In light of the scenarios being circulated politically and in the media about the post-war phase in Gaza, there are things that must be paid close attention to, the most important of which is that it is very difficult to draw a scenario for this phase in light of data whose features are not yet clear.
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The issue here is not only related to the fate of the terrorist Hamas movement and its leaders but to other complex matters that must be carefully guarded so that the sector does not turn into a trap to attract regional and international attention to the exclusion of the rest of the main and subsidiary aspects of the Palestinian issue.
Among the points that should be taken into consideration in the post-Gaza phase is the strong entry of the Iranian factor as a major active player in the Palestinian issue, as it is difficult to deny the reality that Iran has come out from behind the curtain and succeeded in imposing itself forcefully on the facts of the Palestinian file. But what must be done is to prevent Tehran from translating these gains into the political and diplomatic influence that it uses to impose itself at any future negotiating table regarding the Palestinians, especially since it is difficult to remove the Iranian factor from the scene even if Hamas and its leaders are eliminated in the current conflict.
There is another point related to the fact that Iran may not remain silent if the conflict in Gaza comes close to achieving the goal of ending the influence of the terrorist Hamas movement in the Strip, as Iran is expected to push strongly towards expanding the circle of conflict through its various arms.
This is an expected and logical scenario because the defeat of "Hamas" will motivate Israel to confront the remaining sources of the terrorist threat that it faced in the Gaza war, and here we mean primarily the Lebanese "Hezbollah", and to a lesser extent the "Houthi" militia, provided that it leaves the matter to the factions loyal to Iran in Iraq and to a greater extent. Less in Syria for American forces.
Here we point out that the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard are now making standard measurements and comparisons of the balance of power, and may reach false conclusions regarding the limits of American and Israeli power, meaning the conduct of battles on the ground in Gaza.
Regardless of the human and material losses that do not concern the Iranians, and regardless of the nature of unconventional wars that do not reflect the true combat efficiency of regular armies, regardless of their degree of development, they may be tempted to expand the circle of conflict to achieve a great strategic dream, which is defeating Israel and behind it the United States.
This explains, for example, the statement of the Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Abbas Mousavi, in which he said that "if Iran intervenes in the conflict, Israel will be buried in the Mediterranean," as well as the statement of the Assistant Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, who said that the United States "will be humiliated in this current war," noting that American interests are exposed to the anger of peoples all over the world.
The other thing that may tempt the Iranian regime to push its arms to expand the conflict is the Iranian regime's growing conviction that there are shifts in the positions of international and American public opinion against Israel and the current American administration.
It is a conviction in which the Revolutionary Guard may see an appropriate environment for making the decision to wage a broad conflict against Israel without great fear of an American reaction in light of the existing traditional constraints on the White House's decision, whether traditional (the Biden administration's keenness to avoid military conflicts) or emergency by action. Transformations within America and the positions of the major powers regarding what is happening in the Middle East.
There is another important point that international and regional influence on the Israeli decision regarding the future of the Gaza Strip will depend on the outcome of this war.
Therefore, it is difficult to demarcate the boundaries of the roles at a time when the data that will determine the roles are still absent, or at least not final. The evidence indicates that Israel has imposed its opinion regarding the rejection of any ceasefire, did not yield to any pressure in this regard, and was able to direct the course of the war according to what You decide it.
Therefore, it can be said that it will repeat the same scenario if it succeeds in imposing its final say on the sector, and therefore it will be the one who will decide who manages what? And the nature and limits of the roles of each party, and here it is difficult to accept the idea of accepting the handover of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority, at least in the first stages after the end of the war.
In explaining the escalating Israeli position, it can be noted that Hamas' condition at the beginning of the war was the release of all hostages in exchange for emptying Israeli prisons of Palestinian detainees.
This condition has been withdrawn and has now stopped at the possibility of handing over the hostages in exchange for a ceasefire. This is a reflection of the intense military pressure exerted by Israel, and Hamas' desire to catch its breath and rethink the deployment of its forces and equipment, and its realization that continuing the war at the current pace will actually end the tunnel network, which It represents the lifeblood of the movement, its activities, and its leaders.
My personal conviction is that Israel will not accept any of the scenarios currently being circulated among international and regional parties, including the American ones, as they will all serve as indicative scenarios, nothing more and nothing less. With full confidence in obtaining full American support for whatever Israel decides in this regard, whatever it may be.
This gives Israel a large margin of maneuver that prompts it to say that the idea of the Gaza Strip remaining under full management by any Palestinian party or the presence of other Arab parties has disappeared, assuming that any Arab country accepts this role, which is highly unlikely.
In any case, what comes after Gaza will not be the same as it was before it, and it is too early to draw an expected picture of the future scene, and the scene on the ground is very complex and completely unprecedented, so there are many regional and international parties seeking to tip the balance in favor of each side of the conflict because Gaza can answer many questions. Of questions and shapes the features of the new Middle East.
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