Tempers flared on the Right last week when MK Matan Kahana implied that the Yamina party wouldn't discard the possibility of forming a government with the left-wing Meretz party after an early election. No less disconcerting were his other comments, which didn't receive the proper coverage: "In any case, over the next four years there's no chance to implement the Right's diplomatic vision." Even under the assumption that Kahana said those things due to Joe Biden's apparent election victory in the US, it still raises a lot of questions. Does a Democratic president in the White House mean the Right must clip its ideological wings for the next four years? Will Iran also wait four years for the Right to regain its senses? What about the fight on the Palestinian front? Everyone knows there's no such thing as an ideological vacuum.
However, this doesn't just indicate ideological weakness, early capitulation and a clear case of compromising non-leadership. When you add to Kahana's comment the infamous phone call between Ayelet Shaked and Haim Saban, the picture becomes clearer. Yamina, it appears, isn't afraid of a new administration in Washington that won't have the same view of diplomatic-security reality as the Israeli right. Just the opposite, it sees it as an opportunity. A change of policy provides a pretext, a golden opportunity even, for Yamina to continue distancing itself from nationalist ideology and focus "only on the coronavirus." And if the pandemic soon comes to an end? Now Yamina has a new alibi for expanding its era of "centralism," at least another four years.
The tragedy of this story is that we've already seen it. In every election campaign in recent years, the right-wing parties have put aside national and governmental ideology for a temporary embrace from the so-called "center." Similar to Avigdor Lieberman in the past, and Moshe Kahlon before him – the transition from right to center is merely a political-opportunistic tactic, an express lane to a desired portfolio at the expense of the long ideological path. The payoff is personal. The tragedy is a national one.
Ariel Sharon, with the political power of 40 mandates (with Natan Sharansky's Yisrael BaAliyah party) stole votes from the Likud and transferred them to the center for the purpose of more convenient media coverage. Kahlon, another staunch rightist, with 10 mandated from right-wing voters, personally prevented the possibility of introducing governmental reforms. Lieberman, who presented himself as a security hawk, didn't hesitate to leverage his political power to block the formation of a right-wing government – three straight times.
This time, however, it could be particularly painful. Now, the eyes of the people are finally open to the problem of the High Court's unreasonable power and infringement on the legislative branch; along with the danger of a State Attorney's Office with unrestrained power. This time, after tasting the paradigmatic diplomatic shift toward Israel and subsequent peace deals coming in quick succession; when a strategic alliance is tightening around Iran's neck – this is when you run into the arms of the left?
Right-wing governments were toppled in the past by right-wing parties, the price being almost unbearable – but at least then the essence of the move was ideologically principled. Over the past decade, Israelis have moved to the right; the left is shrinking and unable to rise to power, but the right-wing parties are centralizing one after another and ensuring we never see the formation of a clear right-wing government.
