Arab Israelis are more integrated than ever into the state, its leadership, its institutions, its economy, and its daily life, and it's good that this is the direction in which things are going. This is correct not only because an Arab party has been (problematically) included in the governing coalition, or because of the dramatic shift in government funding that goes to strengthen the Arab sector and because of the bias in favor of Arab authorities at the municipal level, but rather as the result of a noted, continual improvement in education and quality of life for members of the Arab sector since the state was founded. The government has an interest in keeping this trend going and expanding it, and listening to well-founded criticism of its faults and trying to fix them.
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Alongside continuing and deepening the process of integration, the lesson of the past few months, after the riots in Lod and Acre, must not be ignored – especially the prestige and identification the rioters earned from the enemy during the war in Gaza, both among the Palestinian public and among the Arabs of Israel and the region. These influenced the behavior of Arabs who have reservations about them. All these demand heightened awareness and a measured response.
The Arab public's main motivations for anti-Israel stances and hostility toward Israel, for violence and aggression and terrorism are ethno-religious and social. Since the 1970s, a process that is intensifying under the leadership of the well-to-do classes has been enlisting Arab Israelis to publicly support the narrative that rejects the legitimacy of the Jewish state. It imbues the young people with a sense of pride in having adopted the "Nakba" worldview and attempting to turn back the hands of time to when "Palestine was Arab." In practice, this means identifying with Israel's enemies. Most of them do not intend to express this outlook through violence, and they realize the damage it would do to their status if relations deteriorated to an open ethno-religious conflict. They are dragged into active identification when Israel's enemies abroad and rioters at home break out into violent clashes. The quashing of the riots in October 2000 cooled their willingness to join the enemy at a time of war, but the more serious outbreak of violence this past May proves that the danger is increasing. The rioters in Lod and Acre and the masses that identify with the war against Israel are not only the heroes of Joint Arab Party leader Ayman Odeh and his friends in the leadership. A poll conducted among Palestinians in June showed that a majority expressed support for Hamas (56% compared to 14% who support Fatah) and armed struggle against Israel (49% compared to 27% who support negotiations), and that 86% see Arab Israeli citizens as contributing to the battle, even more than Hamas (75%) and considerably more that Fatah or the Palestinian Authority (13% and 11%, respectively).
When these are the heroes of the Palestinian people at home and abroad, and Israel is not seen as deterrent, we must prepare for a test of strength. The political leadership is in denial about the problem, most of the media denies it exists for ideological reasons and presents a picture of a "handful of extremists on both sides," but the Shin Bet security agency and the IDF have no choice but to prepare themselves. Recently, a report cited that only 40 of the 500 Arabs who work as truck drivers and bus drivers and heavy equipment operators answered an emergency call during the Gaza fighting, thereby interfering with the IDF's operations. A multi-front war that requires the transport of troops and supplies throughout Israel could be complicated by Arabs who line up with a hostile nationalist view while being integrated in key positions in the country. This danger has already been proven: roads can be blocked, riots can target civilian populations, police forces can be diverted, there are enormous stocks of illegal weapons, and there could be a collective refusal to take part in national efforts and possibly attempts to interfere with reserves call-ups. The IDF understands the risks and is preparing to discuss establishing special reservist national guard units to handle them.
The integration of the Arab population into the country's systems should be expanded, but its behavior requires certain reservations. The small number of rioters whom the centrist stream dismisses are a criminal problem that the police need to deal with. When the masses who identify with the enemy at a time of war are the heroes of the Palestinian people at home and abroad, and the centrist stream doesn't dare to violate the tribal and nationalist solidarity and thwarts Israel's ability to defend itself, the integration should be handled more carefully. Anyone who doesn't want to be treated as a ticking bomb must avoid repeatedly behaving in a manner that justifies those suspicions.
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