The negotiations Israel is conducting with Hamas for the release of the captives are unfortunately not progressing, to the immense pain and sorrow of the captives' families and all of us with them.
The United States, Egypt, and Qatar, who have taken it upon themselves to mediate, are presenting new formulas and improved drafts day after day in an attempt to appease Hamas. Israel has shown a willingness to be flexible in its positions and make compromises and concessions – only to have Hamas keeps hardening its stance, unwilling to make any compromise or deal.
Hamas' external leadership, who reside outside of the Gaza Strip in luxury hotels provided by Qatar, are those who attend the talks with the mediators in Qatar and even in Egypt, perhaps so they could appease the Qataris who fund and host them – but mainly because they know that the very existence of negotiations serves as a life insurance policy for them against any Israeli attempt to eliminate them.
But six months after the war began, it is clear to all that the traveling circus called "Hamas-abroad" that moves from one luxury hotel to another has no real meaning or leverage. After all, they are not the ones making decisions – that role falls to Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, hiding deep in a bunker somewhere in the southern strip for fear of IDF soldiers searching for him. Communication with Sinwar is intermittent and partial, making negotiation management difficult and prolonging the process. But the problem is not technical, not a matter of communication – it is a matter of substance.
Sinwar does not mind that negotiations are taking place –- in his view, they increase pressure on Israel from within and abroad. But it appears he does not want a deal, rather Israel's surrender to all his demands: a ceasefire and end to the war; withdrawal of the IDF from the strip; the return of Gazan refugees to their homes; the wholesale release of prisoners from Israeli jails; and ultimately – guarantees and assurances for his safety and that of his men after the fighting ends.
Sinwar does not care about the residents of the strip. For him, they are "grease for the wheels of the revolution," expendable for the cause. What interests him is not how many more of his men will die, but how the war he initiated against Israel will be remembered in the history books, and what its long-term contribution will be in the Palestinian's persistent struggle against Israel. If Hamas survives the war as a governing and military force and emerges standing – in Sinwar's view, it will be a great victory that would only encourage him to continue on his path.
Sinwar likely believes that any deal that does not ensure an end to the war is a deal "on thin ice." After all, as soon as he let's go of the trump card he currently holds – the hostages –, Israel will not hesitate to pursue him after the temporary lull in fighting ends. This time without the concern for harming the captives holding it back.
This disparity – between Israel's determination to continue fighting after the return of the captives until Hamas is defeated, and the organization's desire to secure immunity for itself and end the war – cannot be bridged. Therefore, a local, limited deal similar to the one reached at the start of the war can perhaps be achieved, but likely not much more than that.
But the truth is that Israel has more flexibility than we tend to assume, since Gaza is utterly destroyed and Hamas has been hit hard. So the question is not necessarily whether the fighting will continue until the last Hamas battalion in Rafah is defeated – but what will happen in the strip the day after. The answer to this lies not only on the military level, but also the diplomatic one, giving Israel room for flexibility and maneuverability.
What is clear is that Israel has a moral obligation to leave no stone unturned in its effort to return the captives it abandoned on October 7. Their return will be a victory for Israel and the Israeli spirit, and an important element in the victory we will achieve over Hamas.
