Starting in the 1980s, changes in values, the law, and the media led to the growing perception that Israeli society was not as willing to accept wounded and casualties in military operations as it had been in the past. This view gained traction due to the IDF's presence in the security buffer zone in southern Lebanon and the waves of protests demanding to "bring our boys home." The view that the civilian homefront had become sensitive to casualties gradually seeped into the decision-making echelon in the government and the defense establishment; and its influence on the way military conflicts are managed is still felt today.
But studies conducted in recent years indicate that this view doesn't exactly reflect the reality. An analysis of the IDF's major military operations in the 2000s – the Second Intifada, the Second Lebanon War, Operation Cast Lead, and Operation Protective Edge – indicates all of them enjoyed strong public support across all sectors from the time they started until they were over. Consensus about a given operation depends on how long it lasts and how many are killed or wounded. But findings show that even after people rally around the flag when an operation begins, support remains strong if the public feels that the war is just, that its goals are vital, and it has a chance of succeeding. So it appears that Israeli society will be more willing to make sacrifices than the decision-makers think, and for a longer period.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter
Nevertheless, the people in charge aren't using the credit extended to them and are trying to avoid calling a spade a spade by sticking to a policy of "containment" and delaying inevitable action. A disinclination for a ground operation that would come with a high casualty count is the prevailing sentiment. In the face of the rocket threat, for example, there is a clear preference to use targeted counter-fire, a method seen as carrying a low body count, even though it clearly cannot curtail the threat to the homefront itself. Even when a decision is made to launch a military campaign, it is hampered by limitations and stopped before it achieves its goals.
The hesitation and idling in neutral are making Israel's warfare less effective, not to mention affecting the motivation of combat soldiers. It is also causing the public to feel embittered, as if the price it has paid so far was all for nothing. What's more, it isn't only casualties that are difficult for Israel – military losses are, too.
Since Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, we have experienced a series of escalations in the ongoing violence with Hamas, during which the idea of launching another ground operation in Gaza was floated. This is clearly not an easy question for the decision-makers to handle but history teaches us that putting off a confrontation with a military threat only makes a future conflict harder, with a heavier cost in terms of human life.
If the scales are tipped in favor of a ground operation, the decision-makers must remember that protecting civilian lives takes precedence over protecting the lives of soldiers and that Israeli society is both rational and stalwart, as it has proven in the past. While there is no doubt that we must strive to minimize casualties, doing so cannot become a goal of the war in and of itself.
