The territorial conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan has raised a question of whether the concept of territorial integrity can be questioned by the secondary rights, such as the right to development, especially in the context of self-determination of national minorities.
Indeed, the Helsinki Final Act (1975) reaffirms the people's rights to self-determination on the basis of the UN Charter, with relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the territorial integrity of the states. However, it is necessary to examine the current territorial conflicts in the light of increasing trends of separatist and nationalist conflicts in some post-soviet countries.
At the global level, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted numerous resolutions that contained an implicit reference to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. These resolutions affirmed the principles of territorial integrity and political independence of the UN member states and sought full respect for the principles. Accordingly, the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by means of the resort to force shall be seen as a wrongful act and occupation in the global sphere.
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In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, it is controversial to claim self-determination due to the existing nature of the international political system, as well as current global trends on advancing the state's sovereignty. Going back before the conflict, until 1918, there was neither Armenia nor a sovereign state called Armenia in the South Caucasus.
In May 1918, when Armenia had been established in the South Caucasus, the Armenian people exercised their rights to self-determination in the territory of Azerbaijani city of Irevan, which historically belonged to Azeri people, such as Irevan khanate, and mainly constituted the current territory of Armenia. There were two 'people's of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani and Armenian community lived together over the decades during the Soviet times until the rise of provocation followed by an escalation in the early 1990s.
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijani people living in the Soviet Republic of Armenia were forcefully deported and settled in Azerbaijan as a result of "Armenization" policy supported by Stalin's resolution dated of Dec. 23, 1947 (Resolution by the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the resettlement of Azerbaijani kolkhoz members and other Azerbaijanis from the Armenian SSR to the lowlands of the Kur and Araz river). Summarizing the historical background, it is worth noting that neither Armenian claim for self-determination nor the occupation shall lead to the violation of international law, as well as a demonstration of force against the international community.
Both parties to the conflict have argued several options for the settlement in relation to the national minorities and local communities. The Armenian government has been a long time denied its participation during the first Karabakh war in 1991-94, and claimed that 'local' armed forces consisted of Armenians living in Karabakh.
However, in the case of Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (13216/05) the European Court of Human Rights noted that "it could not conclusively establish the composition of the armed forces that occupied NK during the conflict (Chiragov, para. 173), but the involvement of Armenian forces was nonetheless confirmed by a Human Rights Watch report and the statement of Armenian officials."
Therefore, it is obvious that the international community has accepted the state of Armenia as a party to the conflict, and explicitly underlined the importance of binding international legal documents that require a sharp definition and respect to the internationally recognized borders of the states.
In his previous statement, Armenian PM Pashinian stated that a resolution of this conflict should be acceptable for all people of the Karabakh.
Here, the term "acceptable" can be seen in various forms from the point of view of parties. However, in his later speeches, the prime minister called for the reunification of Armenia with Karabakh, which leads to explicit ignorance of peace processes and damaged the previous efforts made by the international mediators.
Meanwhile, he has recently pointed out that there is not any political option for the solution of this conflict. Instead, Azerbaijan has clearly introduced its position by reaffirming its will for peaceful settlement upon satisfaction of the following conditions: Firstly, the conflict zone should be de-militarized by Armenia which means that Armenian troops must be withdrawn from the Nagorno-Karabakh and its adjunct seven regions; Secondly, IDPs should be back in their homes and live peacefully with the Armenian community; lastly, the further status for the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan can be defined by the equal participation of both communities.
In the meantime, the international community has already demonstrated its clear position. Based on the latest communications and messages from both Russia and the US officials, it is obvious that there is a commonly accepted position and compromise on the importance of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and confirming the peace-enforcement operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.
According to the interview with Kay Bailey Hutchison, a US Permanent Representative to NATO, the conflict "needs to be settled on the issues of the boundary lines and the sovereignty issues'. In addition to this, during the meeting of Russian President Vladimir Putin with members of the Valdai Discussion Club, by stressing that 'they understand that a situation where Azerbaijan has lost a substantial part of its territory cannot continue' shall be understood as an admit for the peace-enforcement operations by Azerbaijani army in Karabakh.
Another rhetoric by the local actors, as well as regional powers, has to be formulated with the perception of territorial integrity. Why this is so important?
The Western community, especially the US and the EU might demonstrate a clear position and deliver a concrete message in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the basis of full respect to territorial integrity in line with the binding treaty obligations. Such a position also would be beneficial in terms of contributing to the solution of similar territorial conflicts in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Consequently, taking a positive role in the conflict resolution process would lead to fewer bloodshed outcomes in future escalations.
Without any doubt, it is clear that the line of contact in Karabakh can be considered as a line between geopolitical streamlines, as one side is represented by Russia, Iran, and Armenia, jointly ally with political and military means against another side, represented by Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey, which have been supporting a fair approach towards the settlement of the conflict. This line of interest also shares the common agenda on protecting allies from all kinds of threats, military occupation, and political challenges.
The EU's leverage on the EU-Azerbaijan and EU-Armenia relationship, especially in the recent Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Armenia defines the limits of partnership and security aspects of the region. These bilateral partnership tools demonstrate to what extent the EU can use its soft power, or support people-to-people contacts that might decrease the escalation in the future. Despite the high level of bilateral and multilateral cooperation efforts and achievements with the Eastern Partnership countries, the main security dimension is lacking. The EU was not able to stabilize the neighborhood and to reduce Russia's increased pressure and hybrid threat in the region.
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A recent European Commission communication, and Joint Staff Working Document on Structured Consultation on the future of the Eastern Partnership calls for a stronger EU role in existing frameworks for unresolved conflicts. Apparently, the EU does intend to assist in a broad and effective way rather than leave a vacuum for third-party intervention in its neighborhood.
In spite of all efforts made by the EU institutions, Russia's involvement in frozen conflicts remains the main security challenge for the whole European Neighborhood Policy. In order to eliminate external threats, the EU should adopt a rapid and tangible approach without any political discrimination. The question here is whether the EU will use its leverage to pressure on Armenia for the immediate withdrawal of its troops from the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan or to allow Russia to establish a backyard in a conflict zone, as it made in the Donbas example. The international community has little time to think and decide!
