The Palestinian Authority's security forces' battle against terror groups in Jenin and Tulkarem seems far from reaching a decisive end. It remains unclear whether the objective is to restore PA control over northern Samaria or if this is merely a show of force – a message to the new US administration and an attempt to signal the Authority's ability to exercise sovereign responsibility. Analyzing the power dynamics between the sides, the fighting will likely end in an agreement delineating each party's operational zones and coexistence boundaries.
Despite his advanced age, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) possesses strategic awareness and accurately reads the international arena. In his earliest days as PA chairman in September 2004, he explained his approach in an interview with Al-Rai newspaper. He determined that suicide terrorism had harmed the Palestinian cause, shifting international legitimacy from supporting the Palestinian struggle to backing Israeli policy. Therefore, he demanded: "Let us fulfill our Road Map [a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict] obligations, convince the world we've done our duty, and that [Ariel] Sharon needs to fulfill his."
Facing Saudi Arabia's push to implement the two-state solution, Abbas continues to operate similarly today, trying to present the international community with a responsible political entity wielding sovereign authority. In this situation, demanding Israel commit to a two-state trajectory poses the greatest threat to us, more likely than PA security forces turning their weapons against Israeli targets. While such a scenario isn't implausible, the PA leadership understands that direct confrontation with Israel would give the Jerusalem government grounds to reject any progress on resolving the Palestinian issue.
Those who believe diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia toward a regional Sunni-Israeli alliance can be established without concrete commitments on the Palestinian issue should learn from Menachem Begin's mistake during the Egyptian peace agreement. At a conference marking Camp David Accords' tenth anniversary, Dan Pattir revealed that President Jimmy Carter saw the Israeli-Egyptian agreement as a stepping stone to a broader deal resolving the Palestinian issue – which he considered more important. Hence, he clashed with Begin over demands to freeze all settlement construction. At the same conference, David Kimchi claimed Carter promised Anwar Sadat that if reelected in 1980, the Americans would force Israel to implement the Palestinian autonomy as Egypt understood it. Thank God Carter wasn't reelected.
Menachem Begin erred in assessing Sadat's autonomy demands as mere solidarity. To this day, in every meeting with Egyptian representatives, they attribute their deliberately distant and minimalist approach to peace to Israel's unfulfilled Palestinian obligations. Similarly, we should internalize that Saudi demands for advancing a two-state solution wouldn't be seen as a non-binding declaration.
The Oct. 7 massacre created public consciousness enabling broad national consensus to reject establishing a Palestinian state beside the city of Kfar Saba and Highway 6. Israel can renew Yitzhak Rabin's commitment from his final Knesset speech on Oct. 5, 1995, when he brought Oslo II Accord for approval. On one hand, he worked to transfer Palestinians in Areas A and B to PA control – completed in January 1996, effectively ending Israeli control over 90% of Palestinians. On the other hand, he established that Jerusalem would remain unified, including Givat Zeev and Maale Adumim; the Jordan Valley in its broadest sense would be the eastern security border, and the Palestinian entity would be "less than a state."
At Camp David 2000, Ehud Barak abandoned all of Rabin's principles: he agreed to divide Jerusalem, withdraw from the Valley, and grant full sovereignty to the Palestinian entity. The Clinton Parameters in December 2000 presented a map leaving Israel without defensive conditions.
Unlike the Clinton-Barak framework – Saudi Arabia's current starting point – Yitzhak Rabin carefully drew Area C considering Israel's essential security requirements in five vital regions: metropolitan Jerusalem, Jordan Valley as a defensive border against any eastern threat, western settlements in the Samaria hills, protecting the narrow coastal strip; southern Hebron Mountain settlements maintaining a protective line around strategic assets in the south and control of main roads through settlements and security forces.
Not a single Israeli settlement or agricultural farm in Area C fails to serve one of Israel's spatial security requirements. This position needs broad national consensus.
Originally published by Makor Rishon.
