Syria is a linchpin in the developing geostrategic situation in the Middle East and as to what the long-term results of over a decade of regional upheavals will be. This past decade of Middle Eastern revolutions-at least as dramatic and convulsing as Europe's 1848 Spring Time of Revolutions-along with the drawing of battle lines in the area between regional and world powers, came on the heels of a previous decade of direct American intervention and now withdrawal from the region.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter
Iran, Turkey, the moderate Sunni Arab countries, Russia, and Israel all now have strategic and vested interests in what develops in Syria as part of what is a highly refined realpolitik situation. The United States and Europe are also highly attentive to what the ultimate outcome in Syria will be although they are less willing and able to be directly involved in effecting that outcome due to the growing disengagement of the US mentioned, and the fatigue it has incurred both domestically and internationally from its involvement in the Middle East in general since 2001. Now once again like the sands of its deserts, the interests and relationships in the region are shifting.
The UAEhas reportedly been in contact with the Assad regime in Damascus in an effort to basically sway him and Syria back into the Arab fold and away from Iran and its imperial schemes. Having to deal with the Assad regime one way or another was all but assured years ago after the disastrous policies and lack of action by the US administration of President Barack Obama, when rhetorical non-existent lines were drawn for Bashar Assad and Iran was seen more as an asset and partner against ISIS by the US, rather than a regional hegemon and the greatest exporter of terror and mayhem in the history of the modern Middle East. With Russia's subsequent intervention on his behalf, Assad would go on to assure his survivability and control over at least part of Syria as a geographic entity.
Fast forward to today, with Russia not all that interested in competing with Iran in Syria, and Iran's imperial ambitions there not a part of Russia's strategic vision, an opportunity has presented itself to pull Assad away from the Ayatollahs and remind him that even after a horrifying and blood-soaked sectarian civil war, Syria is not Persian, and the Alawites and Shi'ites in the country aren't either, and so the probing by the Emiratis.
It is an open question still as to whether Assad will respond positively to these contacts with the Emirati's but this channel is not the only one working to change the partnerships present in the region since 2010 and to a certain extent before that. The recent face-to-face meeting between the Israeli Prime Minister and Russian President also dealt with Syria as well as Iran. A meeting that reportedly lasted five hours no less. These are topics that are always part of the Israeli-Russian discourse in recent years, but in conjunction with the other regional 'dialogues' that have been developing, there could be momentum building for more conclusive joint initiatives on the issue of Syria specifically.
If Israel and Russia can come to terms on a "grand deal" as it were for Syria the newly minted Abraham Accords and the deep clandestine relations which proceeded them could bring the moderate Sunni Arab states to round out such a deal and provide Assad incentives beyond the already major ones provided by Russia [security, stability, and a buffer against Turkey and Iran swallowing Syria whole]. Russia would like neither imperialistic fundamentalist Iran nor imperialistic Islamist Turkey to dominate Syria. Both countries were useful to Russia in neutralizing various rebel groups who opposed each of the three nations' tactical and strategic goals [in a complex web of oftentimes "strange bedfellow" partnerships] in Syria and the region.
In the case of Iran and more specifically its proxies, they also served as the bulk of the foot soldiers alongside Assad's own troops, in preserving the regime and battling not only rebel groups but the threat posed to Damascus by ISIS and Al-Qaida affiliated groups. This allowed the Russians to focus more on special operations and air and naval strikes in Syria, rather than pouring large amounts of ground troops into the arena and risking a debacle like their experience in Afghanistan in the 1980's or that of the Americans there and in Iraq in the last two decades.
Russia, as has been the case for most of its history, will in the end pursue Russia's best interest and not impair or degrade that interest because of partners that are no longer useful or even more so partners who become competitors\rivals.
Israel for its part has made it clear over the years to Russia that it will not tolerate in any way what are essentially forward offensive forces of Iran in Syria and the use of Syria as a bridge to its other expeditionary forces and outposts in Iraq and Lebanon- existential and intolerable threats to Israel. After numerous strikes, overt and covert, against those forces in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq [attributed mostly by foreign reports to Israel], while at the same time Assad has had his position in Damascus become more stable and no longer under the immediate threat of rebel or Sunni Jihadist removal, Russia is now in a position to close accounts with both Iran and Turkey.
This would allow for Assad to be more fully relieved of Israel potentially eliminating his regime in the context of it being part of Iran's aspiring neo-Persian empire, as well as from the Sunni Arab states taking varied actions against him including ostracizing Syria indefinitely for much the same reason.
As for Turkey, it would want to hold onto or maintain a sphere of influence at the very least in areas of northern Syria. In a "grand deal" both Russia and Israel would want limits on such a presence, or its removal entirely, and that could lead to Turkey, as it has in other instances in the region, to have an alignment of interests with Iran, and attempt to obstruct such a deal.
There is no love lost between Ankara and Moscow both historically and more recently including direct confrontations in Syria only a few years ago. President Erdogan and his Muslim Brotherhood based government's sabotaging of once model and intimate relations between Israel and Turkey are infamous. Assad then will potentially have to face the choice of taking a stronger Russian backed position of moving to take control of Syria's northern border regions, relegating those regions to an exterritorial status, or more provocatively but less likely, allow the strengthening of the Kurds in the area to neutralize Erdogan's designs for it. Strengthening Kurdish autonomy and self-determination in the region in fact is not only just, but as seen by a joint statement in September of this year from Irbil in the Kurdish autonomous region of Iraq, by Sunni Arab, Kurdish, and even some Shi'ite Iraqi's, calling for Iraq to join the Abraham Accords, it is a strategic asset for the forces of stability, security, and prosperity in the region.
The bottom line is Israel must continue and when necessary, intensify, its years long proactive and decisive stance on Syria and against the hostile forces therein for a "grand deal" to come to fruition, or alternatively, to fully remove the threat of Iran and its proxies from the country. In other words, results through strength and resolve. Israel's standing and position amongst the moderate Sunni Arab states, it's relationship with Russia and potentially a more regionally involved China, the expansion of the Abraham Accords, and the ultimate defeat of Iran itself, are all highly effected by what Israel has done and will do in relation to the linchpin that is Syria.
Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!
