There has recently been a renewed effort to tell us that the differences between the Right and the Left have been erased, that a majority of Israelis are somewhere in the political middle, that some 70 Knesset seats will go to the two biggest parties, and that using the terms "Right" and "Left" is a form of incitement. But the fact is that there is clear disagreement between the two competing ideologies and opposing positions on almost every issue on the agenda.
One can see this disagreement on substantive issues like the 1993 Oslo Accords, the 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip, the settlements, liberal economic positions, efforts to reduce regulation, and attitudes toward haredi society, among other things. But this is also true regarding current affairs. It doesn't take too long for either side to position itself opposite the other and demonstrate significant ideological divides. Were we to list all of these various issues, most people would find themselves agreeing with one position. And most of the time, that position would be aligned with the general positions of the larger political bloc.
Supposedly, this is all a matter of posturing, and possibly even due to a certain degree of ignorance inherent in the instinctive thinking typical of both sides of the divide. But the truth is that this is a question of ideology, plain and simple. Israeli society has undergone significant change in recent years; it is now organizing around a two-bloc, and not just two-party, system. These are two significant ideological alternatives that are competing against one other, each bloc with its own set of values and consolidated world view, from which its positions on an array of issues stem. The blocs are not entirely homogeneous, of course, but the disparity between them overcome the internal differences of opinion.
For years, remarks from people on the Right on various subjects were a sort of response to the discourse of the Left. The explanations for the policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians were formulated according to the umbrella of "peace with security," and support for privatization was explained while affording the necessary respect to the dignity of the workers' committee. The Left's value set was the starting point for every discussion, an ideological equator that marked the Right as an "anomaly." We saw examples of this in every panel of commentators on TV, comprising supposedly "neutral" journalists with the exception of one that had been chosen to represent the Right.
The alternative began to make itself known not in the revolution that brought the Likud to power in 1977, but the revolution of 2009, in the post-disengagement, post-global financial crisis, post Second Lebanon War era, which ended with Right's rise, once again, to power.
The last decade has, for the first time, birthed a significant alternative right-wing identity, one that is self-confident and unapologetic, and no longer requires the interpretation, mediation of, and subordination to, the Left.
So, yes, there are now two worldviews vying to determine the country's path forward. This fundamental argument does not present a threat to Israeli society but is, in fact, democratic in nature and important. It is not the lack of agreement between blocs that is putting democracy at risk, but the attempt to force an obscure "centrist" discourse on everyone, from a privileged position that makes any form of ideological assertiveness from the Right out into extremist and dangerous ideological entrenchment, or at the very least, the reading off of party talking points. The ideological Right must not give in to this pressure, which under the guise of "stateliness," seeks to put it back in the political closet.
