Between April and September, the voting patterns of nationalist-religious voters and former Soviet Union immigrants have shifted – shifts the nationalist camp can ill afford to ignore. An entire mandate on the "Russian street" transferred from the Likud to Yisrael Beytenu; at least one mandate from the nationalist-religious camp has gone to Blue and White. And the voters from the nationalist camp who don't belong to either of these sectors have changed sides. We can call them the "liberal right."
The right achieved an ideological victory in Israel that cannot be downplayed. The nightmare of a Palestinian state is no more. But tragically and paradoxically, the right's ideological victory could prevent it from notching a political victory – and not for the first time either.
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In 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected prime minister for the first time and dramatically mitigated the wave of terror that had erupted in the wake of the Oslo talks. Due to the security calm, the public shifted its attention to internal problems. And indeed, in the 1999 election, the campaign focus shifted to health care and matters of religion and state. The Likud failed to provide an adequate response – and lost.
The relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and US Secretary of State's Mike Pompeo's declaration on the legal status of settlements in Judea and Samaria were the culmination of steadfast diplomatic efforts over years, and the facts created on the ground will be etched into the history books. However, Israeli voters have turned their focus to the social, religious and economic issues of the day – specifically due to these very achievements, which stamped out the defeatist policies of retreat and disengagement of the past.
Hence, religion and state is now a hot button issue. Avigdor Lieberman didn't invent this discord, even though he has certainly exploited it cynically, after two decades of encouraging cooperation with the ultra-Orthodox. And still, more than a few Israelis are troubled by the issue, including many right-wing voters. And when they look at the Likud they don't see a party trying to serve as a bridge between Lieberman and Yakov Litzman (United Torah Judaism), rather a party that has chosen a side.
The bond between Likud and the haredim runs deep. But in politics, the whole is not always greater than the sum of its parts. In many cases, such bonds drive voters off. The partnership forged by Likud and Yisrael Beytenu in 2013, for example, drove off Likud supporters with an aversion to Lieberman – and vice versa.
"Back in the day in Minsk, when I was a kid," an acquaintance of mine who jumped from Likud to Yisrael Beytenu explained to me, "if you wanted to buy a sausage, the state forced you to also buy a canned good. So if voting Likud means I also have to vote Litzman, I'd rather pass."
This doesn't mean we must cast aside long-time partners; cooperation can continue in different ways. But the nationalist camp needs to understand that the symbiosis between the haredi parties and Likud comes with an ideological and electoral price, which we no longer have the luxury of denying. The nationalist camp must ensure that everyone has a place. It must open its arms to haredim, seculars, religious-nationalists and those who are conservative on matters of religion and state – and yes, to right-wing liberals, too.
