Iran's launch of a drone on Saturday was a deliberate opening shot in that country's direct confrontation with Israel. In the past, Iran tended to use its emissaries in the region, whether they are Hezbollah or Palestinian terrorist organizations, to attack Israel. But the Iranians have now decided to act on their own, albeit to test Israel and its red lines when it comes to the Shiite country's presence on its northern border.
The serious incident in Israel's north follows a number of militant statements from Lebanese leaders in Beirut last week, claiming they are ready for war and will fiercely protect Lebanon's border and the gas fields off its shores in particular. Lebanon's leaders are not preparing for a war with Israel but rather parliamentary elections set to be held there two months from now.
Lebanon has absolutely no interest in a confrontation with Israel. And anyway, the issues under dispute with Israel, in particular the question of the demarcation of the maritime border between the two countries and the exploitation of the gas fields on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, will likely be solved by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan, who is set to visit Beirut in the coming days. After all, it is American companies that will produce the gas along Lebanon's shores, and the last thing the Americans want is an infernal racket that could keep the gas and the cash from flowing.
The question of the Iranian presence in Syria and Lebanon is an entirely different matter, as are Iran's attempts to establish factories for the production of precision missiles on Lebanese soil. Israel has already made it clear this is a red line it would not allow Iran and Hezbollah to cross. It seems that as always, the key is in Israel's hands because it is only if Iran and Hezbollah are convinced Israel means business and is determined to preserve that red line, that there is a good chance they will be careful not to cross it.
The incident over the weekend can be seen as part of the psychological game between Israel and Iran, where both countries are testing to see who will blink first and just how far each side is willing to go. This weekend's events, therefore, do not necessarily need to escalate into a third Lebanon War.
It is true that in the past, for instance in the summer of 2006, war has broken out despite a desire by both the Israeli government and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's to avoid such an escalation. That is why an experienced and responsible military and political leadership is so important. Such leadership could walk the delicate line between a determined and covert and all-out war. According to the Winograd Commission tasked with investigating and drawing lessons from the Second Lebanon War, there was no such Israeli leadership in 2006. In contrast, the events of the past seven years of the Syrian civil war are indicative of the success of Israel's military and political leadership in advancing Israel's security interests without being dragged into a confrontation.
The winds of war were also blowing in the south last week following reports of an impending financial crisis in the Gaza Strip that could lead to a renewed round of fighting. But Hamas is not interested in a military confrontation as a result of the financial hardships it faces in Gaza, and with the terror group at a low point the likes of which it has not known since seizing control of the territory over a decade ago.
The question is how should Israel handle the humanitarian crisis, which also has consequences for Israel's image in the media. The answer is clear: Another cement or delivery truck will not change a thing. The root of the problem is Hamas' rule over Gaza, which prioritizes the construction of tunnels and equipping itself with missiles over the welfare of the people. Just as no one has suggested helping residents of areas controlled by the Islamic State by providing financial assistance to the terrorist organization, so too is there no reason to help Hamas remain in power. The fall of Hamas will likely bring Gaza's salvation.
