Hamas' terror attack and the massacre it committed on Oct. 7 are a defining event that will forever be etched in Jewish and Israeli consciousness. Investigations into the events of that cursed day clearly demonstrate the systemic collapse experienced by the IDF that day. With them, there are growing claims that if the IDF had been prepared and ready during routine days, and not just during emergencies, for a Hamas terror attack – as befitting a defensive army, which must be prepared for a situation where a terror organization sitting on the country's border might attack one day – the attack would have been thwarted, or perhaps not even launched. These claims are supported by testimonies indicating that on the morning of the attack, Mohammed Deif even considered canceling it for fear that the IDF was preparing an ambush for him.
Beyond the IDF and Shin Bet failure preceding the attack, the fundamental question about Israel's strategic doctrine and accommodation policy toward Hamas continues to resurface. Under this policy, Israel believed the Palestinian terror organization would institutionalize and prefer improving economic reality and the welfare of its citizens, and would therefore be restrained in exchange for a series of civic and economic measures toward the Gaza Strip, and would be deterred by fear of losing those assets.
Moreover, the question of Qatari money transferred to Hamas reemerges, which undoubtedly aided in building the terror army that was ultimately deployed against Israel on Oct. 7. In this context – the Israeli strategy was clear, given the desire to focus on existential threats such as the Iranian nuclear program and Hezbollah's precision missile project, while keeping the Hamas threat under control. The assumption and organizing logic were that preventing a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and improving economic reality, in the shadow of Hamas' institutionalization process, would ensure the preservation of deterrence against the organization, the establishment and deepening of accommodation, and thereby effectively neutralizing this arena in a way that allows necessary intelligence and operational focus on other threatening arenas.
The preoccupation and focus on the concept of Hamas' institutionalization, accommodation, and deterrence diverted attention from the reasonable possibility of thwarting the attack, or preventing it, through proper operational preparation of the IDF on the Gaza Strip border. But at the same time, the importance of the unasked question becomes clearer: Even if the IDF had been properly prepared and either thwarted the Oct. 7 attack or deterred Hamas from launching it altogether, would Israel's strategic doctrine of managing Hamas through arrangements and deterrence have ever been fundamentally questioned?
It is not unlikely that the answer to the unasked question is negative, especially in light of Israel's accumulated historical experience with Hamas since it took over the Gaza Strip. After all, since its takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, and after every violent round with Hamas (2008, 2012, 2014, the fence events in 2018–2021), Israel returned to the path of "dialogue" with the organization and attempts to reach arragment with it.
Therefore, it is not unlikely that if the Oct. 7 attack had been thwarted by the IDF, or if it had been prevented due to better preparation by the IDF – Israel would have continued the same policy toward Hamas, as part of the concept that effectively led to the "containment" of the Palestinian terror organization and the terror army it built on Israel's border. Indeed, if the attack had not been launched – the recognition of Hamas being deterred would have strengthened, hence the validity of deterrence. Had the attack been thwarted – it would have been categorized as just another escalation cycle with Hamas – similar to the previous confrontations we've experienced in the past – none of which were significant enough to prompt Israel to reconsider its strategic doctrine toward Hamas.
Tragically and painfully, this concept led to a stinging and humiliating failure that exacted a very heavy price from Israeli society. On the other hand, it is frightening to think that if the attack had been thwarted or prevented – this concept would likely have deepened its roots, and we might have received the Oct. 7 attack in an even more intense and dangerous format, in a more coordinated multi-arena manner, and at a much more problematic and dangerous timing.
