The Prime Minister's Office put in overtime this week in an attempt to glorify an operation to discover more information about missing IAF navigator Ron Arad. Energetic representatives discussed a daring, successful mission that had led to progress in the attempt to find out what happened to Arad.
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It was embarrassing. The mission was indeed daring, but that is the Mossad – a spy agency that operates in foreign countries, some hostile. The Mossad has carried out endless missions over the years, some much more daring than this latest one, on the Arad matter. It never occurred to anyone to make them public, for two main reasons: they did not lead to anything that would shed light on Arad's fate, and the Mossad is supposed to operate in the shadows. Anything that exposes its activity does it harm.
When new Mossad director Dadi Barnea took over four months ago, he made it clear that he would handle things differently than his predecessor, Yossi Cohen. He forbade Mossad employees and ex-employees from any contact with the media and made a commitment to putting the organization back under a veil of secrecy, which is what many of its personnel wanted to happen.
It's unclear whether Barnea was involved in the prime minister's decision to expose the mission, or whether he was simply assigned to report it. But the Mossad heard and was furious, and they weren't the only ones. Other branches of the security establishment couldn't understand why it was so urgent for Bennett to reveal an operation that ultimately changed nothing.
Upping the risk ante
It's doubtful if there is anyone who has made more use of sensitive intelligence than Benjamin Netanyahu. Since he exposed the Stauber Document in the Knesset in 1995, when he was opposition leader, Netanyahu racked up impressive mileage. Still, even if every such revelation yielded him a nice political dividend, there was something to each one, whether it was the strike on the Syrian nuclear reactor or the theft of the Iranian nuclear archive.
But Bennett achieved nothing by exposing this mission, because the mission achieved nothing. Ruling out information that was ridiculous anyway – and committees over the years have determined that it did not meet the standards of plausibility – is important so Israel can look at itself and honestly say it left no stone unturned, but there was no breakthrough.
If we can trust foreign report, Israel captured an Iranian general from Syria, questioned him in Africa, ruled out the possibility he had any information about Arad (obviously, including the unsubstantiated claim that Arad had been taken to Iran and disappeared there), and let him go. The general returned to Iran and probably reported what happened. The Iranians decided to keep it to themselves, until the matter was made public this week.
Now they have to respond. Israel has once again humiliated them. They could live with the story as long as it was kept quiet. Just like Assad was able to ignore the destruction of his reactor, because Israel never bragged about the strike. But the moment the reports came out, considerations of national honor, which are so dominant in our region, arose. This means a major rise in the risk of terrorist attacks targeting Israelis abroad, especially individuals with ties to the defense and security establishment.
That is what happened in Cyprus this week, although it's unlikely that the two are related. Iran operates terrorist infrastructure around the world as a matter of routine. The ground was probably laid in Cyprus before the general was captured, so that Israeli businesspeople on the island could be targeted.
Five or six businesspeople like these were called and warned that their lives were in danger. Some chose to leave Cyprus, others were assigned security details.
A few other similar networks have been thwarted elsewhere. We can assume that Israel (or Israeli intelligence) had a hand in some or all of these actions, which serve all sides concerned: Israel protected its citizens, and the host country avoided terrorist attacks in its territory. Naturally, all these events were kept secret, as the latest Arad mission should have been.
It's doubtful that exposures like these will build Bennett's leadership. The prime minister commands the Mossad, and doesn't need to brag about its achievements. If there is any doubt, Bennett should talk to Ehud Olmert, who said nothing about the attack on the Syrian reactor, which could have served him well at an extremely difficult political time.
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We need to admit it: The mystery of Arad's fate might never be solved. Israel has long since gotten to everyone who might know something, but has not been able to determine unequivocally that Arad is no longer alive. Still, it is very likely that we do know the answer – that Arad was killed on the night of May 4, 1988, near the Lebanese village Nabi Shayth, where he had been held. That same night, the IDF was operating against terrorist targets in the nearby village Maydoon, and Arad was killed when he tried to flee, or as revenge. There is no official proof of this, either, but until that date there is clear information about what happened to him, where he was being held and by whom, and after that date the trail goes cold, leaving only a black hole.
Nevertheless, it's good that the government continues to do everything it can, even if it's clear it won't lead to anything concrete. Next week it will be 35 years since Ron Arad was taken captive. Rather than bragging about operations, it would be better for the country's leaders to bow their heads and ask the forgiveness of anyone it sent on a mission and has been unable to bring home.
