Until a few months ago, I opposed the proposed hostage deal. Gaza had not been fully captured then. Hamas still had four nearly untouched brigades in the Rafah area; the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor were not yet under IDF control, and massive arms smuggling into Gaza could have easily resumed. In such a situation, I believed it was wrong to risk Israel's security, especially that of the western Negev communities which had already suffered terribly, even for the release of the hostages.
The situation has changed since then, and not just because more hostages have been discovered dead, raising concerns for the survivors' well-being. The main reason to reconsider this dilemma is that the war's parameters have shifted. The war in Gaza is no longer about conquering and defeating Hamas but about maintaining Israel's control of the area. It's not about gaining new achievements, but preserving existing ones. Meanwhile, the northern front has heated up considerably, demonstrating a real need for intensive offensive initiative. We can't leave the northern communities bleeding indefinitely. We paid a price for the containment policy in Gaza over the years, and we must not repeat this mistake.
Boastful claims about Israel's ability to wage a multi-front war have proven false (like many other statements), so there's no choice but to halt the war in Gaza to focus on the northern front. Moreover, it's increasingly clear that we can't avoid a direct confrontation with Iran, and we must be prepared for this confrontation – in equipment and manpower, international alliances, and national unity. This preparation also requires time and optimal focus. Therefore, we should sign a hostage deal, even at the cost of a complete withdrawal from Gaza, to dedicate our strength to the next battles awaiting us. In the current situation, sinking deeper into the Gaza quagmire only delays dealing with these vital tasks on other fronts.
Opponents of the deal still have valid arguments today. The risks from the south will increase after the IDF withdraws from Gaza. The Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah crossing are crucial to preventing Hamas from returning to fighting, and releasing prisoners with blood on their hands is a severe security blow. But ultimately, Hamas is an enemy that has been hit hard, and it will take time before it can strike Israel again. Even when it can do so, Israel is capable of dealing with it alone, while Hezbollah and certainly Iran are more formidable enemies, and Israel needs external reinforcement against them.
Currently, the Americans have a significant interest in calming the situation in the Middle East, at least until their elections. We should exploit this interest to obtain maximum security guarantees from them – both regarding the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor, support for Israel's war against Hezbollah, and especially in creating a regional and international coalition against Iran: from renewing and intensifying economic sanctions to a coalition that will cooperate with Israel if attacked by Iran, and even support for a preemptive strike if it proves necessary. Control over Gaza is a bargaining chip that Israel can use to its advantage in other arenas.
And what if these interests are not achieved? Israel will remain in Gaza, fortify security zones along its borders to prevent arms smuggling and invasion of the Negev communities; erect fences around them to prevent Hamas infiltration as much as possible, and on the other hand, take responsibility, which of course carries risk, for distributing humanitarian aid to Gaza residents, to ensure that as little aid as possible leaks to Hamas. At the same time, Israel will work to establish an alternative government to Hamas, even of the Palestinian Authority, as long as we maintain the freedom of action to strike those who wish us harm, similar to the existing situation in the West Bank.
Like most issues in our lives, the Gaza issue in light of the overall confrontation with Iran and its proxies is complex, and all sides have good arguments. No populist, inflammatory, and unequivocal solution is suitable; neither a solution of conquering and flattening and killing anyone who might harm us, nor a solution of full withdrawal and naive expectation for world peace. All paths need to be examined in cost-benefit tests. Public discourse about them should not be in terms of sons of light versus sons of darkness, but in practical terms of weighing advantages and disadvantages.
