Behind closed doors, senior defense officials said this week that even though the Gaza Strip-terrorist groups are provoking hostilities before the March 2 elections, it doesn't mean they are trying to ignite a full-blown war. But it does, unfortunately, mean that we keep faltering from one rocket salvo to the next, and that without a major military operation in the coastal enclave nothing will effectively change.
Neither Israel nor Hamas want war and both parties are going to great lengths to avoid it. But the gaps between Israel and Gaza's rulers are so wide that it is difficult to see how they could be bridged. UN Special Envoy to the Middle Nickolay Mladenov and Egyptian intelligence officials may have been able to hammer together an effective mediation mechanism to rapidly extinguished periodic flare-ups, but this does little to resolve the deeper issues.
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Israel and Gaza are openly discussing a long-term agreement that will allow prolonged peace on both sides of the border. But that's about the only thing both agree on. From there, each side sees things differently.
Hamas sees Gaza as open to the world, importing goods but also weapons and thus exploiting any lull to build a significant military force that will challenge Israel in the future. Israel sees Gaza as cordoned off and receiving exactly what it need for its civilian and economic rehabilitation, but sans any military buildup.
The chances of bridging these two contradictory desires ranges from slim to none – even before we mention the issue of the captive Israeli civilians and the remains of the IDF soldiers Hamas hold.
This is one of the major bones of contention between the parties: Hamas envisions a version of the 2011 prisoner exchange deal, which saw Israel release 1,027 security prisoners for one Israeli soldier; while Israel prefers a deal of a far smaller scope.
And still, both sides keep trying. Less in the belief that they will succeed and more in the understanding that the alternative is worse. Another military campaign in Gaza will leave it in ruins and with no solution to its myriad of problems. Moreover, barring a solution for the post-campaign era – preferably one that retains a significantly crippled Hamas in power or an equally weak replacement – we will all simply found ourselves right back where we started, but with less favorable conditions.
Rogue agents
As with all recent flare-ups, it was Islamic Jihad that triggered hostilities, not Hamas.
The rare targeted killing of Islamic Jihad leader Baha Abu al-Ata in the Gaza Strip in November may have neutralized the proverbial ticking time bomb, but it didn't really solve anything. The Iranian-backed organization continues to ignite fires and fuel them at its leisure.
Ata was effectively succeeded by two senior Islamic Jihad officials and both are currently trying to establish their new position, at times though aggression vis-à-vis Israel. They have much to prove both in Islamic Jihad and vis-à-vis Hamas and they want to make sure everyone knows they are here and must be taken into account.
Last week, the IDF was able to thwart two attacks the Islamic Jihad tried to execute, killing three terrorists. That, for itself, could be described as routine on the volatile border, but the aftermath was not.
Israel has a policy by which, if the situation allows, the IDF retrieves terrorists' bodies to as to use them in a future prisoner exchange. No one really believes that create substantial leverage, but at the very least, it spares the images of mass, theatrical funerals in Gaza.
The military directive on this issue is that you do not send soldiers to retrieve terrorists' bodies as they may be booby-trapped. Instead, an armored vehicle – a tractor or a bulldozer – is sent in to carry the remains into Israel.
These orders were put in play this week, again – as something of routine – but this time, the ground was hard and the bulldozer struggled to scoop up the terrorist's body. The protracted maneuver allowed Palestinians to gather at the border and riots ensued. The incident was videoed and posted on social media, and while the IDF was eventually able to secure one of the terrorists' bodies, the damage was already done.
The Islamic Jihad was looking to an excuse to redeem its honor and the "humiliation" of the post-border incident was all the pretext it needed to launch a rocket salvo at Israel.
The Islamic Jihad was clearly careful not to provoke war. It kept to the "acceptable" rocket range of the border-vicinity communities, even though it possesses the ability to fire at central Israel. The IDF struck its sites in Gaza and the Iron Dome defense system engaged the fire, intercepting over half of the dozens of projectiles sent Israel's way. The rest, according to the military, hit open areas, causing no harm. As no injuries were recorded on Israel's part, this flare-up, too, headed toward its foreseeable end.
Hamas was the first to breathe easy. It ordered its leaders to go to ground at the first sign of the escalation, fearing Israel will seize the opportunity and try to eliminate them.
Hiding underground, Hamas' leaders were preparing for the possibility of a military campaign but pressed the mediators – Egypt, the UN, and Qatar, which delivered another cash injection to Gaza this week – to defuse the situation.
Normalcy, such as it is in the communities adjacent to the Israel-Gaza border, resumed on Tuesday, and on Wednesday the Israel-Gaza border crossings were reopened and the restrictions placed on the fishing zone off the coastal enclave were lifted as well. But both sides know that all they did was buy some time – not even much of it – until the next round of violence.
Same old story?
The defense establishment did not like the fact that the visit to Qatar by Mossad intelligence agency Director Yossi Cohen and GOC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Herzl Halevi was made public. No damage was actually done, but it's the kind of event that should have been kept under the radar.
The visit revealed what is already known: Israel is doing everything possible to ensure a lull in the southern sector, including persuading countries with which it does not have an open diplomatic relation to finance a terrorist organization seeking to destroy it.
Moreover, this visit reflects the pragmatism in the defense establishment: Everything has to be done to avoid war, and even if one is waged, Israel must consider post-war realities.
Israel is currently sparing no effort to avoid another war in Gaza, regardless of whether this effort stems from the elections, the desire to focus on Iran, or a genuine attempt to exhaust every possibility. But the military is also doing what needs to be done to prepare for a fight. Still, Israel lacks a real political strategy for the day after the war.
Such a strategy is essential because another Israeli campaign in Gaza really is only a matter of time.
An analysis by the Institute for National Security Studies detailed six alternatives with this respect: Long- or short-term truce, a ceasefire, a string of border incidents, limited flare-ups, and an all-out war. Every flare-up, however, brings Israel and Gaza closer to war.
INSS Director and former Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, sees no reason for Israel to shy away from war. On the contrary – it must walk into it with its eyes wide open and with the understanding that war is the only way to effect change from the ground up.
Israel will have to pay a price – it will suffer casualties and its economy will take a hit – but in the end, it will be possible to reach a real agreement vis-à-vis Gaza, one based on deterrence and not the current formula of "quiet will be met with quiet" between incessant rounds of fighting.
"Every once in a while, Gaza needs to be reminded of Israel's true power. It's been over five years since the last time [Operation Protective Edge] and it may be time for a reminder," he said.
Yadlin believes that as part of its preparations for "the day after," Israel must ask itself who it wants to rule the Gaza Strip: Israel (no), a weakened Hamas (some support this option), the Palestinian Authority (Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's policy over the past decade indicates that he has no such interest), or a third party.
Failing to answer this question prior to launching a military campaign in the coastal enclave can lead to a potential disaster ranging from Gaza's utter collapse to it being overrun by an element even more radical than Hamas.
Until such time that the answer is found, Israel engaged in low-intensity fighting with Gaza. This, of course, cannot last forever and Israel's patience will run out at some point, be it over casualties or a calculated decision that enough is enough.
Hamas, for its part, understands that it is on thin ice, which is why its leaders have been trying to relay appeasing messages, rein in its operatives and curb the rogue elements in Gaza. But the Islamic Jihad dances to its own tune, which all but guarantees another flare-up is already in the works.
