After the Hashemite kingdom let the Jordan Valley go in the 1967 Six-Day War, and 32 years after it announced that it was cutting ties with the "West Bank" and even gave up its claims to sovereignty there, Blue and White is trying to drag Jordan into its own "annexation dispute" with the Likud.
Blue and White leaders Benny Gantz and Gabi Ashkenazi, as part of negotiations to form a government, are claiming that annexation without agreement from Jordan will endanger our special ties with the kingdom, and the long-term quiet on our eastern border in particular.
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But this argument ignores the hidden aspects of Israel's relations with Jordan, especially the fact that there is a wide discrepancy between how Jordan openly conducts itself in regards to Israel – using critical, sometimes inciting, rhetoric aimed at pacifying its Palestinian majority – and how the kingdom acts behind the scenes.
Jordan has swallowed a lot of toads over the years to maintain the informal relationship with Israel that is vital to its own continued existence. Jordan enjoys economic, military, and intelligence cooperation with us that is often critical to its interests. Jordan also holds special status on the Temple Mount, and has in effect become Israel's silent partner in managing affairs there. The way Jordan sees it, that status is of almost existential importance, given the place Al-Aqsa holds in the narrative and consciousness of the Hashemite dynasty and many of the kingdom's residents. Jordan will think twice before putting that at risk.
We should also add Israel's relations with the US and Saudi Arabia, which have served Jordan well over the years, and the dependence of impoverished Jordan – which has a multitude of refugees and a paucity of natural resources – on foreign aid. In 2018, the US signed a deal to provide Jordan with $6.5 billion in military and economic aid over five years.
Like his grandfather, Abdullah, and his father, Hussein, King Abdullah II's relations with Israel are carried out both above and below the surface.
To protect them, Jordan has over the years come to accept Israel's annexation of east Jerusalem; the construction of a group of Jewish neighborhoods there; the relocation of the American Embassy to Jerusalem; and US recognition of Israeli settlements – as little as these developments might be to its liking. Jordan will also survive the annexation of the Jordan Valley and Israel's settlements in Judea and Samaria, as the last thing Jordan wants is to find itself shoring up a complicated border with a Palestinian state in the "West Bank" that would pose a threat to the sense of belonging of the kingdom's Palestinian population as well as challenge the government.
The Jordanians prefer that the IDF remain a buffer between them and the Palestinians in the West Bank, and it's convenient for them that this buffer exist without Israeli sovereignty. But even if Israel applies sovereignty, it doesn't seem as if Jordan will burn its bridges. We might see the recall of the ambassador and even the peace treaty being suspended, but in essence, we can assume that Israeli-Jordanian relations and both countries mutual interests will not change. The Jordanians might go "underground" for a while, but nothing more.
Israel taking advantage of a one-time opportunity to apply sovereignty to Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria is a strategic move and no less vital than its strategic ties with Jordan. The price the kingdom will make us pay for that step is worth it. Jordan might rage, protest, and threaten, but eventually, its interests will take precedence, and its relations with Israel – albeit unofficial – will remain intact.
