The Iranian elections are no longer attracting the usual interest, both externally and internally, for several reasons and considerations.
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One of them is that the regime has robbed the election of its meaning by the Guardian Council's exclusion of most of the candidates of the so-called reformist current so that the contest is limited to the hardline current, or rather between the hardliners and the even more hardline currents.
Regardless of the officially announced turnout figures, the scenes at the ballot boxes – according to reliable media reports and numerous testimonies – have not achieved the regime's goal, which hoped that the actual turnout would surpass that of the 2020 elections, which was the lowest in the history of Iranian parliamentary elections with only about 42% of the total vote.
Iranian elections are generally a means of gaining popular legitimacy and not, as usual, a mechanism for transferring power, as power in the Velayat-e Faqih system is limited to those who are loyal to the regime and its basic principles.
Therefore, we do not tend to adopt the prevailing division into conservatives and reformists, as all belong to the same theocratic school of government, with variations. These are allowed by the regime's leadership in order to give foreign policy some formal flexibility and maneuverability to achieve the regime's goals by switching between positions and policies.
This is to suggest that Iranian behavior and orientations are changing. In reality, however, this change is nothing more than a political tactic to achieve strategic goals. What is certain is that the reins of Iranian political positions remain in the hands of the top of the power pyramid, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in any case.
Notwithstanding this, the recent Iranian elections were not without significance, especially the exclusion of former President Hassan Rouhani from the Assembly of Experts elections, which were held in parallel with the Shura Council elections.
This exclusion raised several question marks but seems an understandable move given the powers of this council (composed of 88 members of the clergy elected by direct popular vote for a term of eight years) and its constitutional duties, notably the appointment and selection of the Supreme Leader.
It is expected that in the next term (8 years) a successor will be elected for the current leader Ali Khamenei (83 years old), who is suffering from a difficult health condition. The regime's leading elite of regime scholars is keen to exclude any vote that might contradict their consensus in choosing the leader.
There have been similar experiences in previous Assembly of Experts election cycles, including the rejection of the candidacies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Larijani. It is striking that the Guardian Council recognizes Hassan Rouhani as ineligible to run, even though he has been a member of the council for 24 years, which means that it is a political exclusion of the former president.
Iranian politics is no longer in the hands of the institutions concerned, as the Revolutionary Guards and their leaders have clearly taken the lead in recent years, while the role of elected institutions has diminished, notwithstanding the selective control mechanism of these elections.
The Shura Council has merged with the regime and fully embraced its policies given the dominance of the hardline current over the council's seats, and lacked any counter-voice, except one that uses other tactics to achieve the regime's goals.
Given the geopolitical tensions surrounding Iran, it was difficult for the Iranian regime to admit the decline in its popularity by revealing the actual turnout in the recent parliamentary elections, especially after voting was extended by two additional hours to attract more voters.
The Iranian leadership showed an unusual interest in voter turnout, as Khamenei considered voting a "national duty" and said that "Iran's enemies are closely watching the presence of the Iranian people," suggesting that poor turnout "threatens national security."
The Revolutionary Guards argued that a strong turnout in the parliamentary elections would prevent "foreign intervention" related to the Gaza war, suggesting that the regime wants to suggest to the United States and Israel that the Iranian people are rallying around the Iranian regime.
These are things that do not follow any real logic, because the West knows very well what is happening in Iran and it is not fooled by the statistics and indicators that the regime proclaims, be it about voter turnout or other things.
In fact, this is the second election cycle for the Iranian Shura Council, in which the marginalization of the so-called moderate or reformist current continues in order to consolidate the dominance of the hardliners. It can also be said that the regime is playing a major role in the decline of voter turnout by eliminating any competition.
Regardless of the results, the political composition of the new council will not change much after everyone in the Iranian political scene belongs to a single ideological and political spectrum that embraces the same ideas and orientations with slight variations in the degree of hardliner tendencies depending on their interests and vision for their political future.
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