One of the troubling insights I have as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee was that Israel "is gifted with impressive tactical capabilities, but it repeatedly mistakes that for an adequate substitute for the absence of a national strategy."
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For over a quarter century, Iran has attempted to consolidate its military presence in various territories to develop the capability to inflict devastating and paralyzing damage on Israel. Alongside the effort to obtain non-conventional military capabilities, Iran is building, through proxies, conventional capabilities in the region, which, when matured, will enable effective cumulative firepower strikes, equaling in effect a nuclear strike. Israel's response to this methodical Iranian strategy is a partial series of tactical operations that try "to delay the inevitable" and cover up the lack of adoption of a counter geopolitical strategy. This was the state of affairs up until October 7, and there is concern it will continue to be so on our northern border.
Israel decided a decade ago to operate in the Syrian arena to foil the consolidation of the Iranian axis, in what later became known as the "Campaign Between the Wars." It undertook tactical actions only, without trying to influence the structure of the ruling system in Syria. It had made do with a series of tactical strikes, instead of trying to achieve a single strategic achievement. In Lebanon and Gaza, it relinquished even continuous tactical activity, and took an irresponsible decision to enable significant military force buildup and turning terror organizations into terror armies.
In Gaza we assumed the Iron Dome system provided an answer for the missile threat, while the intelligence would identify a ground invasion force, and the smart fence would block it. On October 7 this paradigm was shattered, resulting in the deaths of about 1,200 Israelis. This collapse significantly eroded Israeli deterrence and regional standing.
In Lebanon, over the past decade, we tried to kick the can down the road. We should have initiated an offensive operation against Hezbollah's capabilities while it was mired in the Syrian mud, thus reducing it to merely a tactical threat. Lack of leadership and shortsightedness led to the ongoing decision not to act, allowing the almost-uninterrupted buildup of significant military forces. In literature, we could have called this "Israel's march of folly." Instead of preemptive action, we adopted the thesis that the balance of terror vis-à-vis Hezbollah would eventually lead to the "rusting away" of the terror organization's missile stockpile, and therefore – so the thinking went – there was no need to take proactive measures and pay the price.
Additionally, we took the geo-political gamble that blood covenants between Hezbollah and Hamas are improbable, hence Israel would not have to face both fronts with high intensity. That strategy, although seemingly no longer popular, remains deeply embedded in the minds of many leaders to this day. They are still willing to accept a situation in which Iran gets to decide how and when to utilize its accumulated capabilities in Lebanon.
The defeat we suffered on October 7 on the Gaza border disabused Israel of obsolete views in its national security policy. Israel is learning the hard way the price of relinquishing the "pre-emptive strike" tools and belittling the threat of a multi-theater conflict. It needs to realize that "intention-predicting technologies" can only go so far, as do purely defensive capabilities developments. First and foremost this requires a paradigm shift in the upper levels of government and adopting strategic proactive steps rather than just a tactical approach.
The challenge in the north puts Israel in a dilemma: Is it time to change the strategic reality in Lebanon, as promised by the leadership at the beginning of the war, or will our leaders be deterred and suffice with tactical achievements in the border area?
Hamas' success created the perception in Israeli society that the key strategic problem on the northern border is Hezbollah's Radwan force, which could invade border-adjacent communities. Pushing the Radwan force back from the border would be a tactical achievement, especially given the IDF's lessons learned from Gaza border communities. But the significant threat from the north is Hezbollah's capabilities to fire rockets and missiles from Lebanon – a threat Israel continues to treat as something that can be dealt with, and this threat would remain as is even if Hezbollah tactically retreats beyond the Litani River.
Meaning the balance of power in the north has not been disrupted, and it is doubtful that the displaced Israelis would be allowed to return home. Paradoxically, this would enable Iran to preserve capabilities for future strikes against Israel despite Israel changing the rules of the game in the Middle East, and despite the US standing by it, including militarily.
Israel risks again basking in the limelight of a tactical achievement, while the Iranians resume building strategic capabilities that will in short order be used against us.
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