed in early November 2023 and carried out with stunning success. Amhaz was kidnapped from the apartment where he was staying, approximately 140 kilometers north of the Israeli border, without a single shot being fired.

The full article will be published this weekend on the website and in the "Israel This Week" section.

The post Without firing a shot: How Israel captured 'The Captain' of Hezbollah appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

This impressive architecture, planted in the symbolic and geographic heart of Europe, is certainly inspiring. But it would take no more than a single Russian explosive drone for all the handsome glass panes of Germany's parliamentary complex to shatter at once. "The problem is that we are sitting in a building that is not properly protected against a drone attack," says Roderich Kiesewetter, a member of parliament from the Christian Democratic Union, speaking on the sixth floor of Paul Löbe House. "The idea behind the design of this building, which was constructed in the 1990s, was to embody the value of transparency in Germany's political system. But this transparency also translates into extreme vulnerability and a lack of fear of danger. By the way, only some of the rooms here are protected against outside eavesdropping. In fact, if someone wanted to, they could be listening to us right now."

If some spy did indeed listen in to our conversation, nothing he heard would have surprised him. Kiesewetter, a former German Army colonel who entered politics in 2009, is considered the most "security-minded" politician in Germany. Ever since Russia's seizure of Crimea in 2014, he has used every possible platform to warn about the Russian threat and to urge the German leadership to adopt a more hawkish approach to the possibility of an armed clash with Moscow.

Kiesewetter's alarmism has not won him many fans, and even inside his own governing party he is seen as an outsider, some would say a thorn in its side. Unlike in Israeli politics, where a security background almost automatically translates into votes at the ballot box, in Germany, a country still grappling with its past and whose current DNA is deeply hostile to war in all its forms, the security-focused discourse Kiesewetter promotes has led to his removal from prominent party roles. It has even made him the target of a violent assault by a citizen who knocked him down while calling him a "warmonger," perhaps the harshest epithet one can direct at a German politician.

"The pillars of German society are politics, the economy and science," Kiesewetter explains. "We have a political culture of distrust toward security professionals, combined with deep ignorance in this field. It is no coincidence that since German reunification, politicians with a military background have disappeared from the stage. When I came into politics, not everyone was happy about it."

Kiesewetter is not particularly liked in the Kremlin either. He says that he appears on a Russian secret list of figures considered a threat to its security. "We have to tell the public the truth," he says. "If we do not take steps against Russian aggression in Europe, Russia will keep pushing our boundaries. We are acting like blind people."

Prisoners of conception

Kiesewetter's story, and the fragility of Germany's parliamentary complex, illustrate the state of Europe as a whole. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the continent has found itself caught between a hammer and an anvil. On the one hand, European states are doing their utmost to preserve stability, refraining from fully throwing their weight behind Ukraine and doing everything they can to avoid a direct confrontation with Russia. On the other hand, these same countries are looking anxiously eastward and seeing Russia arming itself to the teeth, and its president, Vladimir Putin, growing bolder and issuing ever more far-reaching statements. All this is happening while Europe still depends economically on Russian energy, and while the US is seeking to reduce the vast budgets it has been channeling to NATO, the military alliance meant to protect Europe against a third world war. "It is as if we are fighting Putin with one hand tied behind our back," complains Kiesewetter.

European anxiety about war diminishes the further west and south one moves across the continent. Poland and the Baltic states, which border or are close to Russia, are already making preparations on the ground for the possibility of an all-out war. In France, Britain and Spain, by contrast, preparations for such a clash are proceeding at a snail's pace, if at all. In this sense Germany, the economic giant located in the middle of Europe yet still at a safe distance from the Russian border, and the country meant to serve as NATO's main logistical base in any campaign to block Russia, acts as litmus paper for the European policy as a whole. "Germany is in the middle, and it is the one that needs to take responsibility and set the course," says Kiesewetter.

The German government has already begun taking a series of steps, some of them drastic by its standards, to prepare for a potential confrontation with Russia. Yet Kiesewetter remains uneasy. He says the German leadership is still trapped in what Israelis might call "an October 6 mindset": ignoring clear warning signs, turning its back on violations of sovereignty and assuming that if and when war breaks out, there will be advance notice. "It may be that Germany first needs to experience an intelligence failure like October 7 or September 11 in order to wake up and change its approach," Kiesewetter says. "I just hope that when such a failure occurs, if it does, it will not lead to a catastrophe on a massive scale."

Indeed, during a visit to Berlin last week it was impossible to ignore the quiet. Even the city's most central streets felt hushed. It is not a tense silence born of alertness, of ears pricked for sirens or explosions, but the calm of German politeness, which seems to rub off on the tourists as well. Even the official German figures we spoke to, who are well briefed on the intelligence picture, struggled to imagine that this quiet might suddenly be shattered. "Do you really believe that a Russian drone will suddenly land in the middle of Berlin?" one of them asked me in astonishment, scrutinizing my face. "This mindset of constantly fearing your neighbors is an Israeli mindset. In Europe things are different."

And yet, Germany in the autumn of 2025 is a country in the throes of a Zeitenwende, the "turning of the times," the term coined by former chancellor Olaf Scholz in a landmark speech he delivered in parliament days after Russia invaded Ukraine. This week the current German defense minister, Boris Pistorius, declared that "this is Europe's last peaceful summer." As one Israeli official who knows the intricacies of German politics puts it, "Germany is in the middle of a U-turn by an aircraft carrier. This is a state that is cutting itself off from economic dependence on Russia, arming itself and working on a law to reinstate compulsory military service, which is a radical change for it. And yet Kiesewetter is right. If war with Russia breaks out tomorrow, Germany currently has nothing to put on the table."

Grasping at air

In many ways, the war between Russia and Europe has already begun, and it is not confined to the borders of Ukraine. The buzzword on this front, almost a mantra in the mouths of politicians, officials and experts in Germany, Israel and other European countries, is "hybrid warfare."

The term refers to a long, ongoing string of sabotage incidents, influence operations, cyberattacks and other violent acts that Russia is carrying out against European states. It covers, for example, the mysterious severing of undersea communications cables in the Baltic Sea; an unusual explosion at the cargo terminal of Leipzig Airport in Germany; and media investigations that uncovered evidence of Russian use of agents recruited via social media to sow chaos and public panic in European countries.

A recent report by the British think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) found that since 2022, 66 "hybrid warfare" operations attributed to Russia have been carried out across Europe, including assassinations, attacks on infrastructure and even acts of terrorism. Thirty three of those operations took place in 2024 alone. In most cases, European governments preferred to absorb the blows, to make use of the carefully constructed Russian "deniability space," and to settle for tepid condemnations.

In recent months, however, the hybrid war with Russia has shifted up a gear. Russian fighter jets violated Estonian airspace, even swooping toward a German warship sailing in the Baltic Sea. In September, some 20 Russian drones crossed into Polish territory, also a NATO member state. "This is an attempt by the Kremlin to test NATO's responses via gradual escalations," Poland's foreign minister said afterward. Friedrich Merz, Germany's current chancellor, also broke with his habitual caution when he stated that "we are not at war, but we are not in a state of peace either." Since then, Russian drones have entered the territory of another NATO member, Romania, without prompting any military response.

In the weeks that followed, several incidents were recorded in which unmanned aerial vehicles were seen hovering above towns and cities in Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium and Lithuania, among others, sometimes near airports and sensitive military facilities. German officials said these were "military drones for intelligence-gathering purposes," but did not explicitly link them to Moscow. In early October, airspace over Munich was closed, forcing dozens of flights to be canceled, after mysterious drones were spotted above the city during the Oktoberfest celebrations. In the aftermath, European interior ministers discussed creating a "drone wall" that would block aerial incursions from the direction of Russia, as well as legislative changes that would make it easier for armed forces to shoot down unmanned aircraft.

Ukraine first

These hesitant countermeasures stand in sharp contrast to Russia's rapid advances when it comes to drones. Over the past two years, Russia has raised its defense budget to levels unseen since the Cold War, and a large share of that money has gone to producing unmanned aircraft, the main weapon it is using in Ukraine. According to some estimates, by early 2026 Russia will be able to produce roughly 10,000 explosive drones a month, which would make it a global power in this sphere. Israelis will bring to mind the "Iranian night of missiles," when some 300 missiles and drones were launched at Israel. Now multiply that several times over.

Behind Russia's drone industry lies a story whose irony almost defies gravity, in every sense. In 2011, Iran used electronic warfare to take control of a CIA drone operating over Afghanistan and bring it down on its territory. Based on this "captured" American UAV, Iranian engineers developed the Shahed series of attack drones, whose most widely used model is the Shahed 136. As fate would have it, the engines installed in the early generation of these Iranian drones were made in Germany. "We know this, because engines manufactured by a German company were found in some of the drones that fell in Israel," says an Israeli official.

After the war in Ukraine broke out, cooperation between Russia and Iran tightened. Russia purchased thousands of Shahed drones from the Islamic Republic, and used them in Ukraine. The war turned out to be a highly useful testing ground from Russia's point of view. A study by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in the US described how, in the battle of minds that developed in the skies over Ukraine, the Russians began devising methods that refined their drone warfare capabilities, perhaps as preparation for future wars against additional countries.

In recent months, Russia has begun producing Shahed drones itself, according to one account with extensive help from China, while simultaneously improving their strike capabilities and flight ranges. The main drone production facility is in Yelabuga, about 1,000 kilometers east of Moscow, which the Ukrainians have tried and failed to hit several times.

"The Russians started out by producing the same model as the Iranian drone and gradually improved it," says Eitan Achlow, an expert in anti-drone defense. "This is an aircraft that flies low, at a speed of 80 to 100 knots, and carries warheads containing 10 to 50 kilograms (22 to 110 pounds) of explosives. Because many of its parts are made of fiberglass, it is hard to detect. The Russians have recently been changing the engine in order to mask the hot exhaust, which will make it harder to spot the drones with thermal sensors. They are also altering its antenna array to complicate the communications and navigation jamming the Ukrainians use, and increasing its flight speed. Today the Russians are manufacturing these drones at a murderous pace."

As part of Russia's method of warfare in Ukraine, it launches swarms of hundreds of explosive drones at once, with dummy drones mixed into the swarm. These carry no explosives and have cardboard bodies. The aim is to confuse the enemy's air defenses, and to do so at relatively low cost. "The attack drones cost around 30,000 to 40,000 dollars each, and the dummy drones cost a few thousand," Achlow estimates, "while the interceptor missiles cost millions. This is essentially an economic battle. Once the Russians accumulate a sufficiently large number of drones, they will be able to go to war against NATO, because there is no force in the world that can intercept such quantities. Imagine that Russia decides to invade one of the Baltic states and then suddenly, just as a warning shot, it launches 5,000 drones and a handful of them hit government buildings or financial institutions in a European capital. That would make it crystal clear to Europe that it has no real way of dealing with this."

Firing in all directions

The developments on the eastern front have not entirely escaped the attention of European states, especially Germany. In fact, the government of Chancellor Merz, who took office in May 2025, has begun implementing what looks like a far-reaching reform to strengthen Germany's military.

Already during coalition talks, the parties agreed that the additional spending on the German defense budget would not be counted as part of the national deficit. That decision enabled the government to allocate a staggering 377 billion euros for military procurement, with the goal of turning Germany's armed forces into "the strongest conventional army in Europe," in Merz's words. German officials confirm that the government recognizes that "Russia is planning something, and our armed forces are not ready," as one of them puts it.

Israel has naturally been drawn into this swirl of spending. Beyond the huge deal to purchase the Arrow 3 missile defense system from Israel Aerospace Industries, Germany has bought Spike anti-tank missiles from Israel and, according to media reports, drones as well. Beneath the surface, however, a long list of negotiations is underway between the German government and Israeli defense companies and security startups to acquire additional systems on a very large scale. "This is a window of opportunity for Israel to provide technology to Germany," says an Israeli source familiar with the issue, "because in a few years, Germany's own defense industry will catch up with Israel, and right now Berlin wants off-the-shelf solutions."

According to air defense expert Achlow, who is a member of one such defense startup, Israel must make things easier for startups working in this field, both by providing financial incentives and by easing restrictions imposed by the Defense Ministry's Defense Export Controls Agency. "Unlike the civilian high-tech sector, Israeli defense exports are shackled by regulation," he explains. "If nobody wakes up, Israeli companies will move abroad or quit the field altogether. We could miss a golden opportunity for the economy."

Israeli and German officials involved in these negotiations refuse to divulge details. "But Israel has advanced weapons systems, and you can imagine that Germany wants many of them," says one. An Israeli source who recently met with senior figures in the German defense establishment came away with the impression that, in terms of procurement, they are "firing in all directions." "In Germany they are watching Russia's rearmament with concern and are already examining the buildup of Russian forces near the borders with the Baltic states," he says. "The problem is that Germany still faces huge gaps, mainly in training and manpower."

Which brings us to one of Europe's biggest security challenges: soldiers, or more precisely, the lack of them. The German parliament is currently debating legislative amendments that would allow the state to reinstate compulsory military service, out of the recognition that buying equipment alone is not enough, and that soldiers are needed to operate it. Beyond the political hurdles facing such legislation, there are social factors that make it difficult for the German Army to increase its ranks. As one interviewee put it, "The Ukrainians enlisted en masse, but they did so because they had no choice after the Russian invasion. Do you really think young Europeans will give up their comfortable lives and rush off to die fighting Russians?"

A generation passes

This concern is well founded. A poll published in August 2025 found that 59 percent of Germans would not be willing to take up arms and fight, and in Italy the figure is even lower: only 16 percent of citizens would be ready to fight for their country.

On this point, Prof. Susanne Fischer, a lecturer in the intelligence studies department at the Federal University of Applied Administration in Berlin, says: "There is now a public debate about the need to bring back compulsory service, which would require young people to enlist in the army after high school. This debate has intensified as the possibility of war with Russia has become more concrete."

Fischer teaches and lives in Berlin, but we met at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where she was attending an annual intelligence studies conference. Talking to her, one gets the impression that even if the German government has begun taking steps toward a possible clash with Russia, the German public is still largely lagging far behind. "As a Berlin resident and as a mother, of course I am worried about the possibility of war with Russia," she says. "My 11-year-old son also asks me, 'Mom, what will happen if Russian missiles explode in Berlin?' But these feelings are not widespread among most of the public.

"I am an academic who works on security issues, so I think about this more. Politicians and experts have also started talking more about the possibility of war with Russia. There have been public debates recently focused on this and on Germany's security challenges. But 'ordinary' citizens, whoever they may be, are still unaware of the security challenges facing Germany. I think it is important that more and more people in Germany and across Europe begin to talk about the dangers coming from Russia, in order to raise public awareness."

Even in Germany, where the public debate on security is at least beginning to stir, it remains dormant further west, in Britain. "Recent polls show that only a small proportion of young people in Western European countries would be willing to take part in a war," says Dr. Huw Dylan, deputy head of the intelligence studies department at King's College London, who also attended the intelligence conference. "But since the sword of war is not actually hanging over our heads, those figures are not necessarily significant. There is no doubt that in a country like Britain, which enjoys the privilege of being far from the border with Russia, the tension is not felt, in contrast to places like Estonia or Poland. In any event, it is clear that a hybrid war is already underway in Europe, and there are people who fear that this war will escalate. But I do not fear a full-scale war in the foreseeable future."

Zero hour 

In my conversations with European officials, I tried to understand whether they had learned anything from Israel's experience on October 7, when the Hamas terrorist organization surprised Israel with its murderous assault. Yet even the "security hawk" Kiesewetter cannot imagine an absolute surprise on that scale. "The war will not begin with Russian tanks charging into Berlin, nor with airstrikes on Germany," he says emphatically. "If anything, the war will start with a move by Putin against the Baltic states."

Prof. Fischer, an intelligence expert, also does not sound like someone about to shatter the prevailing conception. Like the other German interviewees, she identifies 2029 as the year in which war with Russia is most likely to break out, if it does. Israeli officials who recently met senior NATO figures say those officials also pointed to 2029 as the target year for the alliance's war readiness.

"Europe can certainly learn from the Israeli experience," Fischer says in this regard. "Intelligence experts in Europe are already saying that if there is an assessment that war will break out in 2029, that does not mean it cannot erupt tomorrow. The pretext that will supposedly justify a Russian attack could appear at any moment, before we are prepared.

"At the same time, the liberal democratic states of Europe benefit from peace and stability, and no European leader has any interest in attacking Russia. What I can imagine is a scenario in which Putin tests Europe's willingness to set limits for him, for example in places such as the Baltic states."

Many of the European experts we spoke with argued that Putin has led Russia into economic dependence on its war industry. "I fear that if he ends the war in Ukraine, he will have no choice but to 'look for' another war in order to preserve his status and Russia's war economy," Fischer says. "I hope that if that happens, NATO will pass the test and force Putin to back down."

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If it turns out it was simply a deception exercise intended to gather senior Hamas leaders in Doha for a meeting (in this case, a last meeting), this would not be the first time: a similar deception exercise, involving the American president and Israeli media, was conducted before the surprise attack on Iran. There too, it succeeded.

The decision to target Qatar represents a milestone in Israel–US relations, or perhaps Netanyahu–Trump relations, but it also reflects another essential element in the prime minister's war management: over his many years leading the country, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acted moderately and cautiously regarding military force, avoiding breaking enemy balances. Since October 7 that approach has changed. It appears that now no operational plan reaches Netanyahu without his at least serious consideration.

What began as a deep and genuine trust crisis between Netanyahu and the security establishment reversed completely during the long months of war, at least in special operations (the effort to defeat Hamas in Gaza is a different matter).

The strike on Qatari soil likewise expresses Israeli and American frustration with the Gulf state, which mediates in negotiations on one hand but hosts Hamas' foreign leadership with royal honor on the other.

This frustration is also directed at Hamas's foreign leadership, which imposed difficulties on negotiation progress and steadfastly refuses to compromise. Israel has taken responsibility: it struck Hamas leadership in Qatar.

Israel previously eliminated people it negotiated with (Yahyah Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh), and the sky did not fall. Hamas leaders in Gaza are now more isolated and pressured than ever before, and no one knows for sure how they will respond. Will they execute hostages? Surrender? Or attempt to squeeze Israel to the utmost, this time relying exclusively on Egypt to mediate?

It must be assumed that the Shin Bet – responsible for the intelligence in the operation and whose command center in central Israel ran the operation – seriously considered these questions.

The dynamics in this war are unlike anything else in history, and trying to predict would be pointless. History will judge whether the Qatar operation advances Israel's war goals.

One thing is certain looking back over the past 23 months: When Israel dares, surprises, and strikes with strength – it usually paid off.

The post Past experience proves boldness pays off appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

On October 13, 2023, just one week after Hamas' surprise attack, the IDF scattered leaflets in the northern Gaza Strip. "Residents of Gaza – move south for your personal safety and the safety of your families. Distance yourselves from Hamas terrorists who use you as human shields," they read. Hamas tried to prevent the population from evacuating the areas the IDF declared, including parts of Gaza City, but to no avail. Hundreds of thousands of panicked residents quickly packed their belongings and fled to an area that has since become synonymous with a humanitarian space – al-Mawasi.

Images of Palestinian convoys, marching with their belongings along the coast and on Salah al-Din axis, were published worldwide and earned headlines of "second Nakba" in Palestinian media, but the IDF was satisfied. It appeared that the population evacuation operation, the first step toward beginning a wide-scale ground maneuver, worked successfully.

But Southern Command rushed too much. "We closed their exit route too early," says a source who was involved then in managing the fighting. "The forces maneuvered in a way that blocked the ability of a quarter million people to move south, and they remained trapped." Consequently, tens of thousands of Gazans who were trapped in the northern Strip in the first months of the war moved within it "from side to side," in the words of that source, each time the IDF advanced to a new town or neighborhood. "That was our mistake," he admits.

Since then, lessons have been learned and the IDF, and Southern Command in particular, became more efficient in everything related to the practice of "civilian population displacement for protection purposes," as it is officially defined. In the coming months, extensive and densely populated areas like Rafah and Khan Younis were almost completely emptied of residents by deliberate design, allowing IDF divisions to maneuver in them more easily, while reducing risk to both fighting forces and non-combatants. Conversely, this practice created moral and legal challenges.

Now, ahead of the expected takeover (or conquest, depending on whom you ask) of Gaza City, Southern Command faces its next challenge. In the coming days we are expected to see the beginning of one of the largest population displacement operations so far in the war, as a preliminary step to the ground entry into Gaza. Nearly one million people will be required to evacuate the city and move south beyond the Netzarim corridor, which will constitute the border line above which the fighting will take place.

The entity responsible for this complex evacuation operation is the "Population Relocation Unit" at Southern Command, whose very existence is revealed here for the first time. "This unit has become the national knowledge body for everything related to population displacement," says a senior reserve officer.

Whispering in the ear

The practice of population relocation began in the First Lebanon War (Operation Peace for the Galilee in 1982), and was upgraded during the two operations conducted in southern Lebanon in the 1990s, "Accountability" and "Grapes of Wrath." In an article published during Operation Grapes of Wrath, an Israeli officer told that within just two days, about 200,000 residents evacuated from Shiite villages in southern Lebanon, after the IDF contacted them through local radio stations and leaflets dropped from planes. Afterward, the army moved to more aggressive messages.

"We fired smoke shells whose job was to mark, to remind them, to 'whisper' to them in their ear," the officer explained. In the first stage, the shells landed about 100 meters (328 feet) from the outermost house in each village. In the next stage, the distance was reduced to just 20 meters (66 feet).

In 2003, the Americans also used the practice of population displacement in the invasion of Iraq, including when they evacuated about 200,000 people from the city of Fallujah. According to UN data, most residents returned to their homes after the fighting ended, but tens of thousands remained refugees, because they lacked the economic ability to rehabilitate their destroyed homes.

But with all due respect to the West Bank, Lebanon and Iraq, Gaza is a completely different opera. "There's no comparison," says a military source. "In Lebanon and the West Bank, people can leave the combat zone and find a temporary solution, for example in a relative's house. In Gaza, entire families move with tents."

The explosion is the message

The entity responsible for displacement operations in Gaza is, as mentioned, the "Population Relocation Unit," which operates at Southern Command headquarters and is commanded by a career officer (a similar unit also exists at Northern Command). In the past, this body operated under the "Influence Complex," but after the field's development in recent years, it became an independent body. "As time passed, the subject of population displacement received more attention and became institutionalized," explains a former IDF source.

The origins date to 2013, when Brigadier General Udi Ben-Mocha was appointed chief of staff at Southern Command. Ben-Mocha began to refine the doctrine of population displacement, as part of operational plans for future ground maneuvering in the Strip. "He took this practice and turned it into an art of war," says Brigadier General (Res.) Erez Weiner, who during the current war served as commander of the operational planning team at Southern Command.

The methods developed in the unit were first tested partially in Operation "Protective Edge" in 2014, and became an inherent part of the fighting method in Operation "Guardian of the Walls" in 2021. Under them, the Gaza Strip was divided into blocks, whose sector boundaries were based on Gazan logic, not one imposed from outside. "This isn't the division of a British officer," as Weiner phrases it. "The block's outlines match the neighborhood, the clan, the alleys."

Those who formulated the content of the leaflets were personnel from Unit 504 of Military Intelligence Directorate, which specializes in interrogating prisoners and operating agents. Unit personnel were also responsible for another effort to communicate with the population, which included thousands of text messages and personal phone calls, whose content was tailored to each and every recipient.

By January 2024, the IDF announced that during the war, over 7 million leaflets were dropped, over 13 million text messages were sent, and over 15 million phone calls were made (most with recorded messages). Unit 504 fighters even called on residents to evacuate moments before the entry of maneuvering forces, through loudspeakers placed on IDF vehicles that moved around and within the neighborhoods. Even in this case, the messages were tailored to each neighborhood, based on the clan residing in it.

In the next stage, artillery bombardments that preceded the ground entry and were mainly intended to deter the civilian population, conveyed the clearest message to evacuate. "The IDF activated firepower in Gaza that has not been seen before, certainly not against a civilian population," says a history officer. "This is probably the best means of persuasion, more than any leaflet."

"In the end, people don't rush to give up their homes, so the main means of persuasion is through fear," explains a former IDF senior who specialized in psychological warfare, a branch from which population displacement methods of operation are derived. "When bombs are falling in such mass, even the wealthiest person leaves home. Additionally, you can turn off the radio, television and finally the lights. All these tools are in the arsenal."

Finding a single face among a million people

The Population Relocation Unit is responsible for mapping the population and collecting intelligence about it in advance, and for coordinating the operations intended to displace it. It connects for this purpose a large number of elements, including intelligence, Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, artillery, air force, ground forces and more. A central part is held by military prosecution personnel, who ensure that actions taken in the field comply with international law (we'll get to that).

The unit also operates tools to monitor population movement, from the moment it began. "In the current war, the unit was already prepared at the micro-management level of the operation," says Weiner. "What is the notification process, who notifies, when and how, and how do you track and see that there really is a response on the other side, and that the population is moving. Because ultimately, you need to give an indication of what percentage of residents left, so that certain areas can be opened to fire."

What is that percentage? Zero? "I don't think it's right to get into this, because then you give the enemy tools. But the method is that you activate surveillance, monitoring and control systems over population movement, you build a situation picture, and at any given time the Population Relocation Unit knows how to say what percentage of population remains in each area."

Another component in population displacement operations are checkpoints, positioned along evacuation routes. The IDF places technological means of facial recognition at these checkpoints, to locate within the civilian stream – which can reach hundreds of thousands of people per day – terror operatives disguising themselves as innocent civilians, and even hostages.

Another source familiar with the unit's work explains that population displacement comes at the expense of the surprise factor. "Think that when you order the population to evacuate, you expose to the enemy where you plan to maneuver," he says. "Nevertheless, the IDF understands the importance of the matter. The goal here is not to fulfill an obligation and tell residents 'we notified you, now it's your problem,' and attack. There really is a desire to allow the population to get out."

Despite this, several incidents occurred in which civilians who did not evacuate from their homes were harmed during the fighting. The best-known incident occurred in Khan Younis last May. Nine of the ten children of Dr. Alaa al-Najjar, a physician at Nasser Hospital, were killed in an IDF strike carried out in an area that was supposed to be clear of residents. Her husband and 11-year-old son were seriously wounded.

The tragic incident made reverberating headlines worldwide. The IDF claimed then that the strike was carried out from aircraft toward a house, where suspects were located who operated near a ground force, and promised to investigate the incident.

Nevertheless, the IDF marks the field of population displacement as one of the successes of the current war. "It worked excellently throughout the war, despite being told by sources ranging from General Staff elements, through world sources, through American military personnel and all kinds of former officials – that it wouldn't work," says Weiner. "At the beginning of the campaign we evacuated about one million people from the northern Strip and Gaza City southward, in short time constants. After that we evacuated 300,000 people from Khan Younis in a very short time, and then we reached the Rafah issue."

Sources who were involved in the moves that preceded the entry to Rafah define the population evacuation issue as the main "mine" against the American administration, then headed by Biden, which strongly opposed the Israeli entry to the city. "They told us that the people in Rafah had already been uprooted from their homes, so they wouldn't evacuate again," says Weiner. "But in the command we built a plan that included two weeks of preparation and another two weeks for the entire evacuation. In retrospect, it took altogether ten days." During this period, about one million people evacuated from Rafah.

Which brings us back to Gaza City. After the Israeli withdrawal from the Netzarim corridor at the beginning of the year, following the second hostage deal, it became possible for hundreds of thousands of Gazans who evacuated from the city at the beginning of the war to return to it. During Operation Gideon's Chariots, which began in May 2025, extensive additional population displacement moves were carried out, part of which also evacuated to Gaza City. Now, alongside the al-Mawasi area and the central camps, the city has become the place where most of the Strip's civilians are concentrated.

According to UN data, about 82% of Strip residents lived before the war in areas the IDF defined as "evacuation zones." The aid to the millions of displaced residents is an integral part of the principle of population displacement. As Dr. Ron Schleifer, a senior lecturer at Ariel University and the head of the Ariel Research Center for Defense and Communication, as well as an expert in psychological warfare, explains, "No one likes to leave home, so you need to convince them that the alternative to staying is worse than leaving and going into the unknown."

An integral part of population displacement is fulfilling the promise that in evacuation areas, that population will receive shelter, food and health services. "You make it clear to them that there is a safe passage through which they can move, and that in the next place they will have food and shelter. You work with both the carrot and the stick," phrases a former senior in the field of psychological warfare in the IDF.

If the tents run out

Until now, Israel has insisted that the carrot – meaning humanitarian aid to the Strip – be supplied and managed by the UN and international organizations, such as the American foundation GHF, partly for legal reasons. But the humanitarian spaces that the IDF marked did not always prove themselves. Difficulties in transferring and distributing aid led to chaos and claims of acute hunger in Gaza, which Israel has recently struggled to deal with. Additionally, the IDF continued to attack in al-Mawasi, including when it eliminated Hamas seniors who exploited this space to hide, including Mohammed Deif. The result is that now there is concern that Gaza City residents will prefer to stay home, even at the cost of risking their lives, and will not trust the alternative the IDF offers them.

The IDF recognizes that the Gaza evacuation operation will require establishing humanitarian shelters and setting up additional points for food distribution. The army also recognizes that the international humanitarian system in Gaza is worn down, making it difficult to deal with the expected future.

The entity that has already begun acting regarding "the carrot" for Gaza City evacuees is the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. There they are trying in recent days to assist as much as possible to international organizations, to prepare the infrastructure intended to absorb hundreds of thousands of new evacuees. "You cannot move before you ensure that humanitarian infrastructures – food, water, medicine, sanitation – meet international law requirements," says a source knowledgeable about the subject.

For example, already at the end of July, the coordinator approved, at the political level's instruction, to advance the Emirati initiative to connect a water line from the desalination facility in Egypt to al-Mawasi. In parallel, a power line was connected from Israel to the southern desalination facility in Gaza, which will allow increasing the drinking water supply in the southern Strip tenfold. This week Israel even approved, for the first time since the ceasefire in March 2025, to bring tents and shelter equipment into the Gaza Strip. "You can't start moving population and then say 'oops, there aren't enough tents,'" explains that source. "So Israel is already preparing the infrastructure for evacuation."

Recently, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee also published a statement that there is an intention to expand the activity of the American humanitarian aid foundation GHF, which currently operates four distribution centers in the Strip, and add 12 additional centers. Behind this stands conversations taking place between the American administration, the UN and Israel, about possible cooperation between the UN and the American foundation, to expand the humanitarian effort in Gaza.

The last fortress

The operational and humanitarian issues now facing the IDF are joined by legal and moral questions that the subject of population displacement generates. International law recognizes the need to evacuate residents from a war zone, but stipulates that such evacuation may be considered legal provided it is temporary evacuation.

Already at the beginning of the war, sharp claims arose that population displacement is a first step, ultimately intended to force Gaza residents to emigrate permanently outside its borders. During Operation Gideon's Chariots, three reserve fighters even filed a petition to the High Court of Justice, in which they claimed that the operation order violates international law because it imposes expulsion on the population.

The IDF claimed throughout that population displacement is done for temporary purposes, and not as an act intended to encourage emigration, exile or expulsion. According to coordinator data, since the beginning of the war, only about 38,000 Palestinians left Gaza to a third country, all of them those holding dual citizenship, who received a residence permit from another country, or who received approval to evacuate for medical reasons. Official sources admit this week that so far, the attempt to locate a third country that would absorb Palestinian refugees has failed.

Either way, as the war progresses, the legal rope on which the IDF walks regarding population displacement becomes thinner and thinner. Evacuating Gaza City and military takeover of it, according to several sources we spoke with, may finally pull this rope from under the army's feet.

According to Dr. Schleifer, after evacuating Gaza City "we need to secure fair and equitable food distribution, as much as possible, without profiteering and Hamas involvement." According to him, past experience proves that all this cannot be done through international elements. "We will need to establish tent cities and care for the civilian population, establish an education system etc., and organize in all aspects of maintaining society. What the State of Israel needs to do for this is revive a military branch that was strangled and discarded – military government."

But the goal of the Israeli government, at least on the declared level, is that there will be no military government. "We will reach military government, whether we want to or not. We tell ourselves all kinds of stories, but it's clear we will need to control Gaza, or supervise in some way what happens in the Strip. In my opinion, there is no other solution."

The IDF can subdue Hamas in Gaza. According to several former IDF sources who dealt with the subject, displacing such a large quantity of civilians to a small area – altogether about 25% of the entire Strip area – will force the IDF to provide evacuees with housing, food and health solutions itself, and will practically drag the army into implementing military government in Gaza, something senior IDF officials have avoided so far. "The IDF is essentially being pushed to make the move, and that's why it's so opposed," says one of them. "The implications of this move are enormous, and could lead to international sanctions and even a refusal movement. Beyond that, there is a scenario where Hamas will hold Gaza City's population as hostages, and unlike the past, the evacuation will be carried out very slowly and will erode Israeli momentum. So far Hamas has not succeeded in preventing population displacement, but Gaza City is the last compound they have, and most of their forces are concentrated there. They won't give up easily."

According to Weiner, these concerns are exaggerated. "To convince Gaza residents to evacuate, two things need to happen," he says. "One is to ensure that humanitarian aid doesn't enter Gaza City, but only evacuation areas. The second is to stop talking about a partial deal. We need to say loudly that we don't intend to stop the move in Gaza, so you better leave, because soon the bombings and bulldozers will arrive."

The post As Israel prepares to relocate 1M Gazans, a new danger emerges appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

In the following months, densely populated areas like Rafah and Khan Younis were almost entirely emptied of residents through deliberate efforts, enabling IDF divisions to maneuver more easily while reducing risks to both combatants and civilians. However, this practice has raised moral and legal challenges.

Now, as the anticipated takeover of Gaza City approaches, Southern Command faces its next challenge. In the coming days, one of the largest population relocation operations of the war is expected to begin, as a prelude to the ground incursion into Gaza City. Approximately one million people will be required to evacuate the city and move south beyond the Netzarim Corridor, which will serve as the boundary north of which combat will take place.

A message delivered by artillery

The complex evacuation operation is managed by Southern Command's Population Relocation Unit, whose existence is revealed here for the first time. The unit is responsible for mapping the population, gathering intelligence on it, and coordinating actions to facilitate its movement – distributing leaflets, sending text messages, and, ultimately, firing artillery shells, which send the clearest message to residents that they must evacuate.

"In the current war, the unit was already prepared for micro-level management of the operation," said Brig. Gen. (res.) Erez Weiner, who served during the war as the commander of the operational planning team in Southern Command. "This includes the process of notifications, who issues them, when, and how, as well as monitoring and verifying that there is a response on the other side and that the population is actually moving," Weiner said.

According to UN data, about 82% of Gaza's residents lived before the war in areas the IDF designated as "evacuation zones." Providing aid to these millions of displaced people is an integral part of the population relocation principle. "To convince them to move, you need to use not only a stick but also a carrot," a former military source said.

Until now, Israel has insisted that the "carrot" – humanitarian aid to Gaza – be provided and managed by the UN and international organizations, such as the American GHF foundation. However, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) has been working in recent days to support the humanitarian infrastructure designed to absorb the hundreds of thousands of new evacuees from Gaza. "You cannot relocate people without ensuring that the humanitarian infrastructure – food, water, medical care, sanitation – meets the requirements of international law," a knowledgeable source said.

By late July, COGAT, under the guidance of the cabinet, approved an Emirati initiative to connect a water pipeline from a desalination plant in Egypt to the humanitarian zone in al-Mawasi. This week, Israel also approved, for the first time since the March 2025 ceasefire, the entry of tents and shelter equipment into Gaza. "You can't start moving a population and then say, 'Oops, there aren't enough tents,'" the same source said. "That's why Israel is already preparing the infrastructure for the evacuation."

The full article will appear in the weekend edition.

The post Inside the IDF's plan to relocate 1 million Gazans appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Erik is the middle name of four-star General Michael Erik Kurilla, the departing commander of US Central Command. While subordinates address him as "General," colleagues privately call him "the Gorilla" – a nickname earned through his imposing physical presence and four decades of combat experience. Only his closest friends dare use "Erik."

Three days following that crucial conversation, Kurilla arrived in Tel Aviv and participated in the Chiefs of Staff Forum meeting at the Kirya, where organizers positioned a chair for him at the head table beside Halevi. Together, these two generals orchestrated the brilliant international defense operation that almost entirely neutralized what history would record as "Iran's first missile night." Outside observers noted that the IDF appeared to have two chiefs of staff – an assessment that proved remarkably accurate.

Israel anchored at umbrella's center

That operation allowed Kurilla and Israel to harvest the benefits of extensive military and political groundwork, with Kurilla serving as the central coordinator. Through unwavering determination and exceptional interpersonal abilities, this American general successfully mobilized chiefs of staff across Middle Eastern nations to construct cooperative frameworks that generated regional power beneath an American protective umbrella. He consistently positioned Israel at this umbrella's center, directly alongside him, insisting that Israeli representatives attend every meeting and participate in all briefings.

The historical record of the October 7 war will reserve a distinguished place for 59-year-old General Kurilla. Born in California, raised in Minnesota, and graduated from West Point military academy in 1988, he served in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan before suffering wounds in a bombing during the Battle of Mosul. His appointment as CENTCOM commander came in April 2022, arriving just before the war's outbreak with perfect timing.

The battle-hardened Kurilla and Halevi developed an unusually close friendship, sustained through dozens of American general visits to Israel, predominantly during wartime. This personal bond between the generals translated into exceptional operational coordination, demonstrated during the first and second missile nights, the audacious "Many Ways" operation targeting the SSRC chemical facility in Syria, and notably the Israeli strike against Iran. This represents merely a partial accounting.

However, Kurilla's wartime role extended beyond military functions to encompass diplomatic advocacy for Israel. As someone answering directly to the president according to American governmental structure, Kurilla understood how to influence President Joe Biden whenever Israel required assistance. Consequently, Kurilla emerged as the pivotal figure who moderated the Biden administration's resistance to operations in Rafah and the Lebanon campaign – two critical war milestones. Where Israel's political leadership and the American administration struggled to coordinate, Kurilla provided the essential bridge. Without his intervention, Israel's strategic position would appear entirely different.

Honoring family commitments

Halevi bequeathed this intimate relationship framework with Kurilla to his successor, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir. Reasonable assumptions suggest that Zamir also leveraged his connections with the CENTCOM commander during the persuasion campaign that encouraged President Donald Trump to authorize bombing of Iranian nuclear installations on the operation's final day. This historic achievement represented the culmination of Kurilla's CENTCOM leadership.

Monday will witness Kurilla's farewell ceremony in the United States, marking his military retirement and transition to quality time with wife Paige and their two daughters. IDF Chief of Staff Zamir had coordinated his American work visit to coincide with this event but was compelled to cancel plans after recognizing in recent days that the hostage release and ceasefire agreement had definitively collapsed, requiring his presence in Israel.

Kurilla's replacement will be his deputy, Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, representing the Navy. Cooper inherits a perfectly functioning regional cooperation mechanism within CENTCOM. Cooper brings extensive Israeli visitation experience and has been responsible for strengthening and expanding maritime collaboration between CENTCOM and the IDF. While the diplomatic Cooper lacks "gorilla" qualities, hopes remain that he will adequately fill his predecessor's role, particularly concerning special IDF relationships. This represents a paramount security interest, making Cooper relationship cultivation a primary objective for Zamir.

Connecting at the eye level

Certainly, Kurilla's commitment to supporting Israel during the war served CENTCOM interests in confronting Iran and its regional proxies while establishing American dominance throughout the Middle East. Ultimately, he remains an American general, not an IDF officer.

Nevertheless, Kurilla's inexhaustible dedication to preserving Israeli security stemmed equally from personal connections established with senior IDF leadership and emotions stirred during his numerous visits. The Tel Aviv hotel where he regularly stayed had recently housed evacuees from Kiryat Shmona. Kurilla made it his practice to sit with them, inquire about their welfare and offer encouragement. Throughout his Israeli tours, he visited dozens of IDF units, not merely to understand their capabilities, but to engage officers and soldiers at eye level. "He genuinely cared," observed someone who accompanied him during several visits.

Definitive evidence of his Israeli connection emerged on Friday during his position's farewell tour when Kurilla arrived in the country for his fortieth visit. For the first time, he visited the Western Wall, appearing in civilian clothing and sunglasses, standing head and shoulders above Western Wall Rabbi Shmuel Rabinovich who welcomed him, appearing entirely comfortable. "My mother always told me that for my support of Israel – God will repay me," he said.

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All they had to do was bank slightly eastward, and within less than an hour, they would be on Iran's doorstep. But they didn't. Instead, the aircraft continued to the northeastern tip of Syria, then turned around and flew back the way they came.

"That was the major rehearsal we did ahead of the Iran strike," a senior Israeli Air Force official explained. "The aim was to rehearse the full operation at least once, flying a distance comparable to that of Iran. The easiest way to do that was to fly all the way across Syria, then turn back."

Did the Iranians not spot you?

"And if they did? They knew we were preparing for a strike. It wasn't a secret."

Indeed, the operation in Iran was no secret. Yet three months later, on Friday, June 13, both Iran and the rest of the world were stunned when Israeli fighter jets launched a surprise assault: decapitating Iran's military command, assassinating several nuclear scientists, hitting nuclear facilities, and achieving air superiority over Iran within 36 hours.

The dazzling operation was publicly known as "Rising Lion" but within the Israeli Air Force, it was guided by a complex battle plan named "Iron Man."

"It's a deployment directive that aligns and guides the entire Israeli Air Force," said a senior officer. "We positioned all the Air Force's capabilities about 2,000 kilometers from Israel."

Conversations with Israeli Air Force and defense officials reveal the intricate path of "Iron Man" to Tehran. This is how the Israeli Air Force prepared for the largest operation in its history.

The ambitious goal

Until recently, Israel's plans for a strike on Iran had been relatively modest. "For the past 20 years, we were stuck in a 'pinprick' mentality," said a senior defense official. "Sometimes it was a Mossad operation, sometimes an aerial strike. But it was always an operation, never a campaign."

The paradigm shift came when Herzi Halevi assumed the role of IDF chief of staff. Early in his tenure, he presented a paper to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant proposing a shift in strategy, from a one-off operation to a full-scale military campaign. Halevi set the ambitious goal of achieving air superiority over Iran, to give Israeli jets free rein in its skies and pave the way to Tehran.

"When a squadron of F-15s is circling over Tehran, everything changes - physically and psychologically," a defense source said.

In his first meeting with Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, Halevi instructed him to begin preparations. But Bar was also dealing with internal opposition to the government's judicial reform, which had led some reservists to suspend their volunteer service, posing a potential threat to operational readiness. Israel itself was not yet prepared for war with Iran. "The biggest concern," said a defense official, "was the response from Hezbollah."

Ten months later, that concern became reality. The October 7 attacks froze the Air Force's ability to prepare properly for an Iranian campaign. Constant strikes in Gaza and Lebanon required dozens of jets to remain on high alert at all times, ready for Hezbollah's elite Radwan force to cross the northern border. "At the same time, we had to maintain a certain level of munitions," a senior insider noted.

Still, Bar realized early on in the war that the Iran file had been reactivated. "The understanding within the Air Force that Iran would ultimately have to be confronted came just days after October 7," said a military planner. "The realization that this was a centralized, Iran-led axis left no other option."

Serious internal discussions about a campaign in Iran began in March 2024. Just days later, the Air Force had a chance to prove its readiness. On April 1, Israel assassinated Hassan Mahdavi, the commander of the Syria-Lebanon Corps of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in a strike near the Iranian consulate in Damascus. The original plan had been to kill Mahdavi with a single missile targeting the room he was in - minimizing collateral damage and giving Iran space to avoid a major response. But intelligence failed to pinpoint his exact location, and the Air Force was ordered to level the entire building.

Even so, Israel hoped the strike - aimed at a building near the consulate, not the consulate itself - would keep Iran from entering the war. But Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei viewed it as a serious breach of Iranian sovereignty and immediately ordered retaliation.

That retaliation came on April 13 in the form of Iran's "Night of Missiles" - hundreds of rockets, drones, and cruise missiles fired at Israel. Most were intercepted by Israel's air defense system, with help from a coalition of allied fighter jets led by the IDF and US Central Command (CENTCOM) under Gen. Erik Kurilla. It marked the first time Iran had attacked Israel directly.

Some Israeli cabinet members pushed for a fierce response. But the military resisted, concerned that escalating into full-scale war with Iran - while Hezbollah remained intact and the Air Force lacked full readiness - would play into Iran's hands.

Diplomatic constraints

The IDF's measured approach prevailed. The Air Force was instructed to respond by targeting just one S-300 air defense battery, one of five advanced Russian-made systems operated by Iran. A preparatory meeting with Netanyahu, Gallant, and Halevi revealed that diplomatic constraints made the original flight path into Iran unworkable.

As Halevi left Netanyahu's office, he rushed to Bar's headquarters. Bar's team was preparing the strike, and Halevi told him they'd have to find a new flight route. Overnight, planners reconfigured the path, taking into account new refueling stops and necessary strikes on air defenses along the way. "It wasn't just the flight path," one insider marveled. "It was fuel logistics, anti-aircraft threats, everything. And they did it in hours."

The April strike succeeded in destroying the targeted S-300 system. But not everyone was satisfied. National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir tweeted, "Lame!" Still, the limited strike was calculated and aimed at setting the stage for future operations. Crucially, it kept Iran from re-engaging militarily. Even the high-profile assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in central Tehran in late July 2024 didn't alter Iran's strategic restraint.

The months of relative quiet allowed the Air Force to lead a September 2024 campaign aimed at defeating Hezbollah. But as ground operations in Lebanon intensified and Hezbollah faced collapse, Iran decided to strike again.

The "second missile night," in October 2024, reignited hawkish sentiment in Israel's security cabinet. Proposals ranged from targeted assassinations to the destruction of Iran's energy sector. "A full symposium," said one source involved in the talks. But again, the IDF advocated a restrained response, and again, its view prevailed.

On October 26, Israel launched "Operation Days of Atonement," destroying Iran's remaining four S-300 batteries and striking its solid-fuel ballistic missile industry. To signal its ability to target Iran's energy infrastructure, Israel also hit a tactical air defense battery just 250 meters from an Iranian energy plant near the Iraqi border. "We denied them strategic air defenses and demonstrated we could hit tactical systems too," a defense official explained.

A month later, when the Assad regime lost control of Syria, Iran became dramatically more exposed. With the regime's collapse, the Israeli Air Force conducted a sortie that wiped out most of the Syrian air defense systems, allowing Israeli jets to avoid detours and instead fly eastward at high altitude, unimpeded across Syrian skies, saving significant amounts of fuel.

This removal of the Syrian threat also gave Israeli refueling planes freedom of movement near Iran's border. "Effectively, we could now refuel fighter jets much closer to Iran, just before they entered for a strike," an Air Force source said. "That gave them far more operational freedom."

The Israeli Air Force could now, in essence, set up a fueling station on Iran's doorstep and launch continuous, sustained airstrikes. "Only after Syria fell and the skies opened did the approach shift from 'plan a major operation' to 'prepare for war with Iran,'" said a military source. "There was a realization that we had a rare opportunity to deploy many more aircraft and weapon systems."

Before deploying dozens of jets over Iran, the issue of munitions had to be addressed. The April and October 2024 strikes had all been conducted from a distance, with Israeli planes never entering Iranian airspace. These were known as "standoff strikes," made possible by precision-guided munitions, whose development and procurement had required massive budgets.

For years, Israel had funneled billions into a fantastical Mossad-led plan to destroy Iran's nuclear program covertly, a plan insiders have described as "completely unrealistic." Those funds came at the expense of other capabilities.

"These capabilities have been on the table for 12 years," said a former defense official. "But for years, the system dumped absurd sums into that fantasy Mossad plan. And there just isn't money for everything."

Only during Naftali Bennett's premiership, and later through a series of expert committees established by Netanyahu, was the Mossad option abandoned in favor of funding military capabilities. The shift was rooted in the recognition that a conventional military option was more feasible than the covert one.

The redirected budgets proved their worth. But to launch a sustained campaign to achieve air superiority and systematically destroy Iran's ground-to-ground missile launchers, more was needed. That meant deploying the Air Force's workhorses, older fighter jets equipped with large stocks of cheap, readily available bombs.

This was the foundation of Israel's ability to operate across Iranian territory with manned aircraft, loiter over targets, drop heavy ordnance, and "bring the full weight of Israel's might all the way to Tehran," as one military source put it.

Which brings us back to the "Iron Man" battle plan.

Building a war machine

The assault on Iran was constructed atop decades of groundwork laid by the Israeli Air Force, transforming it into a strategic arm capable of operating far from Israel's borders. In fall 2024, when Bar ordered his team to draft a plan for a sustained and massive strike in Iran, or in his words, "to turn the third circle into the first", they knew they could lean on those foundations.

"This kind of campaign is based on structured battle procedures and building blocks laid down over decades, which built the Air Force into a strategic force, capable of operating in the third circle," said a senior officer.

Still, those building blocks had to be assembled into a coherent whole. "You need to tailor general capabilities into specific operational components. We needed a plan that integrated all elements and turned theory into practice."

Interestingly, many of the most innovative solutions came from the younger ranks and reached the desk of the Air Force commander. Many were accepted.

To draft the battle plan, the Air Force created a "winning team," as one insider described it. The operational headquarters was restructured to focus resources and manpower on the Iranian file. A dedicated Iran department was created, with sub-teams handling air superiority, refueling, and more. Meanwhile, squadrons began long-range training missions.

"Even once you have a plan, it doesn't mean you can execute it," said a senior officer. "We flew the distances and drilled components of the plan both in and out of Israeli airspace. It builds both readiness and a psychological sense of capability."

This massive production for a sustained campaign in Iran mobilized every component of the Israeli Air Force, including its air defense systems, which would have to brace for Iranian retaliation. The Air Force also anticipated that its own bases would come under missile fire, meaning squadrons would have to keep operating under direct attack. Preparations were made accordingly.

Through the workshop

All this planning happened while the Air Force was still engaged on multiple fronts - Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen - without letting up. The strike plan was designed to allow Israel to hit Iran while staying operational across all other arenas. Fighter jets involved in Iran's aerial defense would launch missions with bombs already onboard. Once replaced mid-air by fresh aircraft, they would turn around to bomb Gaza targets before landing. "We couldn't spare a single jet," said a senior officer.

Because of the sheer strain on its fleet, much of the Air Force's Iran preparations took place on the ground, through its maintenance and technical units. These teams made sure every jet was serviced, parts replaced, and performance maximized. "Think about it. You're in a multi-front war, flying nonstop, over 600 days into combat, and now you have to launch a full-scale campaign against Iran," a senior officer noted. "It's an extraordinary effort by the technical crews to keep everything at peak performance amid a regional war."

Some of the aircraft designated for the Iran strike were taken out of rotation and armed well in advance, meaning they couldn't be used for other missions. Managing the Air Force in the weeks before the strike required puzzle-like coordination.

Early in the planning, the Air Force determined it would need to operate over Iran for 7 to 14 consecutive days to achieve maximum effect. At the heart of this was air superiority. Because while the initial "decapitation" strike on Iran's general staff and nuclear scientists was impressive, true superiority was what would allow a long, large-scale campaign.

"A key goal of the plan was to hunt down missile launchers and reduce fire on Israel, while also targeting many other assets," explained a source familiar with the operation. "That required heavy, low-cost bombs, not standoff munitions, which meant being able to bomb directly overhead. So, first we had to destroy dozens of air defense batteries and gain control of the skies."

Once flying over Syria became routine and the strategic S-300 batteries were taken out, the next step was to eliminate Iran's more basic air defense systems, those with a 100-kilometer (62-mile) range. And Iran had many.

At the start of the war, the Iranians kept these systems hidden to avoid detection and destruction. Believing a major Israeli strike wasn't imminent, they left the western border - facing Israel - largely unprotected. Most batteries were focused on Tehran and nuclear sites.

But as tensions grew, Iran moved more and more batteries west to counter a possible Israeli assault, thanks in part to increased domestic production. "They knew we were coming," said an Israeli Air Force officer. "And they prepared."

By June 2025, Iran had deployed about 15 batteries along its western frontier, seemingly securing it from airstrikes. Meanwhile, in the Air Force's command bunker, planners worked on how to outsmart that very defense.

Cracking the Shield

Israel's key advantage in this chess match was intelligence. A special unit in Military Intelligence was established solely to track and study Iran's air defense batteries. For the first time, intelligence officers physically sat in the Air Force bunker, bringing real-time updates about battery locations.

"Just last week, we found ten more batteries we hadn't known about," said one official. "Eventually, we knew exactly where every single battery was. It took hundreds of people from Air Force Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the Mossad."

The plan to achieve air superiority didn't involve destroying every system. On the first night of the attack, Israeli jets carved out two narrow corridors through Iran's western air defenses, both in the north, providing easier access to Tehran. The southern border area near the Persian Gulf was left untouched.

When striking the batteries, the goal was to destroy their radar systems before a missile could be launched. It wasn't just about avoiding being hit, it was because if a missile was fired, pilots had to jettison their bombs to evade it. "That means abandoning the mission," said one Air Force source. "We couldn't afford that."

The resulting gaps, about 300 kilometers (186 miles) wide, allowed Israeli jets to penetrate deep into Iran. The next day, they pushed forward, destroying more batteries en route to Tehran. On the second night, they took out nearly all of the air defense systems in and around the capital. Where aircraft faced difficulties, Mossad teams on the ground stepped in and destroyed systems manually.

The elimination of these tactical batteries was a resounding success. During the operation, only a handful of missiles were fired at Israeli jets (some say none at all), and no manned aircraft were downed. In total, Israel destroyed 84 Iranian air defense batteries.

Early in the campaign, the Iranians tried to move systems around, hoping to hinder Israeli operations. But soon they began keeping them hidden, fearing more losses. "From day three, they barely engaged," said one Israeli participant. "They knew that if a battery came out of hiding, we'd take it out. They shifted to full survival mode and barely fired."

The assault didn't stop at launchers. Israel targeted Iran's entire air defense infrastructure: command centers, military industries, personnel. The network collapsed quickly.

Iran's fighter jets were largely irrelevant. Most stayed on the ground or flew to protect their own bases, avoiding any dogfights. Apart from a few limited strikes on those bases, Israel left the Iranian Air Force alone. The campaign focused entirely on eliminating air defenses.

By January 2025, "Iron Man" was ready. The target date for full operational readiness was set for April. Even after that, the Air Force's planning team kept refining the strategy. Simultaneously, they closely monitored developments in Iran.

"We were facing an enemy that kept evolving and growing stronger," said a senior officer. "We had to fine-tune the balance between reaching peak readiness and avoiding exposure of the plan."

Secrecy was maintained even within the Air Force. Only a handful of senior officers knew when, or even if, the operation would launch. Hours before the strike, personnel began receiving orders to report to command centers, squadrons, and bases. These summons were issued until the very last moment to preserve the element of surprise.

Once the operation began, it exceeded expectations. Despite assumptions that some manned jets would be lost, and despite the pilots' awareness that being downed in Iran meant near-impossible chances of rescue, not a single manned aircraft was hit during the entire 12-day campaign.

"I'd rather crash into a mountain with my plane than eject and be captured," one pilot said.

Achieving air superiority enabled the Israeli Air Force not only to strike freely but to actively "hunt" Iranian ballistic missile launchers, significantly reducing rocket fire on Israel, a key objective of the campaign. For 12 consecutive days, strike waves flew through Syrian skies, refueled safely nearby, and conducted multiple bombing runs over Iran. Eventually, drones joined the effort, roaming over Iran with near impunity.

"We used cheap, short-range weapons, which dramatically increased the number of targets we could hit," said one official involved in the mission.

The plan had been built from the outset to allow continued full-force operations right up to the end. "The goal was to keep hitting with full intensity even as we neared potential closure," said a senior officer. "We had Israeli Air Force jets flying over Tehran, maintaining pressure and consolidating gains until the very last moment."

The operation culminated in a show of force: a massive US strike on Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan. In all these cases, it was the Israeli Air Force that cleared the path by eliminating Iranian air defense systems ahead of the American attack.

Even after a formal ceasefire, Iran violated the terms by launching two ballistic missiles at Israel. In response, Israel assembled a formation of 52 fighter jets to strike central Tehran, sending an unequivocal message. But when US President Donald Trump learned of the mission, he ordered the jets to turn back. "They were 20 minutes from launch," said an Air Force source. "They were stopped at the very last second."

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Six months later, the synergy between the eighth and 14th floors – the political and military echelons – enabled the launch of a preemptive strike on Friday, June 13. The military option against Iran, which had been on the table for at least a decade, came to fruition with perfect timing and political approval. Boom.

As the IDF finalized the details of the impending attack on Iran, planners realized they needed to replicate the Lebanon strategy – a concentrated, surprising blow to throw the enemy off balance, a sort of "Dahieh Doctrine 2.0," referring to the systematic bombardment of the Hezbollah stronghold in Lebanon during the 2006 war and later. "In the military, they call it a 'decapitation operation,'" said an official in the know. "The difference is that with Hezbollah, it took ten days; with Iran, we did it in the opening strike, within one hour."

Plans for a confrontation with Iran, specifically targeting its nuclear facilities, had been in development within the defense establishment for years, shaping the IDF's force buildup over the past two decades. Yet, in typical Israeli fashion, those plans were discarded at the last moment to make way for a bold, creative, and swiftly crafted new strategy.

"In reality, we began the operational planning for the strike in its current form only in October 2024," said an official privy to the details. "That's when we realized the IDF needed to prepare not just for a pinpoint strike in Iran but for an entire campaign."

Video: IAF planes launch toward Iran / Credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit

Until recently, even senior defense officials considered the idea of attacking Iran far-fetched, a plan destined to remain theoretical. However, three months in the fall of 2024 completely changed that perspective.

In September, "Operation Pagers," the air campaign to neutralize Hezbollah's rockets, and the successful eliminations of the group's leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, turned Hezbollah into a weakened force. "We always said Israel doesn't share a border with Iran, but Iran has a border with Israel – Hezbollah, standing at the fences, ready to respond fiercely if we attacked," said a former military official. "Once that border was erased, a new game began."

In October, the Israeli Air Force executed "Operation Days of Repentance," which included widespread strikes on Iran's air defense systems for the first time, fueling the pilots' appetite for more. In November, Donald Trump's election to a second term in the White House further emboldened strike advocates, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. By December, Israel's top echelons no longer debated whether the strike would happen – only when.

As the IDF finalized the details of the impending attack on Iran, planners realized they needed to replicate the Lebanon strategy – a concentrated, surprising blow to throw the enemy off balance, a sort of "Dahieh Doctrine 2.0," referring to the systematic bombardment of the Hezbollah stronghold in Lebanon during the 2006 war and later. "In the military, they call it a 'decapitation operation,'" said an official in the know. "The difference is that with Hezbollah, it took ten days; with Iran, we did it in the opening strike, within one hour."

From the shift in the Military Intelligence Directorate's approach to the Israeli Air Force teams crafting the attack and the politico-media deception that lulled Iran before zero hour, this is how Israel prepared for war with Iran.

The hard nut to crack

The IDF indeed trained for striking Iranian nuclear facilities for years, but simultaneously also reached the understanding that such a strike would delay the Iranian bomb by only a few years and would drag in its wake a complex war against Hezbollah.

Accordingly, during Gadi Eisenkot's tenure as chief of staff, intelligence engagement with Iran was relatively sparse, and Military Intelligence Directorate directed most of its resources northward, to Lebanon.This approach was also aided by the Obama administration's nuclear agreement, which was signed half a year after Eisenkot entered his position and made it somewhat difficult for the Iranians to break through to the bomb. "Eisenkot's conception was that the nuclear agreement would delay the Iranian nuclear program, so there was no need to hurry," said a former senior officer.

Trump's withdrawal from the deal in mid-2018 brought Military Intelligence Directorate back to the drawing board. "Six months after the deal's cancellation, when Aviv Kochavi became chief of staff, the IDF began an intelligence shift from Lebanon to Iran," said the same officer. One of Kohavi's first decisions was establishing the Strategy and Third Circle Division, tasked with focusing on non-bordering states, namely Iran.

By late 2021, when Kochavi appointed Aharon Haliva as head of Military Intelligence Directorate, the first discussion Haliva held was on "Iran's nuclear program." "Even then, we realized our intelligence approach wasn't on track," said a participant in that meeting. In the following years, Military Intelligence Directorate underwent a structural shift, redirecting resources and personnel toward Iran. The "Northeast" arena in the Research and Analysis Division, covering Iran, Syria, and Iraq, was split, creating a dedicated Iran arena led by a colonel. This joined an existing Iran-focused unit in the Operations Division, and later, the Israeli Air Force established its own Iran arena.

The deeper intelligence delved, the clearer it became that the "bottleneck" was the scientists themselves. "We realized we needed to focus on the human factor," said the source.

"What you're seeing now is the result of those years of effort in the Iran arenas of Military Intelligence Directorate and the Israeli Air Force," said a source we spoke with. "A lot of money went into it, and those units proved their worth."

The target validation process in Iran carried out by Military Intelligence Directorate and the Israeli Air Force focused on three legs of the nuclear program – the missile array, enrichment facilities, and the "weapons group" (mounting a nuclear device on a ballistic missile). Accordingly, Military Intelligence Directorate collected more and more intelligence on launchers, warehouses, and factories in the Iranian missile array, and the Israeli Air Force planned focused strikes against enrichment facilities. At a fairly early stage, the IDF reached the understanding that it was possible to effectively strike from the air the enrichment facility in Natanz, but not the one in Fordow, which was dug much deeper.

Missile systems and enrichment facilities presented their own difficulties, but the intelligence community identified the weaponization group as the toughest challenge. "Unlike enrichment facilities and missile factories, which operate in large complexes, the weaponization project uses smaller facilities and doesn't require extensive infrastructure," explained a knowledgeable source. "Plus, with weaponization, you're fighting knowledge. How do you eliminate knowledge accumulated over years?"

The deeper intelligence delved, the clearer it became that the "bottleneck" was the scientists themselves. "We realized we needed to focus on the human factor," said the source.

In 2021, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, head of Iran's nuclear program, was assassinated in a sophisticated operation on Iranian soil. "A beautiful operation," said someone familiar with many such missions. "The problem is, Iran has many scientists and scientific knowledge. Eliminating one, no matter how senior, doesn't stop the program." Indeed, Iran pressed forward. Military Intelligence Directorate, seeing this, devised a new plan – targeting multiple nuclear scientists simultaneously.

The idea of assassinating scientists sparked healthy competition between the IDF and the Mossad. The Mossad proposed using drones, while the IDF advocated striking the scientists from the air with advanced munitions launched from long distances. Initially, the plan was to target the scientists during a joint meeting, but it later shifted to striking them individually at their homes in Tehran.

When the IDF's plan, a joint effort of Military Intelligence Directorate and the Israeli Air Force, was presented to Netanyahu, he was enthusiastic. "The surgical and simultaneous nature of it sparked his imagination," said someone present in the room.

Consequently, Unit 8200 began constant tracking of numerous Iranian nuclear scientists, knowing their locations at all times. In the past six months, work on the operation intensified, with Military Intelligence Directorate's Research and Analysis Division nuclear experts meeting twice weekly to narrow down the target list. "It was like playing 'Super Goal,'" said a military source. "From a large pool, they selected the top scientists in each field – the ones Iran's weaponization program couldn't function without. The Research and Analysis Division honed this plan day and night."

By early 2025, with the "dream team" of targets finalized, a joint Military Intelligence Directorate–Israeli Air Force team turned the ambitious plan into an operational one. Then, someone in Military Intelligence Directorate had another idea.

"All of Them at Once"

The success of the September 2024 strike on Hezbollah, which destabilized the group and effectively decided the campaign, inspired Military Intelligence Directorate. Weeks later, those working on Iran began discussing replicating the Lebanon strategy in Iran.

"Taking out their entire military leadership in one blow," said a source in the intelligence community.

Unlike the scientist operation, where the target list was narrowed over time, here Military Intelligence Directorate expanded it. What began as a plan to eliminate one or two senior Iranian officials grew to include the commander of the Revolutionary Guards' air force, the Guards' overall commander, Iran's chief of staff, and his deputy.

"When the idea came up, no one believed Military Intelligence Directorate could pull it off simultaneously," said a knowledgeable source. But Military Intelligence Directorate persisted, forming a dedicated team that worked around the clock. The team's findings were presented to the head of Military Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder, and later shared with Israeli Air Force officials.

In recent months, Binder, Israeli Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, and operations chief Maj. Gen. Oded Basiuk held numerous meetings to synchronize the operation down to the smallest details. Over time, the three generals and their teams grew confident that the ambitious plan could succeed.

Unlike the scientists, targeted in their homes, the "generals operation" was planned for a joint meeting of Iran's security elite. To ensure they gathered in one location, a sophisticated deception operation – details of which will remain classified for years – was executed.

In 2021, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, head of Iran's nuclear program, was assassinated in a sophisticated operation on Iranian soil. "A beautiful operation," said someone familiar with many such missions. "The problem is, Iran has many scientists and scientific knowledge. Eliminating one, no matter how senior, doesn't stop the program." Indeed, Iran pressed forward. Military Intelligence Directorate, seeing this, devised a new plan – targeting multiple nuclear scientists simultaneously.

Remarkably, the scientist and generals operations matured almost simultaneously. The small team of three generals, fully aware of both plans, realized this in the final weeks. The opening strike was ready.

"A series of complex operations"

Beyond the "decapitation operation," Israel's war plan included other components. The most discussed recently is air superiority. This, too, was addressed only recently.

As plans to strike enrichment facilities developed, it was clear the Israeli Air Force needed a clear path to Natanz and Fordow. The Iran arena in the Research and Analysis Division allocated vast resources to mapping Iran's air defense systems, which were plentiful.

At one point, Unit 8200 established a dedicated team focused solely on achieving air superiority, comprising Military Intelligence Directorate and Israeli Air Force personnel. "The mission of 'paving the way' to Iran took priority over everything else in Military Intelligence Directorate in the three years before October 7," said a source familiar with the Intelligence Directorate. 

As Iran's air defenses were mapped, Military Intelligence Directorate and the Israeli Air Force concluded they could not only clear the path to nuclear facilities but also to Tehran and beyond. The phrase "air superiority in Iran" began as a whisper and grew into enthusiastic discussion.

From late May, two weeks before the strike, a "perception operation" began to lull Iran into believing Israel wouldn't attack soon. Orchestrated by the Prime Minister's Office, it included feeding information to Israeli journalists, particularly those not aligned with Netanyahu. The operation centered on nuclear talks between the White House and Tehran, creating the appearance of a US-Israel rift.

Six months before October 7, 2023, the Israeli Air Force formed a small team of aircrew, mostly reservists, to plan the path to air superiority. The team received an ever-growing list of air defense battery locations and critical intelligence from Unit 8200's secret unit. "Israel put all its intelligence efforts into this, and when Israel focuses on something, it delivers incredible results," said a source in the know.

Previous Israeli Air Force plans for Iran were scrapped and rewritten. "Iran has dozens of surface-to-air missile batteries in a first layer along its borders and a second layer around high-value targets," the source continued. "It required a phased approach, a series of highly complex operations to neutralize the defenses, hoping it would work."

The air superiority team presented the plan to the air force commander, who understood the risks but was willing to lose a few planes to achieve the mission. "The goal was no losses, but the air force commander's policy allowed for some losses while continuing the plan," the source said.

"Fortunately, we succeeded far beyond expectations, with no planes lost. I think it worked because the enemy didn't expect Israel to strike like this. They lacked drills that prepared them for the moment."

Skeptics in Military Intelligence Directorate doubted the air force's ability to achieve air superiority without losses. "When we started, it seemed impossible," said another source familiar with the operation. "Iran's air defenses are both high-quality and numerous. You need to neutralize them quickly, or Israeli pilots start falling in Iran."

Ultimately, the mission was accomplished in just 36 hours with no losses. On the first night, 30 Iranian air defense batteries and a double-digit number of radars were destroyed. "The greatest air superiority operation in history," said someone familiar with the details.

The Mossad joined in recent months, deploying drones operated by local agents to target additional air defense batteries.

While the scientist and generals operations could have proceeded without air superiority, the air force's control of Iran's skies greatly facilitated strikes on Natanz, missile sites, and other nuclear facilities. It also enabled extensive hunting of ballistic missile launchers, as dismantling Iran's air defenses allowed more drones to operate freely from Israel to Tehran.

"This means you can strike munitions wholesale, from Tehran westward, drastically reducing missile launches toward Israel," said a knowledgeable source. "Instead of hundreds of missiles on day one, we faced dozens. That's a game-changer, reducing pressure and strain in Israel."

Another component, built meticulously over time, was defense. "You can't attack without defense," said Brig. Gen. (res.) Ran Kochav, former air defense commander and Arrow unit head in 2006. "Preparations for war with Iran on the defensive side began 20 years ago. That was the reference threat we trained for, building a multi-layered air defense system and conducting joint exercises with US Central Command."

Indeed, Israeli Air Force officials confirm that both air defense and air superiority are two components that could not have been achieved without full cooperation from Washington. Which brings us to the last component in Israel's war plan against Iran. "The Americans," said an official well-versed in the war plan. "The plan was indeed built without them, but it was impossible to execute it without getting tailwind from them."

Deep in the know

Shortly after Trump's January 2025 inauguration, messages from his circle reached Netanyahu, indicating he wouldn't strongly oppose turning the "military option" operational if nuclear talks with Tehran stalled. Trump reportedly lifted restrictions on intelligence sharing, including access to US satellites and radar systems.

While Trump didn't commit to joining the strike, several Israeli officials confirm he was "deep in the inner circle." "Full coordination," one described it. Trump also participated in the deception operation in the days leading up to the surprise attack.

From late May, two weeks before the strike, a "perception operation" began to lull Iran into believing Israel wouldn't attack soon. Orchestrated by the Prime Minister's Office, it included feeding information to Israeli journalists, particularly those not aligned with Netanyahu. The operation centered on nuclear talks between the White House and Tehran, creating the appearance of a US-Israel rift.

On May 28, Ben Caspit reported in Maariv that Dermer and Mossad chief David Barnea traveled to Washington in a "desperate last attempt to block a dramatic announcement of an interim nuclear deal between Iran and the US." Caspit noted his sources were "quite insistent." In reality, their discussions with US officials focused on final strike preparations.

On June 9, Moriah Asraf reported on Channel 13 that Dermer and Barnea were preparing another trip to meet Steve Witkoff. In the following days, "insistent" sources continued to push the narrative to Israeli journalists that the US nuclear deal was a done deal, that Dermer and Barnea were desperate for US attention, and that Trump firmly opposed an Israeli strike. "This information was spoon-fed to journalists, unlike similar cases in the past," said one journalist.

On June 10, Channel 12's Yaron Avraham reported that in a call, Trump told Netanyahu he "hadn't given up on negotiations" with Iran and demanded he "take the strike off the table." Two days later, as air force jets headed to Tehran, Asraf reported that Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir and air force commander Bar "stood on their hind legs" and told Netanyahu Israel couldn't act alone against Iran.

Trump, for his part, issued vague statements, insisting, "I don't want Israel to attack Iran." He sent his ambassador in Jerusalem, Mike Huckabee, to tell Yedioth Ahronoth that "the president would be pleased if the Iran issue ends peacefully." This headline appeared on the newspaper's front page on Friday, June 13, after the strike had already begun.

Other newspapers that morning highlighted Trump's supposed opposition. Even the Haredi paper Hamevaser,, the Agudat Yisrael outlet, reported Trump saying, "As long as there's a chance for a deal, I don't want Israel to attack."

These headlines, printed before but published after the strike, testify to the success of the media perception operation. It was so effective that even unusual moves, like evacuating American diplomats' families from Middle East embassies in the days prior, didn't alert Iran to the impending attack.

"Perception Maneuvers"

An Israel Hayom investigation found that some misleading messages to the Israeli media came directly from Netanyahu's spokespeople. The Prime Minister's Office didn't deny quotes attributed to Trump-Netanyahu talks, aiming to project a US-Israel dispute. An Israeli official familiar with the office said, "Israel surprised Iran with psychological maneuvers." He added, "The goal was to make Iran's leadership think there'd be no attack, or if there was, it wouldn't be imminent."

"Deception, as a rule, doesn't turn black into white. For that you need an operation on the scale of decades, like what Iran did to us with the concept of 'Hamas is deterred.' Within the timeframe for the attack on Iran, there wasn't time for such an operation. Therefore, the deception exercise was activated under the classic principle of taking a gray area and then as needed clarifying or darkening it."

Were the misleading, some might say false, messages from the Prime Minister's Office a step too far? Was it manipulative use of journalists, violating Israel's media ethics? Schleifer responds with a marriage analogy: "If all men and women told 100% of the truth 100% of the time, there'd be no married couples left. Each side has its interests, but there's also a shared interest in cooperation. Whoever executed this deception knew how to exploit that."

"In the past five years, lying has become a legitimate tool for politicians," said Avi Benayahu, former IDF spokesperson. "When Trump, Putin, Erdogan, or Bibi lie, we're no longer shocked. Yitzhak Shamir once said it's permissible to lie for state security. If a leader feels it's okay to lie for political matters, it's certainly okay for matters at the core of state secrets. Still, Netanyahu didn't exactly lie this time – at most, these were white lies."

Former minister Nachman Shai, also a former IDF spokesperson, said, "I tried not to use the media for my purposes, but it's been years since I was in that role, and there's been some decline. With fake news dominating, lying has become routine. What was once taboo is now standard. Truth is a lower priority. Can I say no one in the Prime Minister's Office manipulates journalists or media players to spread disinformation? I wouldn't rule it out. The media is more open to these influences than ever."

In this context, it should be emphasized that from all our investigations, the "influence operation" that preceded the attack on Iran did not come from the direction of the IDF spokesman or any other element in the military.

"The Stack Model"

Contrary to media reports claiming a "golden intelligence" tip about Iran assembling a nuclear bomb within weeks prompted the strike, military sources say the "stack model" – a convergence of circumstances – enabled it. "It was a maturation of military capabilities and US support," one said. "We reached the best historical conditions for a strike. It was the optimal timing."

Another source familiar with the military and diplomatic arenas added, "No Hamas, no Hezbollah, Trump in office, Iran isolated, and Israel mentally prepared for destruction and killing. It was right to strike now because the geo-strategic and domestic conditions allowed it."

Someone who apparently wasn't very bothered by the accumulation of these circumstances is Argentina's President Javier Milei, who landed in Israel for a state visit last Monday. On his last day here, Milei visited the Western Wall with Netanyahu. Netanyahu used the opportunity to insert between the stones of eternity a note with a quote from Psalms: "Like a lion shall rise and as a lion shall lift itself up." Several hours later, President Milei would take off back to Argentina, and Israeli Air Force aircraft would take off toward Iran.

The next morning, Friday, June 13, Netanyahu ensured his note was publicized in the media. "He understands perception operations," smiled a source familiar with his media tactics. "Netanyahu gave himself PR for 'I knew before everyone,'" added Benayahu. "That's fine – a prime minister can do PR. By the way, I think this is the first time a prime minister, not the IDF or its computer, named a military operation."

An Israel Hayom investigation confirms that, unusually, the operation's name, "Rising Lion," was set by the political echelon.

The post The untold story of the Iran war: How Israel did the unthinkable appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

In January 2016, the Israeli Mossad discovered suspicious activity being conducted by the Iranian Defense Ministry. Intelligence information indicated that ministry personnel were diligently collecting documents from various sites throughout the country and secretly transporting them to a civilian warehouse in an industrial area in southern Tehran.

When Mossad tried to understand what these documents had in common, they concluded they were all related to the Iranian nuclear program. "Prepare to bring these materials home," ordered the then-Mossad director, Yossi Cohen, to his operatives.

It took only two years until the order, which initially seemed impossible to execute, was fulfilled with remarkable success. In January 2018, Mossad operatives broke into that warehouse in the heart of Iran and returned home with what became known as the "Iranian nuclear archive" – "half a ton of incriminating documentation about Iran's nuclear program," as described by a source who was exposed to the materials in their entirety.

Among the vast material stolen from the nuclear archive were documents that revealed intelligence previously unknown to Israel. Among other things, they revealed names and locations of several sites where Iran had previously conducted secret military nuclear activities. "These sites only came to our attention following the theft of the archive," the source says.

But the documents from the nuclear archive revealed even more. They contained unequivocal evidence of Iran's deception attempts regarding the supervision of its nuclear program. More precisely, the papers stolen from Tehran demonstrated, in black and white, how Iran did everything in its power to hide its activities from the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency of the UN, the international body supposed to monitor civilian nuclear programs worldwide and prevent the development of nuclear weapons.

The archive documents proved, then, what Israel had claimed for years – Iran repeatedly mocks IAEA inspectors and the entire world, submits false reports, forges documents, conducts deception exercises, destroys and cleanses nuclear sites to impair the ability to find incriminating evidence in them, and diverts nuclear equipment and materials from suspicious sites to hide their connection to its military nuclear program.

More than seven years after the Mossad's hair-raising operation, and with negotiations currently underway between Washington and Tehran regarding a new nuclear agreement, it's worth revisiting the Iranian nuclear archive. The information emerging from it leaves no room for doubt – for years, Iran has done everything in its power to deceive the monitoring mechanisms imposed on its nuclear program while advancing toward a nuclear bomb. There is no reason to think it will act differently this time.

Above and below the grass

One of the nuclear sites whose existence was revealed in the Iranian nuclear archive is located south of Tehran, near the city of Varamin. The stolen documents revealed that in the early 2000s, Iran operated a research and development center at the site for the production of "yellowcake" and its conversion to uranium compounds needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. According to the archive documents, at some point, some of the equipment and materials from the Varamin site were evacuated to an unidentified building in the Turquzabad neighborhood in southern Tehran, not far from the warehouse from which the nuclear archive was stolen. The documents revealed that the Turquzabad warehouse, which was presented as a carpet factory and was unknown to the intelligence community in Israel, served from 2009 as the secret storage of undeclared nuclear materials and equipment for processing them.

Additional information found in the nuclear archive concerned a site called Lavizan, which had already been identified by the Mossad as a nuclear site and had previously been investigated by the IAEA. Israel concluded that the site served as headquarters for the Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, and laboratories were established there to produce yellowcake, convert uranium, and enrich it. In 2002, the site was completely destroyed by the Iranians, the land it stood on was scrubbed and flattened, and a city park was established in its place. The nuclear archive contained pictures of the Lavizan site before and after its destruction.

In 2004, about two years after the site's destruction, IAEA inspectors requested to conduct tests at Lavizan to detect traces of enriched uranium. Among other things, the agency's inspectors demanded to sample two WBC devices for radiation safety checks for workers at nuclear sites, which were placed at the location before it was destroyed. Iran claimed then that the two devices were loaded onto containers and removed from the site. The IAEA managed to reach one container, but when it asked to sample the second container, the Iranians claimed it was sold and "no trace of it remained."

In a document from the Iranian Defense Ministry found in the nuclear archive, analyzing the ministry's involvement in issues investigated by the IAEA, concern is expressed about the agency's insistence on sampling the second device. This, according to Israeli assessment, was because the Iranians knew they would be implicated in undeclared nuclear activity if the container was examined.

Another document found in the nuclear archive revealed correspondence from 2005, in which parties involved in relations with the IAEA write that "if we are able to conclude this issue (of the IAEA investigation) through additional explanations, as happened with the destruction of Lavizan... the IAEA's excuses regarding the military center (the body in the Defense Ministry that dealt with nuclear weapons development) will end."

Meanwhile, in another document related to the uranium mine operated by the Iranians in Gchine and their yellowcake facility in Bandar Abbas, unequivocal evidence was discovered that Iran forged a document from the Iranian Ministry of Justice to support a false version given to the IAEA regarding these two sites. In another document found in the archive, the then-Deputy Defense Minister of Iran, Hoseini Tash, writes to the head of the nuclear project, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, "This (the sites in Gchine and Bandar Abbas) is one of the important issues that sooner or later they (IAEA personnel) will ask us about. Therefore, we need to have a comprehensive scenario for it." In other words, a cover story.

Secret tunnels

Iran's concealment efforts vis-à-vis the IAEA primarily relate to activities it conducted in the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly those related to its military program for developing nuclear weapons, which was named the "Amad Program." The program, led by atomic scientist Prof. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (who was assassinated near Tehran in 2020), operated between 1999-2003 and was intended to produce a small number of atomic bombs that could be mounted on a ballistic missile.

For example, documents from the Iranian nuclear archive revealed that a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, which Iran delayed reporting as a nuclear site until it was exposed as such in 2002, and which was dug for some reason at a depth of 66 feet underground, served as a model for Amad program experts, who visited Natanz and consulted with its managers regarding the establishment and operation of an additional secret enrichment site. During the visit, Amad personnel also examined centrifuges operating in Natanz.

The additional enrichment site is apparently the one exposed in Fordow in 2009. It was then discovered that for several years, the Iranians had been digging tunnels deep in the mountain and equipping them with infrastructure for uranium enrichment, with the aim of establishing a site that would not be reported to the IAEA. The Iranian intention was to continue enriching uranium to a low level in Natanz, which was placed under IAEA supervision starting in 2003, and to secretly enrich uranium to a high level in Fordow. Documents found in the nuclear archive indicate that the Fordow site was supposed to be used for enriching uranium to a level of more than 90% and in a quantity of 99 pounds per year, for the core of the nuclear weapon that the Iranians were developing as part of the Amad Program. Even after the program was frozen in 2003, Iran continued preparing the site for its original purpose, under the cover of the Atomic Energy Organization. Diagrams of the enrichment tunnels in Fordow were found in the nuclear archive, including the centrifuges planned to be installed there.

Traces of enriched uranium

When Israel considered what to do with the wealth of information that fell into its hands after stealing the Iranian nuclear archive, it was decided to share it, in its entirety, with the IAEA. "The archive was significant because it allowed us to tear the mask off the Iranian nuclear program," says a security source who was involved in the matter. "It contained a lot of previously unknown information, but such that could be brought out, and therefore we transferred it to the IAEA."

Israel also helped the IAEA locate within the archive materials the documents pointing to sites where secret enrichment of nuclear materials had previously been carried out, the area under the agency's supervision. "The IAEA only investigates fissile material activity, not weapons development, for example," explains the same security source. "Therefore, we had to sift through the materials to find violations related to fissile material within them. There are documents and signatures and leads there, which can be used to open investigations on this matter."

The IAEA, equipped with the archive documents and intelligence pointing to Iran's violations in the nuclear field, demanded that Iran allow it to conduct tests at several undeclared sites in the country, but these requests were repeatedly rejected with various strange excuses. Israel decided to apply diplomatic pressure – in April 2018, during his speech at the UN General Assembly, Netanyahu exposed the Turquzabad site to the entire world and criticized the IAEA, which he said refused to conduct tests at the site even after secretly receiving the Iranian nuclear archive materials.

The pressure apparently worked, and the IAEA increased its demands from Iran. In sampling conducted by the IAEA in Varamin in early 2019, traces of nuclear materials were indeed found, including processed natural uranium particles, low-enriched uranium containing the isotope uranium-236, indicating its irradiation in a nuclear reactor, and depleted uranium, which is a result of enrichment. This was conclusive proof that the nuclear archive documents were authentic.

The tests in Turquzabad were also conducted only after a lengthy period. In the IAEA's inspection of the site, traces of natural uranium were eventually detected, confirming the assessment that prohibited nuclear activity had taken place at the site. The explanations given by Iran, stating that the site was used to produce chemical compounds for civilian industry, were rejected by the IAEA because they did not match the findings on the ground. The explanations provided by Iran regarding the site in Varamin were also rejected by the IAEA.

The Iranian delays, designed to postpone again and again the visit of IAEA inspectors to the sites in Varamin and Turquzabad, were not in vain. In accordance with their known methodology, and as they did with the Lavizan site that became a city park, the Iranians used the time to completely destroy the suspicious sites. The site in Varamin, for instance, was flattened and currently serves as an agricultural farm.

These efforts, however, did not prevent the IAEA from finding traces of enriched uranium at both these sites. "The Iranians destroyed and turned over the soil and poured water on it, but it didn't help," explains a former intelligence community source. "It's very difficult to eliminate evidence of enriched uranium, which sticks to the smallest level of the molecule. You don't wash it away, and it disappears, and that's what happened to them."

The intelligence from the Iranian nuclear archive and the findings of the tests conducted by IAEA inspectors as a result became a breakthrough in Israel's diplomatic struggle against the Iranian nuclear program – in 2019, the IAEA, in an unusual move, opened four investigations against Iran for undeclared nuclear material, based on the archive materials and given the name "the open files." Israel could then mark a checkmark on the decision to transfer the archive materials to the IAEA. "Without the Iranian archive, it would not have been possible to obtain the information that the IAEA discovered in Iran," says a defense establishment source with satisfaction.

Every possible violation

However, the IAEA's activity around "the open files" ultimately ended in almost nothing. Israel did claim a diplomatic achievement when it exposed Iran's nakedness to the world, but in practice, two of the files were closed by the IAEA relatively quickly, and the other two remain open and do not seem likely to lead to definitive conclusions, let alone substantial actions against Iran. Meanwhile, Iran continued to sabotage the IAEA's monitoring capabilities, did not allow the agency to bring inspectors into its territory, and repeatedly rejected the agency's inspections with various claims.

All these led the IAEA Chairman, Rafael Grossi, to admit a year ago that "Iran is weeks, not months, away from a nuclear bomb," and that "the fact that we are not getting the level of access needed to nuclear sites in the country only makes the situation worse."

Grossi's words should echo in the ears of the Americans, who are currently negotiating with Iran about its nuclear program. The starting point in Washington must be that Iran will, again, do everything in its power to violate the terms of the agreement and continue to advance toward a bomb.

The post How Mossad stole Iran's nuclear playbook appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.