Former IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. (res.) Gadi Eizenkot deserves credit for a lot of things, and one of those is his plain-spokenness. You can understand his positions and considerations. According to this, the apparent reason he intends to go into politics is his criticism of the political leadership while he was in charge of the military. One might conclude he wants to promote himself to the political decision-making echelon.
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One thing is certain – whatever party he joins, he will not find leaders who will critique his views. If he joins Yair Lapid, which makes the most sense, Eizenkot will rule alone when it comes to security and defense. Despite his criticism of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, it must be said that when we look at Eizenkot's accomplishments, he is the most successful chief of staff in the last 15 years. This means the success of which he is justifiably proud says something about the defense leadership at the political level.
What is more concerning is his remark about the war against Hamas, which appears to reflect the views of the IDF top brass in recent years. "The IDF is wasting energy fighting the weakest enemy in the Middle East in a complicated reality that does not allow them to be defeated. This creates a situation in which little Hamas declares that they are standing up to the big IDF. It harms deterrence. It harms Israel's image as a victorious country," he said.
Eizenkot accepts a situation in which Hamas is not defeated, because of a "complicated reality." Essentially, he accepts the capability of the so-called "weak" party to attack Israel, its home front, without restrictions, because there is no point in going to war against a weak enemy. We need to wage war against a strong enemy, like Iran, and its attempts to entrench itself throughout the Middle East and develop nuclear weapons. Eizenkot reflects the last generation of IDF leaders' lack of understanding about the way in which the Palestinians are fighting Israel. This could teach us something about the three candidates for chief of staff.
According to various reports, Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Herzl Halevi is Defense Minister Benny Gantz's pick. Some call him the "frontrunner." About 20 years ago, when he was commander of the Sayeret Matkal unit, he personally showed up to present Professor Benzion Netanyahu with the War of Attrition ribbon for Netanyahu's late son, Yoni, which the IDF issued 30 years late. That might say something about the tradition of old Jerusalem families.
The current pressure to decide on the appointment immediately stems from the concern of left-wing officials and the left-wing establishment that Benjamin Netanyahu could return to power at any time. The assumption is that Netanyahu would prefer former deputy chief of staff Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir as chief of staff. Everything has to do with Netanyahu, and no one is asking the opinion of, for example, Prime Minister Bennett.
Halevi looks too much like someone picked out years ago for promotion to IDF chief. That's somewhat of a problem. He was GOC Southern Command at a time when the IDF was struggling with arson balloons from the Gaza Strip, sporadic rocket attacks, and ongoing incidents on the border. These are precisely the incidents that shook up the public, and which the IDF opted to contain. The method was to exact a price from Hamas, mainly by hitting their infrastructure. The definition of left or not left doesn't fit here, and it might be good for a right-wing prime minister to have a chief of staff that balances him. But it's no substitute for finding a systemic method of fighting Hamas under its leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar. Halevi talked about the resilience of residents of the western Negev as a response to terrorism. The truth is, that's no response.
Halevi has held all the top jobs, knows the top political leaders and also some of the other leaders in the region. He was head of Military Intelligence, commander of the division stationed on the Lebanese border, a GOC and also deputy chief of staff. Zamir at least tried to respond forcefully to incidents at the Gaza border fence that were part of the Hamas-led "marches of return." The Left, and especially Haaretz, did not at all like that the IDF killed dozens of rioters to keep them from crossing the fence, including some who were armed and waiting to act. The Left picked up Hamas' slogans and got to work. Instead of talking about riots at the border, they talked about "marches of return," part of whose plan was to breach Israeli communities. Even then, they'd ask, "Why did you shoot?" and talk about "war crimes." If the IDF chief should be someone who has the support of a certain kind of journalism, that's an irrelevant and negative concern.
Zamir was Netanyahu's military secretary. At the time, he had a certain level of access to the prime minister and was part of his cabinet along with Mossad head Yossi Cohen, Ron Dermer, and a few others. In those years, the cabinet's ability to function waned due to two factors that interfered – one was Naftali Bennett, and the other was Yair Lapid.
Zamir, as an Armored Corps soldier, should represent the core values that the IDF has clearly neglected – logistics and discipline and rethinking the scope of the ground forces in light of the lessons of the Ukraine war. Only recently, reports said that the IDF has prepared a document detailing those lessons, and concluded that the next war must be won quickly, powerfully, and in a way that will leave no doubt about who the victor was. The IDF suddenly realized that it was mistaken in thinking that ground wars were a thing of the past and that victory needed to come through defining specific goals. But this is no breakthrough in thinking, merely a return to the IDF's traditional outlook. Perhaps it's time to reformulate them for use against a "weak" enemy.
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