Saleh al-Aruri played a major role in Hamas' activities, second only to the triumvirate that leads the organization in Gaza (Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa). He has a long history of sending terrorists to carry out attacks, although he never carried out attacks himself.
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He spent years in Israeli administrative detention and was eventually released as part of a deal in which he left abroad. He initially resided in Damascus and later in Turkey, from where he operated cells that carried out attacks in the West Bank including the attack in which the three teenagers were kidnapped and murdered in the summer of 2014.
Under Israeli pressure, and also out of fear that he would be eliminated, he left Turkey and moved to Lebanon, where he enjoyed the patronage of Hezbollah and became very close to the leaders of the Iranian Quds Force. While sending instructions to carry out attacks (and sending funds to cells in the field) he established a terror infrastructure in the refugee camps that carried out several rocket launches and attempts to infiltrate into Israel, including during the current war.
Senior officials in Israel have declared more than once in the past that al-Aruri is a dead man. There were plenty of reasons to eliminate him even then, but after the October 7, attack he became a target for elimination – according to the public declarations of Israel's political-security leadership – alongside his colleagues in the Hamas leadership in Gaza and abroad. In the past, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah warned that the elimination of al-Aruri or other senior figures would lead to a direct response from Hezbollah.
Now Nasrallah has to make the most complex decision he has faced in the current conflict: To determine whether the assassination carried out in the heart of the Shiite stronghold in Beirut justifies expanding the fighting to the point of firing towards central Israel, under the equation he set in the past that Beirut equals Tel Aviv, knowing that this could lead to a broad campaign, which all signs indicate Hezbollah is not interested in. On the other hand, refraining from such action or settling for a symbolic response will indicate that Nasrallah fears Israel and that he has no interest in combining the fronts, leaving Hamas alone in the campaign.
Although Israel did not take responsibility for the assassination, no one doubts who was responsible. From here, one can also relate to the dilemma: The elimination of al-Aruri is significant not only in the context of revenge and harming the Hamas leadership but also in the broader circles of recovering Israeli deterrence. Carrying out such an assassination during a war requires excellent intelligence and high operational capabilities in a problematic and dangerous target, which only a few security services in the world possess, and which there is a constant fear of losing if they are not activated.
On the other hand, Israel also does not currently want a broad campaign in Lebanon, at least as long as the Gaza war is still raging at the current intensity. His elimination significantly increases the chances that this will happen and that all fronts will boil over simultaneously, including Judea and Samaria where Aruri has extensive connections (especially in the Judea area).
Israel's challenge now will be to prevent this and keep Hezbollah deterred. If this happens, Israel will be able to breathe a little air for the first time since Oct. 7, knowing that Hamas has started to pay the price.
