Since 2006, the four IDF chiefs of staff who have served in that position consecutively have championed the approach of a small, technology-based, quality army with offensive capabilities. This approach stemmed from the view that large wars are a thing of the past: We have peace with Egypt and Jordan, Syria (in 2006) was irrelevant, and at the time there were two small terrorist militias fighting Israel that weren't a true threat.
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Those terrorist militias in Gaza and Lebanon have since become terrorist armies armed with some 150,000 rockets and missiles, along with 16,000 infantry equipped with the best weaponry, including anti-tank missiles. The Syrians have made a comeback and are rebuilding their army with the help of the Russians. Pro-Iranian Shiite militias capable of firing rockets and missiles at Israel are active in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. There are tens of thousands of armed Palestinian terrorists In Judea and Samaria, and inside Israel itself, we can expect thousands of extremist Arabs and Bedouins to riot in the next war, possibly with firearms. None of these factors entered into the equation espoused by these IDF chiefs as they continued cutting the army's size.
If that isn't enough, the units in the IDF's already small reserve corps are no longer combat-ready due to a lack of training and a failure to integrate new weaponry. Essentially, they are presently incapable of implementing an attack inside Lebanon. Without these units, the army cannot carry out such an attack, which could also spark regional hostilities on five fronts simultaneously. This would require the IDF to deploy infantry units to defend these fronts, but the army's size makes this impossible.
The IDF's standing army also has a significant Achilles heel. IDF chief Aviv Kochavi's desire to build an army capable of fighting multi-dimensionally, through synchronizing air and land forces, hasn't gained momentum, with only a handful of ground units possessing such capabilities. Most of the units in the regular army haven't implemented this doctrine, and the few that have are losing their capabilities with the turnover of commanders and soldiers.
A lack of discipline
Moreover, units in the regular army are infected with a lack of discipline, a lack of oversight and supervision, a failure to verify commands, an inability to contend with harsh criticism, an inability to learn land implement lessons, and unreliable investigations. Today, the IDF is an organization that doesn't learn, lacks continuity, and has low standards and a culture of reporting unreliably. All of this means the IDF cannot launch an offensive inside Lebanon.
The majority of reservist tank units haven't adequately learned and trained on the hunting system that has been installed in all tanks, which facilitates command and control of the battlefield and hitting targets. Without proficiency in operating this system, the soldiers in these units will perform poorly.
According to Kochavi's view, every battalion-sized unit, including tank battalions in the regular army, must be able to operate intelligence-gathering drones, guide artillery to targets, and coordinate airstrikes. This is a complex undertaking, and only a few units are currently capable of performing these tasks. The majority of tank units in the regular army lack this training, even though the chief of staff says it's a prerequisite for launching an attack. It looks wonderful in presentations, but on the ground, the situation is vastly different.
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