Most of the responses to the Trump plan – from the revelers, the mourners and the historians – attribute too much immediate importance to it, or too little long-term importance. Those who hope it will lead to a negotiated deal or worry it will ignite the Middle East are exaggerating its potential and its dangers. Those who assume the Trump plan is "just words" that will fade because the Palestinians will reject it, the Arabs won't support it and the Europeans will oppose it – are unjustifiably underestimating the importance of the conceptual element.
To properly assess its weight, we must make a realistic distinction between certain fundamental facts and the ever-shifting balances of power. What is fundamental is the negation of the historical compromise and the serial irresponsibility of the Palestinians, the justified concerns in Arab countries over clashing with the radical "Arab street," the feebleness of the Europeans and the decisive influence of the US and Israel in terms of shaping the fate of the territories. What has changed and could change again is the American approach and its effect on Arab, Iranian and Israeli policy.
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It's obvious why the Palestinians rejected the plan, just as they rejected every proposal before it, and adamantly so – for the first time since Oslo they've been offered less than in the past. They are expected to incite violence and civil unrest, but it's doubtful this will have any significant diplomatic benefit, other than, perhaps, exacerbating the unfriendly attitude toward Israel in Europe. Arab states won't volunteer to replace the Palestinians and legitimize the plan. Europe is expected to oppose its unilateralist tenets and make it hard on Israel in the diplomatic arena, maybe even economically, but won't initiate a full-blown political battle or impose comprehensive sanctions.
Even if violence intensifies in the territories and in Arab capitals, once it is quelled the balances of power still won't have changed because even if Israel is hurt it won't bolster the Palestinians. Even in an extreme case, whereby the violence spreads from the territories to the north, Israel will focus on the pivotal fight against Iran and Hezbollah, and it's hard to imagine the results of such a clash serving the Palestinians.
What matters is Israeli and American policy. In Israel, the result of the election isn't expected to deeply impact the approach to the Trump plan, because there isn't an ideological gap in the center of the political map: The strategic importance of the Jordan Valley is generally recognized and there's agreement over incorporating the large settlement blocs. There is also a shared awareness that full Palestinian sovereignty poses a security threat.
A sea-change in Washington, on the other hand, is extremely significant. Even though a Democratic administration isn't expected to completely abandon Trump's moves regarding Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Palestinian refugees and the Jordan Valley, the ramifications for the region could be immense.
Such an administration, especially under the helm of a "progressive," such as Bernie Sanders, for example, will be perceived by the radicals in the region (Iran, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood and large parts of the Palestinian public) as reticent to support Israel. Such an assumption, justified or mistaken, will embolden Iran to be more aggressive, encourage Palestinian and other violence, and erode the confidence of moderate Arab regimes working with Israel. It will also encourage the Europeans to step up their pressure against Israel.
The lesson for Israel is that it must combine short-term restraint with prolonged determination. The restraint is necessary, despite the constraints of the looming election, due to the interest of advancing the Trump plan without succumbing to the temptation of implementing declarative measures that don't contribute to realizing the main accomplishments. It is necessary because it is vital to coordinate with the US, in the desire to alleviate the challenges the friendly Arab regimes are sure to encounter, and because Jordan's role in the equation is of critical importance.
If the Palestinians and Muslim Brotherhood do inflame the Jordanian street and undermine the monarchy, any hasty declarations of sovereignty will have been detrimental and counterproductive. Long-term determination is necessary to institutionalize the dramatic change introduced by Trump within the parameters of shaping the future reality in Judea and Samaria.
