The bottom line of the operation to destroy the nuclear reactor in Syria is a positive one.
President Bashar Assad stood on the precipice of acquiring nuclear capabilities; Israel identified the threat in time and neutralized it, while also avoiding a war and delivering a message (again) to its neighbors near and far that it will not come to terms with its enemies' efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction.
This summary, however, is only partial, because the full picture is far more complex. In 2003, Israel was taken by surprise when Libya's nuclear project came to light. The Israeli explanation at the time for not knowing about it was that Libya was not a intelligence priority. In Syria or Egypt, it was argued, a nuclear project could never go undetected.
And yet, a little more than three years later, it became apparent that it could. The Syrian nuclear project had been underway for years without anyone in Israel knowing about it. Although there were a few "crazies" in the Military Intelligence Directorate and the Mossad who sounded alarm bells, their claims were not based on concrete evidence. They certainly were not able to wake up the defense establishment, which was operating under the ingrained notion that Israel knows everything that is happening in Syria (or according to the old saying: "We receive a report every time Assad turns over in bed at night").
This massive oversight was largely due to the prevalence of a rigid rationale. Israel was searching for clues under flashlights. Assad realized this, and began using oil lamps. He allowed very few people in on the secret, and he did not work via the customary diplomatic-military channels. The facility he was building was operated solely by North Koreans and the reactor's shape was unlike that of a normal nuclear reactor – circular with a smoke stack – resembling a simple factory, to deceive anyone watching from the ground or the sky.
This deception plan almost succeeded. Assad's reactor was mere months away from becoming operational, and had it not been for a grave lapse in field security by his atomic agency chief – who according to a report in The New Yorker took photographs of the reactor with him on a work trip to Vienna – it's likely that Israel would have detected the project too late.
This intelligence failure turned into a success with the discovery of the reactor, the ensuing efforts to gather more intelligence, the formulation of the attack plan, and the approach to avoid a war in the wake of the attack.
But the failure truly became a success because the intelligence community decided to thoroughly examine itself in the aftermath of the operation. This professional introspection bred the concept of the "campaign between the wars" – a title that encompasses a host of covert and low-intensity military and intelligence efforts to prevent enemy states and terrorist organizations from becoming stronger and thwart their offensive activity – under which the IDF has been operating in recent years.
The operation to destroy the Syrian nuclear reactor was essentially the first operation within the framework of the campaign-between-wars concept. It gave birth to the hundreds of intelligence-gathering and covert operations Israel has carried out in recent years.
Another disconcerting lesson from this affair is the fact that Israel is alone in the fight. The United States is perhaps our greatest friend in the world, but in the moment of truth it left us on our own. Israeli officials shared the information with their counterparts in Washington and asked them to attack the reactor in order to avert war and send a message to Iran, but the Americans, under the leadership of President George W. Bush, decided for their own reasons not to act.
In other words: American officials knew a nuclear reactor was being built in Syria for military purposes and that its clear objective was to threaten Israel's existence, and they told us to "manage alone." Israel managed alone, exceedingly well in fact, but we must not fall for illusions: In the future too, Israel will only be able to rely on itself. Its friends may help (militarily, economically, diplomatically), but they will not do the job for it.
In the grand scheme, the operation was a success. Certainly when it comes to achieving its goal of destroying the nuclear reactor, but also in the path to achieving it. The process in its entirety was managed perfectly, both diplomatically and militarily. Proper judgment was applied throughout and the risks taken were calculated. Most of the credit must go to then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who never received even a fraction of what he is due. The Israeli public judged him on the failures of the Second Lebanon War, and the courts judged him on his criminal affairs. But he was never recognized for plotting the correct course to eradicate an imminent existential threat, because utmost discretion was required to avoid war.
Israel's current and future political and military leaders would do well to study this course – its weak and strong points, and mainly how to manage complex situations. They would also do well to learn a lesson in humility and integrity. Things are not always political, not everything is personal, and credit is not always needed. Sometimes the nation's interests are more important. Ultimately, the nation's future precedes its leaders' place in the history books.
