Now in its fifth week, the current U.S. government shutdown is officially the longest in the country's history. The reason: A dispute between President Donald Trump and the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives over the construction of a border wall with Mexico. Trump wants the wall, while the Democrats refuse to allocate a budget for its construction, and so the government is now closed for business.
But there is also an Israeli angle to this story that goes beyond the fact that we could also do with a few government agencies shutting down for a while. In the American public discourse, Israel's border walls and fences are cited as examples of how problems can be solved through the erection of a physical barrier on the border.
Announcing the government shutdown, Trump said, "If you really want to find out how effective a wall is, just ask Israel ... [It's] 99.9% effective. And our wall will be every bit as good as that, if not better."
So why has Israel's security fence become such a symbol of success?
There are four types of borders in Israel: The borders with Lebanon, Syria and Jordan; the border with the Gaza Strip; the border with Egypt; and the separation fence in Judea and Samaria. When people compare the situation in Israel to that of the U.S., they are usually referring to the fence on the Egyptian border. Sometimes, though, they cite the separation fence in Judea and Samaria, which "put an end to terrorism."
It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that it was the first to be erected, under then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the height of the Oslo peace process in the 1990s, no one has mentioned the fence on Israel's border with Gaza. But the reason for this is fairly obvious: The Gaza border fence isn't exactly effective. Unlike the myth of "separating" from the Palestinians, a physical barrier, in and of itself, is not enough. This is also true of the separation fence; it is not the fence that provided the security but the Israel Defense Forces' war on terrorism during and following 2002's Operation Defensive Shield.
In his research into the effectiveness of the security fence, Bar-Ilan University Professor Hillel Frisch examined the number of terrorist attacks and terror victims on both sides of the Green Line, both before and after the erection of the fence. According to his findings, the number of attacks decreased most drastically in the time leading up to the completion of the fence, and not upon or following its completion. Moreover, he found that the number of attacks inside Judea and Samaria, meaning the area not protected by the fence, dropped quicker than it did outside the Green Line.
Frisch's findings are clear: "The offensive factor was proven more important than the defensive factor, meaning the fence." Proof for this theory can also be found in abundance in an analysis of the differences between Gaza and Judea and Samaria: What is it that prevents the Judean Hills from turning into a base for launching Palestinian rockets, as is the case in Gaza, if not the offensive steps the IDF has taken there?
A similar principle also applies to the situation on the Egyptian border, where the border fence was mistakenly perceived as the only factor that led to the curbing of illegal migration. On the face of things, it makes sense. Before the final segment of the border fence was completed in 2012, Israel was flooded with infiltrators at a record pace of 1,500 people a month. Completion of the fence brought the number of infiltrators down to several dozens.
But alongside the establishment of the physical barrier, a number of additional steps were implemented, among them the legislation of new laws aimed at curbing infiltration and the establishment of the Holot detention center in Israel's south. The necessity of the complementary legislative effort has been confirmed by facts on the ground: Israel recorded an increase in the number of infiltrations around the time when the High Court of Justice struck down portions of the Prevention of Infiltration Law in 2015: 231 in 2015 compared to 44 in 2014.
Furthermore, Israel employed its "immediate return" policy, which allowed the use of force with the aim of return infiltrators caught at the border to Egypt. Between 2007 and 2009, the policy was partially implemented, and infiltration stood at a few thousand a year. Appeals to the High Court on the matter let to a policy freeze, and in 2010, the dam was burst, with 14,624 infiltrators entering Israel in 2010, compared to 5,191 in 2009.
Although the fence certainly helps, without the means and appropriate legislation, it would be a lot less effective. Without tight security and a legislative package of complementary laws, even Israel's glorious fence would be nothing more than a joke. The reason for this is simple: It is not just fences and walls that protect the border, but also, and mainly, the determination of the nation behind them.
