David M. Weinberg

David M. Weinberg is a senior fellow at Misgav: The Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy, and Habithonistim: Israel’s Defense and Security Forum. He also is Israel office director of Canada’s Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA). He has held a series of public positions, including senior advisor to deputy prime minister Natan Sharansky and coordinator of the Global Forum Against Anti-Semitism in the Prime Minister's Office. The views expressed here are his own. His diplomatic, defense, political, and Jewish world columns over the past 28 years are archived at www.davidmweinberg.com

A look into my crystal ball

If you had predicted a year ago that the United States would recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, Saudi Arabia would allow women to drive, and Avi Gabbay would become the head of Israel's Labor party, most people would have called you crazy.

But all those things happened, which says something about the perils of predicting political and diplomatic developments.

Still, many of the forecasts I made for 2017 proved to be accurate: that U.S. President Donald Trump would make a move on Jerusalem and would begin to cut the U.N. down to size; that despite ongoing criminal investigations, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would survive another year in office  (a prediction I am not prepared to confidently make again for 2018); and that, despite his repeated threats to resign, Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas would cling to his perch to keep his $3 billion corrupt "authority" afloat (here, again, I'm less certain about the coming year).

I wrongly predicted that Ron Huldai would become the head of the Labor party, and that Russian President Vladimir Putin would peel away from the Iranians in Syria.

So with the disclaimer that I could be proved wrong again, here is what I see when looking into my crystal ball for 2018:

• Elections: Israel will go to the polls either in May or June this year, or in spring 2019. I am betting on the later date. These are the two windows for a race, and the timing depends on three factors: the pace of investigations against Netanyahu, an American decision to put an aggressive peace plan on the table, and the ability of the governing coalition to get together on a 2019 budget plan, on Shabbat laws and on another haredi draft law. (Nationwide municipal elections in November make a fall race impossible.)

Netanyahu should get a big boost in public opinion from the big 70th anniversary Independence Day celebrations in April. Surrounded by world leaders and much pomp and ceremony, he will be at his diplomatic best. Going to the polls shortly afterward makes some sense, but if the buzz about alleged government corruption continues, he'd best bide his time.

• Leadership: Looking further ahead, we are facing leadership crises on many fronts. What happens to the Likud party after Netanyahu? What happens to the Palestinian Authority after Abbas? What happens to the haredi community leadership now that Rabbi Aharon Yehuda Leib Shteinman has passed away? And what happens when prime ministerial hopefuls Moshe Kahlon, Moshe Ya'alon and Aryeh Deri all bomb in the next elections? (Actually, the disintegration of Deri's Shas party – which is a real possibility if Eli Yishai's counter-Shas Yachad party wins big in the municipal elections – wouldn't be such a tragedy.)

• War: All of Israel's fronts are highly volatile. Hezbollah has gained substantial operational experience in Syria, Iraq and Yemen; Iran is digging in north of the Golan; Hamas is inciting terror in the West Bank; and Islamic State is gaining strength in Sinai. The IDF chief of staff has warned that Israel holds reduced margins of error along its borders.

Nevertheless, I hope and pray that I'm right in predicting no wars this summer, for two reasons. Russian military and political entrenchment in Syria should temper Iran and Hezbollah's shenanigans, especially as Russia's economic investment in Syrian reconstruction grows. Putin's dominance of the region also limits Israel's operational maneuverability, but in the short term this may be a fine deal.

In June, the FIFA World Cup begins in Russia. This is not a good time for the Arabs to go to war with Israel, because they won't get any international media attention for their inevitable claims of disproportionate Israeli force.

• Turkey: Despite President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's anti-Semitic views, his aspirations to lead the global Muslim Brotherhood camp and his slide away from the West and toward Iran, Turkey will not cut diplomatic relations with Israel.

Israel cannot let Erdogan's attacks slide, and must thwart his support for Hamas and for radical Islamic institutions in east Jerusalem. But Israel must differentiate between Turkish society and its popular but problematic leader, and keep all its options open.

Only half of all Turks voted for Erdogan in the last election, and one day those tens of thousands of Turkish leaders who have been imprisoned by Erdogan (there are more academics, journalists and generals in jail in Turkey today than in China!) will be back to reclaim the country. Here's hoping.

• Europe: Federica Mogherini, the high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy, will continue to babble and bluster and condemn and threaten every time Israel builds a porch in "occupied Jerusalem" or dismantles one of those brazenly illegal EU-built settlements for Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. (The explicit EU intention is to erode Israeli control over Area C and east Jerusalem while promoting Palestinian territorial continuity leading to runaway Palestinian statehood.)

But you can be sure that Mogherini will continue to be highly and scrupulously silent when it comes to political and human rights in Iran. It's been a week since courageous Iranians began taking to the streets en masse to protest the foreign and domestic policies of the mullahs, but Mogherini hasn't tweeted a word of support. Doing so might endanger all the big fat commercial contracts that European counties are racing to secure from the ayatollahs.

• Jerusalem: The Knesset has passed the so-called Jerusalem law, making it harder to cede parts of Jerusalem under a future peace agreement. The law contains a trapdoor allowing for the disengagement of neighborhoods beyond the separation barrier (such as Kafr Akab and Shuafat) from the Jerusalem municipality, in accordance with Jerusalem Affairs Minister Zeev Elkin's plan.

But I'm betting that Netanyahu won't go for this, since the domino theory would apply to such a move. The shift in municipal status would become a slippery slope, leading to broader political division of the city – and that's precisely what the main body of the law was meant to block.

• Dreams: I hope that this year Saudi women will get in their cars and drive all the way to Israel; and that Riyadh's bold new leader, 32-year-old Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, will follow them. He can hitch a ride with the women, or fly over in one of his royal jets.

I dream that after a three-decade delay, Israel will finally begin building in E-1, the most socially and strategically necessary expansion of Jerusalem – with Trump administration approval.

I further hope that when Israeli-Palestinian peace talks resume under American pressure (and yes, Abbas inexorably will bow to American pressure to cooperate), Trump and Netanyahu will put issues such as immediate Palestinian refugee resettlement outside Israel and the sharing of prayer rights on the Temple Mount plaza at the top of the agenda.

These issues go to the heart of Palestinian rejectionism. The demand for a "right" of refugee return to pre-1967 Israel, and the insistence on Muslim-only prayer on the Temple Mount, amount to Palestinian insistence on achieving what is not negotiable: Israel's delegitimization and disappearance.

Perhaps even the Jewish Reform and Conservative movements will join the struggle and demand egalitarian prayer space on the plaza most holy to the Jewish people. I wish.

Related Posts