The killing of Hassan Mahdavi, the commander of Iran's Quds Force for Syria and Lebanon, is the most significant assassination attributed to Israel since the start of the war. Mahdavi was not just another senior official – he was the most important Iranian figure in the region, second only to Hassan Nasrallah in importance.
Mahdavi was an extremely powerful and experienced figure. He has been active in the arena for over two decades, and this was his third tour as commander of the Quds Force unit. He began his latest stint last year after the dismissal of Jawad Rafari, and in the current campaign, he was the linchpin coordinating between all Iranian proxy forces in the region – Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as Syria, and the Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.
He was also intimately involved in the smuggling of weapons from Iran and Syria into Lebanon, the production of weapons on Syrian and Lebanese soil, and the various attacks carried out by Iran's proxies – most recently two nights ago when an Iranian armed drone launched from Iraq struck a naval base in Eilat.
The assassination on Monday is the harshest blow Iran has suffered in years. While various other Iranian figures have been struck in recent months, the sword has not come this close to Iran's top leadership before. In fact, the last time this happened was in January 2020 with the killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in a US strike near Baghdad airport.
Mahdavi's assassination puts Iran in a difficult dilemma: What price to exact from Israel, which it sees as responsible, in retaliation for the killing? Iran has four main options: First, not to respond – an unlikely scenario. Second, to respond broadly in a way that leads to a wider war, such as by firing rockets into central Israel – a low probability. Third, to respond forcefully but not necessarily in a way that would lead to an all-out war – a high probability. And fourth, to strike an Israeli target around the world like an embassy – also a high probability, though such an operation would take time and may not be the immediate retaliation.
Hezbollah will also have a say in the nature of the response. While the group is an Iranian proxy, it is also the defender of Lebanon and not necessarily eager to be dragged into a war it has avoided since October 7.
Mahdavi was extremely close to Nasrallah, and one can assume the Hezbollah leader's fury (and personal fear of being assassinated) burns hot. But Nasrallah is a calculated leader; he is unlikely to rush into a regional flare-up just so he can avenge his death.
As mentioned, Iran will likely not demand this of Hezbollah; the group was built to shield Iran's nuclear program, and the fact it was not pressured to join the current war en masse suggests Iran seeks to maintain its original strategy.
The assassination was surely preceded by extensive intelligence gathering and meticulous preparations to ensure a strike on the target itself while avoiding widespread collateral damage (in part due to the presence of sensitive sites like the Canadian embassy nearby). While Mahdavi operated deep underground like a fugitive, like anyone, he let his guard down – for which he paid with his life.
Despite assessments that the Israeli-attributed assassination will not lead to war, the IDF is preparing for that scenario. This underlies the IDF spokesperson's statement yesterday about the IDF chief approving operational plans in the Northern Command – a message to the other side that Israel is ready.
The national priority remains the southern arena, accomplishing a decisive victory over Hamas and freeing the captives. But the understanding that the northern front is heating up and that the tit-for-tat strikes expected in retaliation for the assassination could spiral out of control into a wider conflict, cannot be ignored.
