The arrest of the members of the terrorist cell who murdered Rabbi Raziel Shevach near the Samaria outpost of Havat Gilad last week did not surprise anyone. It was clearly only a matter of time before the Shin Bet security agency would find them. The only questions were how long it would take and whether they would put up a fight.
But the Shin Bet's success was quickly marred by a sense of failure. The Jenin-based cell was able to form and operate right under the security agency's nose. This was not the case of a "lone wolf" who kept his nefarious plans to himself, making intelligence-gathering operations difficult – this was a group, and its members obviously met up, spoke, coordinated their operations, obtained weapons, and at least once previously tried to carry out a terrorist attack.
The Shin Bet should have picked up on all this. The reason why it fell through the cracks warrants a review, especially given that the terrorists did not try to hide after Shevach's murder and simply went about their daily lives.
Wednesday's successful raid in Jenin has yet to fully resolve the issue. Both Israel and the Palestinians are keeping their cards close to their chests and information about who of the cell members was arrested and who was killed has yet to be released.
It is also unclear whether the cell was neutralized in full or in part, and whether future arrests are expected in the case. The only thing we know for sure is that all cell members are part of the local Jarrar clan and that they were affiliated with Hamas.
They will be questioned on whether they were instructed and funded by Hamas in the Gaza Strip or by the terrorist group's headquarters overseas – a reasonable assumption given the efforts Hamas has been making to carry out terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria.
Rumors in the West Bank suggested Thursday that the Shin Bet received the intelligence it gave Israeli security forces ahead of the raid from the Palestinian Authority.
But this was not the case. The raid was based purely on "blue and white" intelligence-gathering efforts that led to an operation carried out by police and military special forces. Palestinian security forces preferred, as usual, to take a back seat, as they have no issue with Israel neutralizing their enemies.
The cell's capture turned the media spotlight back to Jenin, once the undisputed terror hotbed of the West Bank, but a far calmer place in recent years.
This was the result of three factors: Israeli security forces' intense operations in the sector, which crushed the city's infamous terrorist infrastructure; the improved economic situation, mostly due to an increase in trade with Arab Israelis who visit the city over the weekends; and the fact that that there are no Israeli communities – easy targets – in Jenin's immediate vicinity.
Past experience has shown that terrorists prefer operating close to home, in familiar landscapes that facilitate their escape. This time, they had to drive over half an hour each way until they saw their victim near Havat Gilad. Without intelligence, such attacks are very difficult to foil.
The defense establishment should focus its efforts on thwarting similar terrorist cells and making sure that Jenin's terrorist past does not rear its head.
