Despite limited resources of personnel and equipment, the IDF remains the biggest, most professional, best-supplied organization in Israel. Its capabilities are mainly intended to create deterrence, and most of its activity is devoted to that end.
The people heading Israel's defense and security establishment in the time of coronavirus are looking at the civilian system's failure to handle the crisis in an orderly, coordinated manner and convinced that if the IDF were given a chance to bring the various systems at work under one roof, it would be more successful. Under predefined conditions, the army's involvement could be the most efficient way of managing the epidemic, even if the present danger still isn't defined as a security threat.
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In the early days of the corona crisis, it seems as if Prime Minister Netanyahu almost enjoyed talking to his citizens on prime time broadcasts, instructing them to wash their hands and wear masks and creating the sense that there was a responsible adult in the room who could manage the crisis and also be his own spokesman. He shot up in the polls and refused offers from the former Defense Minister Naftali Bennett (whom he hasn't been able to stand for some years) and current Defense Minister Benny Gantz (whom he hasn't been able to stand for a year and a half) to oversee the handing of coronavirus as only the IDF knows how. Maybe now, when Netanyahu realizes that people who succeed are also blamed for failures, he will be satisfied with his general responsibility and agree to let the IDF win the war on corona.
Prior to Israel's 25th Independence Day, reporters for the Devar newspaper were assigned years and I was handed 1950 to cover. While working on it, I found an article by former Housing Minister Avraham Ofer and was surprised to read it because 23 years later, I knew him as a man of the establishment.
The winter of 1950 was indescribably difficult. February saw snowfall in Tel Aviv. That had never happened before in the first Hebrew city, and hasn't happened since. Toward the end of the year, there were heavy rains, which caused flooding that swept away the camps housing new immigrants. The army was called in to save the situation.
The newsletter of the young socialist, Ashmoret, published Ofer's critical article under the headline "What does the army need with the camps?" Among other things, the angry young man wrote: "There might not have been any choice other than to call in the army. But we must not welcome that step without demanding an answer to the question of how we arrived at the crisis and who is responsible for it."
Ofer's conclusion holds true today. When other systems fail, we need to examine why they failed, but the army is the right address for a democratic society at this time. Unlike the Shin Bet security agency, whose head is rightly asking that the organization's capabilities not be used to track people who are not under suspicion of harming national security, the IDF is ready and even eager to oversee all aspects of the battle against corona.
The law allows it to do so, according to reasonable interpretation of Article 18 of the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948, which is still in effect, as well as Article 2 of the Civil Defense Law, which allows the IDF to fill civilian roles at the request of the Israel Police. If the IDF's role is time-limited and under police and parliamentary supervision, not bringing the army in – even in supervisory role – will put our democracy in danger.
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