There are several indications of continued convergence and openness between Tehran and Arab capitals, with strong indications of an imminent resumption of relations between Cairo and Tehran. The resumption of relations with Egypt was welcomed by the Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei during his reception of Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, the Sultan of Oman, who recently visited Iran.
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Khamenei stated that Iran has no problem with fully restoring relations with Cairo as part of its policy of good neighborliness. The Iranian government spokesperson also expressed readiness to enhance relations with Egypt and stated that President Ebrahim Raisi has instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take the necessary steps in this regard.
It is evident that the Sultanate of Oman has played a prominent role in de-escalating tensions and thawing Iranian regional relations, both with Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Reports also suggest that Muscat is playing a similar role between Tehran and Washington at present.
Some reports indicate that Egypt is considering various aspects of rapprochement with Iran and has taken steps to allow Iranian tourists to enter Egypt under specific procedures, in an effort to boost tourism and increase foreign currency inflows.
No one rejects or objects to the convergence or regional détente with Iran or Turkey, as well as the establishment of official relations with Israel. Important prerequisites for achieving peace and promoting coexistence in the Middle East are security and stability.
However, achieving this goal is not solely dependent on procedural agreements and the exchange of ambassadors but is also tied to substantial and genuine transformations that address the causes, manifestations, and factors that have fueled tensions from the start.
For example, regarding Iran, observers do not notice any change in Iranian regional behavior that indicates Tehran's seriousness in opening a new chapter with its Arab neighbors. There is no evidence of any Iranian movement to liquidate direct Iranian military presence in Syria or the military and financial support provided to Tehran-backed militias in Iraq.
There is no sign of Iranian pressure on its ally, the Houthis in Yemen, or Hezbollah in Lebanon to end the crises in these Arab countries and restore a unified national atmosphere.
In this matter, there are two perspectives. The first suggests that rapprochement with Tehran encourages Iran to take similar steps to gradually end its regional interventions, and this convergence can serve as an incentive for Iranians as a positive message. This is a perspective held in the world of pragmatic politics.
The second perspective suggests that rapprochement with Iran should be based on a tit-for-tat approach, where any Arab step should be met with a similar Iranian step. However, this policy seems difficult to implement in the case of Iran, especially regarding the issue of halting Iranian meddling in Arab affairs. Iran has what it considers to be a logical response in each case, and it possesses negotiating capabilities that can engage in prolonged talks, even if the dialogue takes place in consecutive futile rounds. The negotiations between Iranian delegations and representatives of major powers regarding the nuclear file serve as an example.
Between this and that, there are those who believe that openness to Iran and temporarily closing the doors of tensions serves an Arab strategic interest in terms of removing the justifications for Iranian interventions, provocative behaviors, chaos, and disruptions. It also provides a regional climate supportive of development, particularly needed for ambitious development strategies in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. This is completely true, and there is no debate about it, especially since Iran has an extensive expansion project that is non-negotiable from the Iranian perspective. Billions of dollars have been invested and spent in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and elsewhere.
Personally, I do not believe that Tehran can completely or partially abandon this before achieving its long-term goals, either through regional and international recognition of its role and status or by becoming a regional nuclear power and then securing the ultimate goal of sustaining the Iranian regime, consolidating its power, and achieving its objectives.
So, it can be said that changing Iran's regional behavior is hard within the foreseeable future, regardless of the atmosphere of rapprochement and regional détente. This in itself means that Tehran is content with slogans, pursuing its interests, neutralizing Arab positions and policies toward it, without making any significant concessions.
However, this does not negate the sensibleness of betting on the possibility of changing Iranian behavior and the likelihood of steps towards rapprochement between Tehran and Arab capitals because, in the current reality, there is no alternative to attempting to convince Tehran of the benefits of security and stability, especially considering the economic and societal suffering caused by Iran's hostile policies over decades and years.
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