Almost a week later, Hezbollah is still licking its wounds following the attack on the organization's communication infrastructure last week, which resulted in thousands of its operatives being hit. Despite the rocket barrages already launched toward the north since then, it can be assumed these are only the first swallows of response, and that along with attempts to reorganize, the organization will strive to present an unprecedented achievement, one that will rehabilitate its image as "Lebanon's defender" and prove that its strength remains intact.
Many superlatives have already been lavished on the intelligence and technological capabilities demonstrated in the "pager attack," as well as on the sophisticated planning embodied in splitting the attack into two waves, where the second wave was timed to coincide with the funerals of those killed in the first wave, thus amplifying the damage. Among the operation's results, one can count the hit to the order of battle, the disruption of the organization's command and control capabilities, and the deep moral injury among its operatives. However, despite these impressive achievements, as well as the expansion of air strikes, let's not be confused: they do not translate into a significant strategic hit to Hezbollah, one that will achieve the new war objective set by the cabinet just days ago – returning the residents of the north to their homes.
The war in Gaza has proven that toppling a terrorist organization is not an achievable goal. Still – although it's clear that even a ground war won't knock out Hezbollah, we must exploit the opportunity that has been created to exact a heavy price from it and push it as far from the border as possible.
Against the backdrop of the blurring of war objectives in Gaza, and so that the war objective in the north doesn't remain mere hollow populist rhetoric, we must harness last week's successful tactical action to achieve the strategic purpose. After almost a long year of absorption in the north, during which all means were taken to avoid expanding the war against Hezbollah, it seems that the understanding has matured among decision-makers that there's no escape from it. Examining public opinion polls shows that the public consistently demonstrates high willingness to pay the required price to bring about a change in the security reality in the north. And it's clear to all that the price will be heavy, very heavy.
Indeed, the opening conditions are far from optimal for Israel in light of the erosion of its forces in the prolonged war in Gaza, but against this, it's doubtful whether Hezbollah's opening conditions will be worse in the near future than they are now. It should also be remembered that winter is knocking at the door, which will substantially burden troop movement. It seems that the issue of American legitimacy now constitutes the main barrier, but it may be possible to overcome this if the following two conditions are met: a. Avoiding the dismissal of Gallant - beyond the major problem inherent in replacing the defense minister on the eve of expanding the war, the Americans see Gallant as a balancing factor in the political echelon, and his dismissal will intensify tensions between the Biden administration and Israel at this critical time; b. Presenting a plan for a ground incursion into southern Lebanon that is limited in time and space.
The war in Gaza has proven that toppling a terrorist organization is not an achievable goal. Still - although it's clear that even a ground war won't knock out Hezbollah, we must exploit the opportunity that has been created to exact a heavy price from it and push it as far from the border as possible. In the cost-benefit balance, the advantages inherent in expanding the war now outweigh the disadvantages: maximizing military achievements, along with minimizing casualties to our forces, in light of Hezbollah's condition. Avoiding this would be a tragic missed opportunity.
