The selection of Yahya Sinwar, known for his extremist views, as the new head of Hamas's political bureau, following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran at the end of last July, has sparked considerable debate and surprised many experts and analysts. Sinwar was not initially considered a likely successor to Haniyeh, suggesting that this choice may mark a turning point in the future of the terrorist movement and its overall trajectory.
In my opinion, several factors influenced Sinwar's selection. One key factor is the absence of a prepared alternative to fill the void left by Haniyeh's assassination promptly. This is particularly relevant given that Khaled Meshaal has distanced himself from leading the terrorist movement and is no longer internally supported, in addition to his strained relationship with Iran since he sided with the Syrian opposition in 2012.
Another factor is the charged atmosphere resulting from Haniyeh's sudden assassination amidst the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip. This explains the haste with which Palestinian factions "endorsed" Sinwar's selection and considered it a "logical response" to Haniyeh's assassination, as stated by Jibril Rajoub, Secretary of Fatah's Central Committee. This endorsement is not unrelated to the Palestinian factions' relationship with Sinwar, who had previously attempted to bridge the gap between Hamas and Fatah, and is known for his radical hostility towards Israel. The Palestinian Authority may view him as a bulwark against the strong pressures exerted by Israel and regional powers for reform and addressing rampant corruption within it.
Sinwar's selection carries several messages, but the most significant implication is the absence of a political face for the terrorist movement. Sinwar is essentially a field commander whose location is unknown and who cannot move freely even if he manages to leave Gaza alive. Israel will pursue him relentlessly and eliminate him, making it impossible for him to exist on the soil of any country, even those known for their relationship with Hamas, given the escalating conflict with Israel.
Therefore, Sinwar's presence means merging the political and military wings of the terrorist movement and confining them together in Gaza's sewers and tunnels, without any presence in inter-Palestinian political interactions or in the movement's relations with the outside world, let alone managing its complex alliance relationships with countries like Iran, Qatar, and Turkey. In this regard, he resembles Hassan Nasrallah, the permanently hidden leader of Hezbollah.
The dilemma resulting from Sinwar's selection does not lie in his radicalism, as some observers suggest. Often, peace has been achieved through the efforts of hardline politicians. The real problem is that Sinwar cannot exercise his political role effectively, especially at the height of the conflict with Israel. This makes him extreme in his demands and less inclined to make concessions, particularly since he fully realizes that his life is constantly threatened, regardless of whether ceasefire deals are reached.
Hamas's messages behind Sinwar's selection, as officially expressed by Osama Hamdan, one of the terrorist movement's leaders, are that the movement wants to demonstrate its unity and cohesion, which have been questioned, and its ability to make decisions regardless of circumstances. It also wants to show that it can transfer power and produce new leadership cadres, and prove that the killing of its leaders at a high rate and the resulting pressures do not affect the movement and will not push it to make any concessions or submit to any bargains.
These are not surprising to Israel or others. The reality is that the terrorist movement suffered a heavy loss with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh. Sinwar may indeed be a subject of internal consensus at the current stage, but he does not have the ability to unite the movement internally and externally in later stages, even if he manages to stay alive or reach a settlement that allows him to leave the Strip safely, which is doubtful given current indicators and evidence.
Hamas has made a grave strategic error that will strongly affect its future by choosing a leader described as "deranged" by sources close to him, in addition to being pre-condemned to death. While Hamas could have chosen a more realistic alternative, the moment charged with fear and anxiety played a prominent role in tipping the balance in Sinwar's favor, to avoid any divisions or disagreements or even delay in the process of choosing a replacement for Haniyeh, which could have exposed the movement's decisions to confusion and turmoil at a time when it is supposed to continue the desperate fighting in parallel with the negotiation process with Israel through Egyptian and Qatari mediations.
The terrorist movement's leaders also preferred to appear falsely in a deceptive show of strength and perhaps believed that choosing the "deranged" Sinwar would be a provocative step for Israel, which has failed in its efforts to find him so far and to send a message of the terrorist movement's strength and ability to survive in light of regional and international understandings that completely exclude the terrorist movement from the Palestinian equation or scene in the day after the war. Although this choice may push in the opposite direction of its intended purpose for the movement, it doubles the conviction of regional parties and confirms beyond doubt the terrorist movement's lack of ability to coexist peacefully with Israel and its insistence on pursuing the path of terrorism and bloodshed.
It is impossible, of course, to replicate Haniyeh's experience, who was confined to the Gaza Strip for two years, during which he headed the terrorist movement and then left to reside in Qatar and move with relative comfort between Doha and some regional capitals. Sinwar will not repeat this experience due to the difference in his situation in Gaza's sewers and tunnels. Moreover, even if Israel were to consider allowing his exit as part of a negotiated agreement, it's doubtful that Qatar or other nations would bear the responsibility for his safety and residence.
It is more likely that the rush to choose Sinwar was merely a solution to get out of the circle of division and disagreements over choosing a successor to Haniyeh, as the connection with Iran has come to play an important role in choosing who takes over the presidency of the terrorist movement's political bureau, given the military wing's adherence to this relationship at the expense of the movement's original relationship with the international terrorist organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.
This is in addition to the insistence of the Gaza leadership on managing the movement, escaping from the continuous pursuit of the terrorist movement's leaders residing abroad, solving the crisis of hosting these leaders after it was proven that the chances of the terrorist movement's leaders staying hidden in Gaza's sewers and tunnels have become better than abroad, and avoiding potential pressures on external leaders to make concessions regarding stopping the war or demands for the terrorist movement to completely distance itself from the day-after scene in the Gaza Strip.
