Meir Ben Shabbat

Meir Ben Shabbat is head of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy, in Jerusalem. He served as Israel's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council between 2017 and 2021, and prior to that for 30 years in the General Security Service (the Shin Bet security agency or "Shabak").

Recent successes in fight on terror have yet to deliver

There is no single "game changer' able to curb this phenomenon on its own – only the combined use of all available tools will have a strategic impact

 

The numerous achievements of the security establishment in contending with the protracted wave of terrorism we are currently experiencing are both impressive and praiseworthy, but it appears that despite everything, they have not yet been able to generate the desired strategic impact: the motivation to carry out terrorist attacks is not on the wane, the number of attacks and attempted attacks is not diminishing nor is their intensity.

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram

The month of Ramadan is just around the corner, bringing with it the usual dubious promise of a powder keg waiting to explode, and a series of issues placed on our agenda, each of which has the potential to add to the fire and fan the flames even more. Although the lone-wolf attackers might put their plans into action without partners and without any orderly aid or guidance from terrorist organizations, they certainly do draw inspiration from their predecessors, who have been turned into heroes on the Palestinian street, and also from the inflammatory content of violent incitement disseminated on the social media. The general atmosphere is spurring on attacks of this kind. In an attempt to contend with this trend, there is no single "game changer" that can curb this phenomenon by itself. What is called for is the judicious use of the broad basket of means available, each of which on its own provides a limited contribution, but whose cumulative impact might just be able to bring about the desired change.

Dealing with the root cause

Firstly, there is a need to lower the requisite threshold for carrying out (administrative) detentions of terrorist supporters and those who praise terrorist attacks, individuals who raise concerns that they might not simply make do with providing support.

Secondly, a rapid and effective response is required at the very moment an attack is perpetrated. The more attempted attacks that end in the terrorists being "neutralized" without incurring casualties on our side, the greater the doubt there will be as to the point of adopting this current modus operandi. Attempted attacks that end one after another in the death, injury, or arrest of the attackers without them being able to cause damage, at least will not encourage copy-cats. In order to improve the speed of response, it is crucial to increase the deployment of police forces, especially in those areas on the seam line between east and west Jerusalem, to continue to encourage individuals with the appropriate authorization to carry firearms and to cut the red tape on the investigative process of normative-law-abiding citizens seeking to obtain a firearm license, who would then be able to use a weapon in circumstances justifying it.

Thirdly, preventing the glorification of terrorists. If the intelligence organizations have information that can harm the image of terrorists being portrayed as national Palestinian heroes, then they should make sure it is published and do everything to highlight it. The idea being to prevent such an individual from becoming a source of inspiration and a role model for others to imitate.

Fourthly, destroying the houses of the perpetrators. In traditional Palestinian society, family plays a key role in a terrorist's life, and so the fate awaiting it could have a significant impact on a would-be terrorist's desire to engage in acts of violence. Moreover, deterrence is also designed to put off a would-be attacker from doing so by encouraging his family to step in and stop him, as soon as they identify any suspicious, tell-tale signs.

Fifthly, taking away social benefits from the terrorist and his family. Action should be taken to confiscate funds and assets belonging to the terrorist and to trace funds (or equivalent benefits) transferred to him or his family from the PA (Palestinian Authority) or various terrorist organizations. This would enable the authorities to prevent potential attackers from receiving any financial incentives.

Sixthly, revoking the residency status of inciters from east Jerusalem and deporting them to the Gaza Strip or to other areas within the Palestinian Authority. Dealing with incitement requires a thorough effort to deal with the root cause – from the study programs in schools in east Jerusalem, through the media and social media, and culminating with the sermons voiced in the mosques. In order to be able to fundamentally deal with these issues a long-term plan of action is required along with an orderly mechanism to implement it. Yet without waiting for such a plan to take shape, it is advisable in the immediate term to consider the issue of stripping inciters from east Jerusalem of their permanent residency status and deporting them to the Gaza Strip or to other areas within the Palestinian Authority.

Side effects are a phenomenon that is not unique to the world of medicine, and it is just as difficult to find solutions to core security problems that do not entail associated adverse effects. Having said that, when taking into account the overall balance of profit and loss, and in order to curb the current negative momentum, however severe it might seem, this is a critically essential step. Even if all of these are not sufficient to totally guarantee to bring this phenomenon to an end, they should certainly contribute to reducing it or at least preventing it from snowballing any further. In the ongoing war on terror, this is an achievement that should not be underrated.

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

Related Posts