Defense Minister Benny Gantz's meeting last week with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas drew, as expected, criticism from one side of the political spectrum and praise form the other. As far as politics and security go, the meeting was legitimate. The question on which we should focus is what political vision led to it in the first place, and what trends it sought to promote.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
The repeated policy of the Israeli government is that it will not promote any significant diplomatic steps, whether they be annexation or a peace deal. It's also clear to the PA and the Americans what constraints the Israeli leadership is under. But in the meantime, things on the ground can't stay as they are. This is what is causing concern about the process the defense minister is leading. While all the actors have realized that there will be no official diplomatic steps in the next two years, it appears as if Gantz is working to move toward two states, under the radar. In a creeping process of a fraction of an acre here and there, encouraged by the US administration, a Palestinian state is being built in areas that go over what the PA has already received in Areas A and B.
There has been much discussion about Palestinian construction and encroachment in Area C. It's possible that the defense minister thinks that ultimately, most of what is currently defined as Area C will be transferred to Palestinian hands, anyway. He envisions Israel holding onto the settlement blocs that are near the Green Line, which is about 3% of Judea and Samaria, as well as a narrow strip the length of the Jordan Valley.
The main difference between the post-peace deal maps proposed by the late Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert has to do with the role of Area C. On Rabin's map, this territory was vital to Israel's security outlook, whereas Barak and Olmert saw it as a "deposit" for a future agreement, to be handed over at the end of the process.
After more than 25 years, one can cast a critical eye over the vision of security for Judea and Samaria vs. the one that has taken shape for the Gaza Strip. Especially after the disengagement in 2005, Gaza came to be surrounded by a contiguous border that determined the operations of IDF forces deployed along it, with the separation being complete – "They're there, and we're here." It has become a difficult military operation for the IDF to cross the border into Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas.
This reality has led to the IDF losing its ability to operate deep in the Hamas-controlled area. In contrast, in Judea and Samaria – thanks to Rabin's creative views, which led to the division of the territory into Areas A, B, and C – the IDF still has almost unlimited freedom to operate. Among other things, led to the success of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 and what still allows IDF forces to pursue terrorists and arrest them without sending in heavy forces.
The way in which Area C is interwoven between Areas A and B is an expression of a unique take on security that in the 25 years since it was conceived continues to prove its efficacy in terms of defense. The Palestinian Authority's subversive construction in Area C, as well as the Israeli concessions the defense minister is promoting, are eating away at the territorial infrastructure that Rabin laid out as vital to Israel's security. Herein lies the danger of a plan for new boundaries that the IDF Civil Administration is backing, which would see an expansion of Palestinian quarries next to main roads in Area C.
The processes that Defense Minister Gantz is promoting for Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley are part of Israel's overall defense and security outlook and have significance for the country's future, and as such should be the subject of public debate.
Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!
