Four and a half months into the Gaza war, it is time to revisit the goals set by the government. Israel has achieved some of them with great success, some partially, and some are clear failures.
The first goal is to dismantle Hamas' military capabilities. So far, 18 out of 24 fighting battalions have been destroyed. The remaining four in Rafah and two in the central refugee camps are still active. Based on experience so far, it will take another 6 to 8 weeks until they are dismantled once the order is given.
Even after the battalions are no longer functioning militarily, the IDF will have much work for many months down the road. Hamas will try to rebuild, mainly through local guerilla forces staging pinpointed attacks, and the IDF will go in and out of different areas in the strip to address emerging threats, similar to the pattern in the West Bank after Operation Defensive Shield.
Anyone expecting terrorism to drop to zero is spreading dangerous illusions. Israel dealt with Gaza attacks even before the 2005 pullout and will deal with attacks in the future as well – including sporadic rocket and mortar fire.
The second goal is to eliminate Hamas' governing capabilities. While Israel has heavily damaged governing institutions in the strip, Hamas' control of the territory remains firm. Because they are responsible for food and fuel supply, they maintain power, especially because their leaders have not been harmed and continue to instill fear among Gazans.
In this context of eliminating senior officials, Israel has seen utter failure: The entire Hamas leadership – Yahya Sinwar, Mohammad Deif, and Marwan Issa – still lives and functions.
The third goal is returning the captives. As of Saturday, negotiations have been at an impasse, with each side blaming the other for refusing to find a way out. The prime minister said he refused to agree to Hamas' outrageous demands (ceasefire and full withdrawal from the strip) but he has not said what he did agree to and especially evaded the question of why he excluded the War Cabinet from decision-making on this issue.
The fourth goal is preventing regional escalation. While fighting in the north is intensifying, so far Israel and Hezbollah have succeeded in avoiding an all-out war.
While Israel has inflicted heavy blows on Hezbollah, especially on the border, it pays a heavy price in the ongoing evacuation of tens of thousands of residents and damage to businesses and agriculture in the north. Worse still, it is unclear how the situation in the north will fundamentally change, as the government promised, and when this will happen.
The fifth goal is maintaining international legitimacy for the war. This is a mixed bag for Israel: On the one hand, Israel has enough backing to continue fighting; on the other, it steadily accumulates yellow cards that could turn into a red one.T he growing friction with the US and Egypt is especially worrying and requires immediate attention to minimize future problems.
Above all these, the cracks in national unity are troubling. On October 7 it seemed Israel had put all disputes behind it and gone out to fight as one unified entity. This is still the prevailing sentiment in the IDF and among the masses of volunteers, but our politics is steadily drifting away from there.
Netanyahu was right to ask that people not listen to those trying to divide; it would be even better if he would set a personal example and start implementing this himself as well.
