The emerging agreement for northern stabilization, essentially built on the UN Resolution 1701 model that ended the Second Lebanon War with minor upgrades, puts Israel at an unbearable strategic risk. Signing it at this time would be irresponsible, and those who decide to do so cannot later claim "their hands are clean of bloodshed."
Before detailing the dramatic risk, we must honestly explain the logic behind the emerging agreement, and it's important to note that such logic exists. Since Oct. 8, Hezbollah has kept Israel in a state of constant low-to-medium intensity conflict in the north. This situation forced us to conduct an exhausting and intense defensive battle, with Hezbollah's attack intensity steadily increasing. All attempts by mediators to reach a reasonable northern arrangement failed – not because of the arrangement's details, but due to Hezbollah's consistent position that there would be no northern arrangement without a Gaza arrangement, meaning an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Then came Israel's string of operations: operation beepers, the elimination of senior officials including Hassan Nasrallah and his successor, and primarily, the destruction of all the organization's extensive infrastructure along the contact line. And now, surprisingly, Hezbollah is willing to accept northern arrangements under better terms for Israel than those previously offered by mediators – without IDF withdrawal from Gaza.
This development has critical significance, as Israel's assessment is that Hamas's refusal to accept a reasonable hostage deal stems largely from its sense of having Hezbollah's backing. If Hamas feels isolated, it may be forced to agree to a deal, while simultaneously allowing for significant achievements within the northern agreement framework.
While this explains the agreement's logic, alongside this reasoning lies what could prove to be a terrible trap for Israel. If reports about the emerging arrangement are accurate, and it ultimately amounts to an upgraded Resolution 1701 rather than an agreement that includes at least complete Hezbollah disarmament and demilitarization of southern Lebanon under strict Western supervision – there's no way to define this event other than disgraceful. Israel could quickly (within a few years at most) find itself in a worse position against Hezbollah in Lebanon than it was on Oct. 6, 2023.
Until Oct. 6, Hezbollah had positioned itself along the village line near the Lebanese border fence and throughout southern Lebanon in a way that would have enabled an attack on northern communities that would make Oct. 7 look, respectfully, like child's play. This was known to anyone even somewhat familiar with the northern security situation. The attack infrastructure Hezbollah prepared in the first line of villages, revealed during phase one of Operation Northern Arrows, is staggering. The IDF Spokesperson published some findings, but those with access to the evidence know that what was published is just a fraction. It involves a five-pronged system, well-equipped, ready for both attack and defense. An entire Radwan Force system prepared for zero hour, arranged in unimaginable scope. The fact that all this wasn't activated on Oct. 7-8, due to various considerations by Hassan Nasrallah and Iran, and that Israel was given time to evacuate border-adjacent communities and prepare for northern defense, is truly miraculous.
However, it's important to note that Israel had also prepared in advance for confrontation. Operation beepers, the intelligence penetration that enabled the elimination of the organization's senior leadership, and extensive, precise intelligence gathering on Hezbollah throughout Lebanon – all these allowed Israel to transition from defense to offense in the north far more effectively and quickly than anyone could have imagined. Accumulating these assets is no small feat. Such operations don't succeed every year, deploying quality intelligence networks takes years, as does collecting target intelligence on such a large scale. When Israel launched Operation Northern Arrows, it inherently received a one-time opportunity to utilize all assets accumulated in the current round and maximize both military and political damage to Hezbollah, preventing it from harming Israel again. This window of opportunity opened and remains open as long as the current operation continues. However, once the operation ends, the situation changes.
From that point forward, the IDF's ability to conduct an offensive of this magnitude resets for an extended period. If this opportunity isn't used for a decisive victory, we're left with an undefeated Hezbollah that will resume its arms race, and there's no guarantee that by the time it accumulates sufficient assets for an attack, Israel will have gathered enough offensive assets to counter it effectively. Not every day does a sophisticated covert operation like operations pagers succeed, and a country gains such dramatic strike capability against a terrorist organization it faces. This means that an agreement of the type being discussed could bring us within a decade, perhaps less, to a military disadvantage that would genuinely endanger northern communities, with Israel lacking an adequate response in time. And that's already an unbearable strategic risk.
