Four former senior Obama administration officials told the Haaretz newspaper last week that in 2014, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed a plan to swap land with the Palestinians, whereby Israel would annex the large settlement blocs and the Palestinians would receive land in Sinai from the Egyptians, adjacent to the Gaza Strip. The prime minister denies the report.
Whether the claims are true or false, the alleged thought process is correct. The solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be found outside the box of territory between Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea and the "two states for two peoples" approach to the West Bank. Only a significant expansion of the territory earmarked for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict – to include Jordan and Sinai – would facilitate realistic territorial compromise; rather than the sides being stuck in a zero-sum territorial game, this solution would be both suitable and sustainable.
A Palestinian state within 1949 borders is a clear and present danger to Israel's security. On the other hand, a tiny Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria is not viable; its economy would not be self-sufficient, and it certainly could not absorb refugees and solve their problems. The predictable crises in this Palestinian state will necessarily lead to friction with Israel that will eventually escalate into war. Israel is also tiny; shrinking its borders even further will invite Arab aggression.
According to the report in Haaretz, Egyptian President Abdel-Fatah el-Sissi rejected the proposal. This isn't surprising; the idea's Achilles' heel is the lack of a partner on the other side. In this regard, it is no different from any other plan that has included the existence of a Jewish state in the land of Israel. The Palestinians have rejected far-reaching proposals from former Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert, former U.S. President Bill Clinton and from former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. The Palestinians have never abandoned their "right of return," which would essentially drown Israel in millions of Palestinians. Instead of incessantly repeating the mantra of "two states for two peoples according to the 1949 armistice lines" – we must inject creative ideas into the international discourse that, despite the current absence of diplomatic partners, could serve as a basis for true peace.
Until a partner for a final-status resolution emerges – and we must be honest and say that no such partner is on the horizon – we have to manage the conflict discerningly while preserving our national and security interests. Ensuring defensible borders is imperative. First and foremost, this means that the Jordan Valley – which presently encompasses the eastern slopes of Samaria and the Judean Desert – must remain untouched in Israeli hands. We need to make sure that a united Jerusalem remains the capital of Israel and the Jewish people (even if it's possible to concede some of its satellite Arab villages, which were annexed after the Six-Day War in 1967). We have to sustain the settlement enterprise, certainly in the large blocs.
With that, we must never jeopardize our status as the national Jewish home with a clear Jewish majority for generations to come; which is why there is no place for ideas involving complete annexation of Judea and Samaria. The continued existence of the Palestinian Authority is an Israeli interest, at least until a final-status agreement can be reached, as an entity lying somewhere on the strata between a strong autonomy and quasi-state.
