Iran's persistent pursuit of nuclear capabilities is not a surprise to anyone in our region or in the world. Nor is the possibility of militarizing these capabilities and converting them from conventional weapons to weapons of mass destruction a new issue for the experts. That is why the contents of the latest report by the Institute for Science and International Security are perhaps not much of a discovery.
The report warned of the nuclear threat posed by Iran, pointing out that with its "remaining stock of 60 percent enriched uranium and its stock of near 20 percent enriched uranium," Iran can produce six nuclear bombs within a month and twelve bombs within six months.
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The report addressed the growing threat from Iran's nuclear program since May 2023, which was exacerbated by Operation Al Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023. According to the report, the tense situation in the region provides Iran with a unique opportunity and an exaggerated internal justification for possessing nuclear weapons.
The ability of the US and Israel to monitor, let alone deter, the development of Iran's nuclear program has diminished significantly. The report spoke of the role of conflicts in the Middle East in neglecting the Iranian nuclear threat.
Despite the real possibility of possessing a nuclear weapon, the institute raised the Iran Threat Geiger Counter from 140 degrees in May 2023 to 180 degrees, placing it in the Extreme Danger category for the first time. The details of the published report are unremarkable, at least to observers and experts.
Talk of the possibility of raising the uranium enrichment level from 60% to 90% within a week has been around for a long time. It is only a question of political decision because the technical knowledge and the necessary equipment are available.
Relying on the inspection and control measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is difficult, as many Iranian nuclear facilities are secret and inspectors do not visit regularly due to differences between Tehran and the organization. The bottom line is that it all comes down to the will of the Iranian regime whether it wants to have military nuclear capabilities or not.
All efforts by successive American administrations have failed to contain Iran's pursuit of an advanced nuclear program that can be turned into a military program whenever the Iranian Supreme Leader decides to do so. This is a leader who, in a politically correct tone of voice, keeps talking about the ban on possessing a nuclear bomb.
However, there is always a way out, namely taqiya or political pretense, which allows this spontaneous commitment to be circumvented if the Iranian regime really feels its fate is threatened. When we talk about the likelihood of creating the conditions for Iran's nuclear weaponization, we need to agree on a few essential points.
First and foremost is the distinction between the Iranian state, the people, and the threat that could compel the regime to take this step, on the one hand, and the threat perceived by the regime itself, on the other. The latter is more serious and has a greater impact on the Iranian leadership than the former.
If human assets such as the Revolutionary Guard or the regime's first line of leadership or facilities such as the main nuclear facilities are exposed to a major threat, the supreme leader will most likely be forced to protect the regime, whatever the consequences may be.
Another important point is the Iranian leadership's awareness of the danger factors and sources of threat in the current regional and international strategic environment. The Iranian regime feels increasingly threatened, although the US is careful not to cross any red lines in its relations with its adversaries.
What worries Tehran most at present is the course of confrontations between its terrorist proxies in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Syria on the one hand and Israel and the US on the other. Tensions are increasing between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran's main arm in the Middle East.
An international trend is also emerging that highlights Iran's responsibility for the chaos and unrest in the Middle East and the consequences of holding Iran accountable or working to limit its role in this regard. In any case, Iran can no longer deny the chaos caused by the missile attacks and drone operations of the so-called axis of resistance.
It must therefore expect a backlash, especially from Israel and to a lesser extent from the US. This scenario can materialize if the right conditions are in place, be it when Israel ends the war in Gaza, gets the security crisis with Hezbollah on its northern borders under control and its residents in the north and south can return to their homes, or at the end of the year when the American presidential election take place.
Tehran is aware of the high probability that former President Donald Trump could return to power. Overall, a strategic conflict is raging in the Middle East between the axis of moderation, which includes many Gulf and Arab countries, and the so-called axis of resistance, which includes Iran and its sectarian and militia terrorists.
At the same time, Tehran is in a race against time to maintain its influence and the strategic advantages it has gained in recent years. Iran is seeking to improve the survivability of its operatives, neutralize influential regional parties and prevent its regional isolation.
These goals depend on the outcomes of the current wars and conflicts in the geostrategic Middle East as well as other factors of varying relevance. These include the growing self-confidence of countries in the region and their ability to deal with and manage sources of threat, the declining confidence in the US deterrence capability, which has reached its lowest level in decades, and the growing role of China and Russia, which offer countries in the region new alternatives for strategic partnerships.
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