After U.S. President Donald Trump's angry letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un last Thursday canceling their scheduled Singapore summit, communication restarted between the two over the weekend, thanks to South Korean mediation. The tension and suspicion gave way to conciliatory messages. The possibility of the historic summit being held as scheduled on June 12 has revived.
Despite an air of optimism emanating from the White House, a fog still hangs over the summit, and it is questionable whether early understandings will be reached that would secure its success. The possible failure of diplomatic efforts and the implosion of such a dramatic summit could have grave consequences for the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the entire region.
Indeed, just as the resounding failure of the Paris Summit on May 16, 1960 – an effort by the United States, Soviet Union, France and United Kingdom to halt a deterioration in international relations – led the U.S. and the Soviet Union on a dangerous collision course, so too does the current renewal of dialogue risk a renewed polishing of swords and missiles on the Korean Peninsula that will escalate the crisis. This risk is exacerbated by the steel curtain that hermetically seals North Korea off from the international community, preventing the U.S. from learning the cultural, ideological and political codes of this rival. Accordingly, the expectation that, with a lack of communication channels, the U.S. and North Korea will be able to break firmly rooted obstacles and distorted perceptions through a single summit may well prove to have been unrealistic from the start.
It would have been best for U.S. officials to learn lessons from the past, especially those rooted in failures stemming from the American delusion of creating a new and stable world order after World War II. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt strongly held this belief, which led him to widen a gap that was ostensibly impossible to bridge on the essence and nature of Western and Eastern regimes and political systems. The president's belief that his personal charm and the gestures he made would transform Soviet tyrant Joseph Stalin into a moderate collaborative player who respects agreements was rooted in a disastrous illusion. Stalin was completely unimpressed by the trust-building gestures and concessions, seeing them as blatant expressions of weakness.
When dealing with totalitarian rivals who lack inhibitions, such as Stalin or Kim, the recurring American belief that sentiments of hostility and resentment can be uprooted in one fell swoop through personal relations with the enemy, setting in motion a hasty detente process or thawing of mistrust, is likely to be disastrous. In contending with prolonged, multifaceted conflicts, history proves there are usually no shortcuts.
This is how former U.S. President Richard Nixon's competent Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was able, slowly and surely, to successfully plan a rapprochement with Communist China. The U.S. fought against the Chinese in Korea during the first half of the 1950s. Only once the war ended was the path paved for Nixon's successful Beijing summit.
In light of this, let us hope that Trump will adopt a careful and controlled modus operandi for the scheduled summit. Interpersonal connection requires comprehensive and precise groundwork without background noise such as Vice President Mike Pence's defiant declarations last week. A window of opportunity for a true breakthrough on the North Korean front may indeed open. There is no doubt that such a breakthrough, if it can be reached by adhering to most of the basic principles stipulated by the U.S., would reinforce the validity and credibility of the tough and uncompromising line taken by the Trump administration toward Iran too.
When it comes to totalitarian rivals, the American belief that deeply seeded sentiments of hostility can be removed with the help of the president's personal relationship with the enemy is likely to have disastrous consequences.
