Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror is a former national security adviser. In his last post in the IDF, he served as head of the Research Department at the Military Intelligence Directorate.

When 'facts' are based in ignorance

Ami Ayalon, the former head of the Navy and Shin Bet security agency, was right when he said baseless hatred motivated the allegations put forth by investigative television program "Uvda" ("Fact") – whereby senior defense and intelligence officials might have been wiretapped. Let me just add, if he is wrong and hatred isn't the reason, then the allegations of "Uvda" are based on pure ignorance.

The job of the Shin Bet and the Office of the Director of Security of the Defense Establishment is to make sure that vital national security secrets are kept safe, either from leaks or mistakes. They are authorized to take any measure they see fit to safeguard those secrets, including wiretapping people deemed relevant as long as it is done through the proper legal channels. These aren't issues of mistrust; rather necessary safety measures. People who join the security agencies understand oversight is part of the package, and that the higher up they ascend the ranks, the more secrets they will be exposed to – and the clearer is the need to safeguard them.

Refusing in principle to implement these measures would be irresponsible. I can think of instances where the refusal to utilize these basic safety mechanisms led Israel to the brink of serious danger. In my estimation, they are used too sparingly.

Three notes on "Uvda":

(1) Not everything that one thinks should be said, and not everything that is said should be broadcast. No one has ever regretted something that wasn't said. As it says in the rabbinical literature: "Wise men watch what they say." The Prophet Amos noted that "the prudent keep quiet in such times, for the times are evil" (5:13). Rabbi Akiva said: "A protective fence for wisdom is silence." These things are true sevenfold in the shadowy world of espionage. Almost invariably, the damage caused by talking outweighs the expected benefits, not to mention the harm it causes to those still operating in the shadows, persevering righteously in their anonymity.

(2) Professor Mordechai Kremnitzer erred in his expansive interpretation of Basic Law: The Government. According to the law, only the government (amended to include the cabinet) can decide to go to war. The jurists expanded on this with the logical reasoning that even a military operation that isn't categorized as a war, but has the high probability of becoming one – should be subject to a similar process. Kremnitzer's position, however, that even preparations for such an operation require such a process, is baseless. Preparations, due to their very nature, should be kept a secret and they can almost always be shelved, even if they have already cost a great deal of money and the risk to the soldiers increases. If even preparations need cabinet approval it will be hard if not impossible to surprise the enemy. The authority to order such preparations must remain in the hands of the prime minister and defense minister – provided that these preparations cannot be cancelled and their main objective is to minimize the time it takes between execution and the decision to execute (by the cabinet, of course).

(3) The intelligence tools and military capabilities should serve the country's diplomatic and strategic needs. In most cases, these needs fall beyond the purview of the army and intelligence chiefs; they are determined by the political echelon, and in Israel this is mainly the responsibility of the prime minister. It isn't surprising therefore that sometimes Israel's security chiefs don't understand the behavior of the political leadership. This is true when it comes to making war and peace alike.

Thus, for example, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin decided not to inform anyone in the army or intelligence community about the developments that led to the Oslo Accords – which impacted Israel's fate more significantly than most military operations or wars. Ultimately, responsibility falls on the shoulders of the prime minister and it would be prudent to leave him considerable operational leeway over the matter of diplomatic agreements and decisions rather than handcuff him with too many regulations.

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