The uptick in terrorist attacks in recent weeks has seen a growing call for another counterterrorism operation the likes of 2002's Operation Defensive Shield in Arab localities and in West Bank cities. These calls are purely populist and are disconnected from reality: in the absence of specific intelligence on the whereabouts of weapons, not only will military raids in the midst of population centers bear little fruits, but it will also lead to mass unrest.
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There is no doubt that there is a need to increase efforts to find and seize weapons in Arab society by increasing cooperation between the Israeli security forces themselves, and between them and the Arab sector's leaders, but doing that is far removed from launching a military campaign against Arab Israelis.
Even a comprehensive Defensive Shield-like operation in West Bank cities is not applicable at this time, both for reasons of international legitimacy and because it would most likely be counterproductive. The more likely possibility is to intensify military pressure on Jenin, employing both methods to isolate it, as well as dealing it as many surgical blows as possible.
Focusing on Jenin makes sense: As a known hub of terrorist activity, it represents the "snake's head": several Gilboa Prison fugitives fled to the city before being captured; a terror cell en route to carry out an attack in Israel was eliminated on the city outskirts last week, and the terrorists who gunned down Israelis in Bnei Brak and Tel Aviv both hailed from the Jenin area, and both were clearly well trained, given the damage they were able to inflict.
In addition, the Palestinian security forces have long since withdrawn from the city, which is now under the control of the various terrorist factions and predominately the Islamic Jihad. All this makes Jenin the "smoking gun" and it should be a top priority for counterterrorism operations in terms of public opinion at home and abroad.
Beyond the inherent efficiency of focusing such efforts on a single location, the gradual use of force is easier for the public to comprehend and it reduces the potential risk of a flare-up across the entire West Bank.
Jenin is also considered the most challenging of the West Bank cities: during the 2002 operation, the refugee camp in the city proved a stubborn adversary and it is where the IDF sustained the largest number of casualties. Since then, decision-makers have been reluctant to order ground operations in urban centers.
This psychological barrier seems to have been broken, and apart from the deterrent effect of a successful military operation in Jenin, it could also serve as a "pilot" in public diplomacy efforts ahead of future military action in other West Bank cities, if that proves necessary.
This also represents an opportunity for Israel to work with the Palestinian Authority. In November 2021, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas tried to seize weapons from the armed organizations in Jenin and failed. His security forces entered Jenin's refugee camp only to leave with their tails between their legs. Thus for Israel and the PA to combine their efforts to restore governance to Jenin, it would be more efficient in terms of sparing lives – on both sides.
One must remember, however, that no military operation can presume to permanently uproot terrorism nest or quell the motivation to carry out terrorist attacks – neither in Jenin nor anywhere else.
Despite the constant pressure from various security forces, terrorist organizations in the West Bank have continued to carry out terrorist attacks in Israel proper as well. Therefore, it seems that there is no alternative to mounting a wide-scale operation from time to time, to undermine the recovering capabilities of Palestinian terrorist organizations. If this buys us peace, even temporarily, it will have to do.
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