Bedouin Israeli businessman Yakub Abu Al-Kiyan wasn't some major spy. It's doubtful he would have become one even if he had continued to be handled by Iran for considerable time, simply because he had early no access to information and decision-makers.
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The information he did hand over was elementary, of the kind that any average consumer of news could have picked up. But it's not the level of the information he provided that indicates the potential seriousness of the case, but rather his intentions. Al-Kiyan was completely aware of his actions. More than that: he initiated them, and wanted to move forward to more meetings, more contacts. It was clear to him what he was doing and with whom he was doing it, and nevertheless, he chose to continue. As proof, we have the fact that he corresponded not through written means but by conversations on Whatsapp, which are easier to hide and make vanish later.
Al-Kiyan's motives will be made clear at his trial. Unlike former MK Azmi Bishara, who intentionally handed sensitive information to Hezbollah during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, it does not appear that Al-Kiyan's motives were security-related.
A perusal of the charges against him gives the impression that he was infatuated with his new status. The world of espionage is full of mystery and charm, and has entrapped many good people before Al-Kiyan. It's possible that he also saw it as a way of padding his income – spy agencies pay very well for the intelligence their agents hand over. But Al-Kiyan is just one side of this story.
Iran is more active than ever
The second, more important, side, is Iran, which continues its attempts to operate agents in Israel. It's unclear why they chose him as one: a short internet search would have revealed a huge gap between what he told them about his seniority and contacts and what his reality was.
It's possible that this affairs indicates that the Iranians are having a very difficult time recruiting agents in Israel and are forced to make due with small fish. It's also possible that they are choosing to operate on every level, and are enlisting high-ranking and low-ranking agents to create a broad picture of intelligence that goes beyond the military level into politics and society. This is what every serious intelligence agency does, and the Iranian spy organizations have already proven that they do their work well.
Iran has already operated agents in Israel. The most famous was former Energy and Infrastructure Minister Gonen Segev, who was activated while in Nigeria and even visited Iran. Segev was in contact with the Iranians for six years prior to his arrest in Equatorial Guinea. He was extradited to Israel and sentenced to 11 years in prison. Unlike Al-Kiyan, Segev really had been a senior official – years before he was activated, but as a former minister and cabinet member, his contacts had dangerous potential in terms of collecting intelligence and passing it on, or to tempt other senior officials into deals that could lead to their abduction.
There was similar potential, albeit to a lesser degree, with Al-Kiyan. If his contact with his handlers had continued under the cover of business and economic dealings, he could have led them to other agents who might have provided more significant information. The Iranians and their satellites know how to tempt people. Al-Kiyan, it appears, was happy to be tempted, but the message from the affair needs to be directed to others – that Iran is here, and more active than ever.
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