For years, Israel's security doctrine has rested on its strategic alliance with the US and on its place within the bloc of democratic nations. Israel is the only country in the Middle East that shares both a partnership and a common set of values with democratic states, what diplomats commonly call "like-minded states." In its public diplomacy, Israel often describes itself as "the only democracy in the Middle East." The values Israel shares with its allies have helped it develop decisive military and scientific capabilities, build national resilience and establish a balance of deterrence against its enemies.
Israel presents itself to its allies as a Western democracy, governed by the rule of law, bound to the US and Europe by historical memory and sharing with them a common value system rooted in Judeo-Christian cultural traditions and ideals. Throughout the State of Israel's existence, this principle has been a strategic asset, one emphasized especially in times of crisis. The high points of the values-based alliance between Israel and the US, Israel's principal ally, came during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and at the beginning of the Swords of Iron War that erupted after the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack. At moments when Israel appeared to face potentially existential threats, that ideological and values-based partnership translated into an "airlift" of weapons and ammunition.
What you bring to the table
Over the past two years, however, the fundamental idea underpinning Israel's alliance with the US appears to be shifting. The weight given to shared values within the relationship is changing. They are not disappearing, but they are becoming a condition that is clearly no longer sufficient in itself. America is introducing a new organizing principle as it reassesses its alliances within the international system. Under this emerging approach, interests, practical contributions and burden-sharing are carrying ever greater weight.
The US National Security Strategy, dated November 2025, reflects this change clearly. America declared a retreat from a foreign policy aimed at strengthening other countries primarily because they share the American value system. The purpose of current US foreign policy is defined as protecting the United States' core national interests, rather than defending abstract principles and values. The administration's strategy criticizes the post-Cold War tendency of the US to assume commitments and burdens in pursuit of ideological goals whose connection to the American national interest was not always clear.
The document goes on to outline a doctrine of "flexible realism," recognizing that the US can maintain good relations and cooperation with countries whose political and social systems and values differ from the American model when doing so serves shared interests. In the same breath, it states that it is natural and legitimate for countries to place their own national interests first. By implication, one can assume this "tolerance" also applies when a national interest runs counter to principles that were once at the heart of America's values-based worldview.
This shift has concrete implications for the United States' relationships with its allies. The strategy stresses burden-sharing and greater regional responsibility by partners, and it points to preferential treatment in areas such as trade, technology cooperation and defense procurement as possible incentives for countries willing to contribute more to collective security.
None of this means that the US has entirely ceased to value principles or historic alliances. The more accurate conclusion is that interests are becoming more important at the expense of shared values. Those values are shifting from a sufficient condition to one that is no longer sufficient on its own. In such a world, the importance of an ally will increasingly depend on what it can contribute to America's security, wealth and well-being, what it can provide, where it possesses a unique advantage and how difficult it would be to replace.
A question of priorities
A recent illustration of this shift came in August 2026 in the United States' treatment of one of its oldest and most traditional allies in Asia, South Korea. US President Donald Trump ordered a substantial reduction in American participation in the annual joint military exercise with Seoul. Among his stated reasons, he explicitly cited South Korea's refusal to accept his request to join the US effort against Iran. At the same time, he emphasized his good relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
A single case does not mean that shared values or a historic alliance have ceased to matter. But it does illustrate the growing weight assigned to each factor: A country's membership in the democratic camp and its status as a longtime ally no longer guarantee preferential treatment by themselves. Alongside shared values, Washington is increasingly examining a country's concrete contribution to American interests, needs and priorities. In other words, in this new relationship, the question is no longer simply how "like-minded" a country is, but what value it brings.
The shift in US policy is already making itself felt, spreading to other countries around the world and signaling the beginning of a new era in bilateral and multilateral relations across the democratic world. In the second quarter of the 21st century, Israel appears likely to confront unfamiliar challenges as it seeks to preserve its alliances and secure its place among the countries receiving preferential treatment from the American superpower.
Put differently, if Israel is to continue maintaining an effective network of alliances, which is essential to its prosperity, it must develop capabilities that make it a strategic asset in the eyes of its partners. Such strategic value creates dependence and generates power and leadership. Israel must therefore concentrate national effort on capabilities that directly serve the future interests of the US and other Western countries.
Taiwan offers a fascinating example. Its status stems not only from a convergence of interests or its proximity to the democratic camp, but also from its critical position in the global value chain for advanced semiconductors. The Gulf states have energy, capital and strategic geography. Turkey has demographic scale, a military, a defense industry, geographic position and an ability to operate in theaters where the West is constrained. Strategic value is increasingly becoming the essence of an alliance, while also making that alliance more resilient to changes in leadership, public opinion and national priorities.
Brains versus mass
Several fields stand out when examining the areas likely to be at the center of international competition in the coming decades: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space, synthetic biology, robotics and the supply chains for critical minerals and metals. The US strategy also explicitly identifies the need to ensure that American technology and standards lead the world in AI, biotechnology and quantum computing, while placing space, AI, quantum technology and autonomous systems among the fields likely to shape the future of military power.
Israel should, of course, operate in all of these fields. It has high-quality human capital, strong research institutions, a developed high-tech industry and a proven ability to build advantages in technological niches. It can periodically produce breakthrough technologies. But there is an important distinction between achieving individual successes and establishing systemic strategic indispensability on a global scale.
Israeli companies can produce extraordinary achievements, but that does not automatically make Israel a leading actor on which the Western system depends. As emerging strategic sectors become increasingly dependent on infrastructure, capital, energy and manufacturing capacity, the gap between those two concepts continues to widen.
Artificial intelligence offers a particularly striking illustration. Based on the latest 2026 investment forecasts and the most recent annual data, five US technology giants, Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet, Meta and Oracle, are together expected to spend more than $750 billion a year in capital expenditures. A major share of the surge is being driven by spending on cloud and AI infrastructure, servers, GPUs, data centers and the capacity required to meet soaring demand for computing power.
That figure represents investment in enabling infrastructure alone, before the ongoing operating costs of running it. To illustrate this scale, the International Monetary Fund estimates Israel's nominal gross domestic product in 2026 at roughly $720 billion. In other words, the annual 2026 infrastructure spending of just five companies in the AI sphere exceeds the entire annual economic output of the State of Israel.
Capital expenditure and GDP are, of course, not economically equivalent measures, and the comparison should not be presented as though they are two accounting figures of the same kind. Its significance lies in demonstrating scale: Five companies can allocate resources to infrastructure in a single year whose monetary value is comparable to everything produced by the entire Israeli economy over that same period.
It is difficult to see how a country of roughly 10 million people could become the global leader, and establish its strategic indispensability, by controlling the world's AI infrastructure when the price of entry is measured in sums greater than its annual GDP. Israeli ingenuity can be exceptional. The sheer mass required to dominate the infrastructure will almost always exceed Israel's capacity.
Be there, and lead
In different ways, similar limitations apply to the other fields. Israel can possess advanced space capabilities and even significant niche advantages, but comprehensive space infrastructure depends on launch systems, ground infrastructure, manufacturing capacity and sustained investment on a scale that is difficult for a small country to match against great powers.
Synthetic biology may produce groundbreaking Israeli research and companies, but as the field moves from laboratories to industrial-scale production, manufacturing facilities, automation, databases, computing infrastructure and supply chains will become increasingly important.
Critical metals and minerals present an additional constraint. Alongside technology and industrial capability, access to the geological resource itself matters in a way that cannot be replicated through innovation alone.
Quantum computing presents a similar limitation. Israel may lead in research, algorithms, sensing and certain components, but building a systemic advantage in the field also depends on complex research and hardware infrastructure, manufacturing facilities, cooling and control systems, and large-scale, long-term investment.
None of this means Israel should reduce its investment in these fields. It must be present in all of them, and in some it should aspire to lead in particular niches or applications. But Israel must manage its future creatively, recognize and understand its limitations, and seek to operate in areas where other countries currently find it difficult to do so.
The field of information, perception and influence is likely to assume growing strategic importance in the West. Unlike domains of national power that depend heavily on capital, infrastructure or natural resources, this field is still in the process of emerging as a distinct component of national security. That means small countries still have an opportunity to build a qualitative advantage through early recognition, concentrated effort, and the development of expertise and capabilities.
The democracies' dilemma
The starting point in this contest is not balanced. For years, it has been the democratic world's adversaries, led by Russia, China and Iran, and in different ways North Korea, that have developed advanced doctrines, methods and capabilities in the information and influence domain and integrated them into the state toolkit.
For these regimes, propaganda, disinformation, influence networks, cyber activity and manipulation of the information environment are not peripheral activities carried out alongside foreign policy or military power. They are continuous components of the struggle to advance national interests.
These regimes also enjoy a significant structural advantage. They are not subject to the same legal, institutional and ethical constraints imposed on democratic states regarding freedom of expression, privacy, an independent press, transparency, oversight and the distinction between action against an external adversary and interference in domestic political life.
Over the years, this has created a substantial gap between the ability of authoritarian states to exercise power in the information and cognitive sphere and the ability, or willingness, of Western states to confront them in that same front.
The challenge of information security extends far beyond Israel. The development of generative artificial intelligence, the ability to create content on a virtually unlimited scale, personalized messaging, automated distribution systems and the capacity to systematically shape the information environment are turning influence into one of the central challenges facing open societies.
Both the US National Security Strategy and NATO's strategic framework identify destructive propaganda, influence operations and forms of societal or cultural subversion among the threats against which democratic societies must defend themselves.
Democracies, however, face an inherent difficulty in confronting this threat. A democratic government cannot simply adopt the methods used by authoritarian states. Freedom of expression, freedom of the press, citizens' privacy and the separation between national security and internal political debate are not obstacles to be circumvented. They are principles that must be protected.
The Western challenge, therefore, is not simply to develop technological capabilities. It is to build a doctrine that enables a democratic state to identify foreign manipulation, protect its information environment and conduct influence operations in external fronts without damaging the principles of the political system it seeks to defend.
A conceptual watershed has been crossed. Despite this inherent difficulty, democratic countries will no longer be able to treat information and influence as secondary concerns. They are already core elements of national security in its broadest sense, and will become even more so in the coming years. This is no longer a matter of Israeli "hasbara," public relations or communications.
One step ahead
The working assumption should therefore be that, sooner or later, every democratic country will need to develop substantial capabilities for defense, detection and influence in the information environment. The wider the gap with authoritarian states becomes, and the more AI tools enable influence operations to be conducted on a scale, at a speed and with a degree of precision that were previously impossible, the less the West will be able to afford to abandon this front.
The question is no longer whether Western countries will have to build such capabilities, but when, on what scale and within what institutional framework. Precisely because the field is still taking shape, the coming years offer a limited window in which a significant advantage can be built before the great powers begin devoting their full resources to it.
Israel has a historic opportunity to get ahead of its allies, exploit what might be called the "advantage of smallness," make focused decisions quickly and seek to establish an ecosystem in this field that would enable global leadership and build strategic value in the eyes of its allies.
First, Israel's need in this field is not theoretical. It has been forced upon the country. For years, Israel has faced enemies that regard information, perception and psychological warfare as integral parts of the campaign against it.
On the "red side," meaning activity directed against an adversary, the campaign is designed to damage morale, create confusion, undermine trust and influence decision-making. In recent years, however, the importance of the "white side" has become increasingly clear, along with the scale of the effort and investment by enemy states to blacken Israel's image and turn it into a country whose very legitimacy is pushed toward the margins among its friends.
From the perspective of Israel's enemies, the struggle to shape perceptions among governments, international institutions, the media, university campuses, professional communities and the publics of friendly countries regarding Israel, and regarding the necessity and justification for its existence, has become more successful and effective than violent kinetic action.
The cognitive and information dimension is increasingly determining the legitimacy of Israeli action and the country's room to maneuver diplomatically, militarily and economically. Undermining Israel's legitimacy to act can be more effective than damaging the facilities and equipment that enable it to act.
In this respect, Israel occupies an unusual position among democratic countries. It faces funded and organized disinformation campaigns, systematic attempts to destabilize it and undermine its legitimacy, particularly among its allies, as well as antisemitism on a scale the West itself is struggling to absorb. The challenge facing Israel today foreshadows challenges other countries are likely to confront in the future.
A rare window of opportunity
Israel's experience as a Western country facing a systematic, high-intensity campaign gives it an opportunity to concentrate its efforts and turn this challenge into a historic opening to develop advanced state capabilities in information security and influence before others do.
Israel does not yet lead the Western world in this field. But circumstances have given it a head start: earlier experience, exposure to a high-intensity threat and the necessity of developing a response in an area where most of its allies are still at earlier stages of recognizing the problem.
That head start could form the basis for a clear Israeli advantage. Unlike sectors in which the central resource is physical capital or natural resources, the information and influence domain relies to a greater extent on human capital, intelligence, data, software, behavioral science, familiarity with adversaries, multidisciplinary capabilities, operational experience and institutional flexibility.
Significant and sustained investment is required here as well. This is not a cheap solution. But the cost structure and barriers to entry are entirely different from those in AI, quantum computing, synthetic biology, robotics and space. Information security is still a field in which a small country can build a qualitative gap through early recognition and concentrated effort. This window of opportunity will close quickly, and Israel should move early to exploit it.
The relevant Israeli precedent is cyber. Israel did not invent cybersecurity and was not the country with the largest budget in the field. Its advantage grew out of recognizing its importance early, an urgent security need, institutional boldness, the concentration of high-quality human capital, accumulated experience and the connections forged between the defense establishment, academia, the high-tech sector and private capital.
A capability initially intended to answer an Israeli need thus became an international asset as well.
Israel should adopt a similar approach in the information and influence domain: move beyond "hasbara" and ad hoc responses toward national force-building and the creation of a technological and professional ecosystem.
Such force-building must go far beyond a government communications apparatus. It requires a national doctrine, professional and institutional critical mass, and integration among fields that are currently handled separately: intelligence and research; technology and artificial intelligence; data science; psychology and behavioral science; marketing and communications; international law; languages and cultures; diplomacy; and systematic measurement of influence.
The goal is not merely to produce better content or respond more quickly to a media event. It is to develop the ability to understand how perceptions of reality are formed, how narratives move between groups and institutions, where the relevant nodes of influence are, how hostile interference can be detected and how to measure whether a particular action actually changed an opinion, behavior or decision.
Not merely a partner, but an asset
Alongside the development of state capabilities, Israel also needs gradually to establish a civilian ecosystem. The state cannot and should not be the sole producer of technology and knowledge.
As with cyber, a real advantage will emerge when security needs feed research, companies, software tools, methodologies and services that can also develop in the civilian market and in cooperation with friendly countries. That is the difference between establishing another government apparatus and creating a new domain of national power.
The effort should be accompanied by legislation where necessary, as well as oversight and clearly defined boundaries, particularly a rigid separation between external operations and democratic discourse within Israel. Precisely because these capabilities are so sensitive, their limits cannot be left ambiguous.
Building such capabilities could produce a double return. The first is a direct improvement in Israel's international position. One of the structural weaknesses of Israeli activity today is its reactive character. Israel repeatedly finds itself trying to challenge a perception of reality only after it has already become entrenched: An event occurs, an image spreads, an interpretation becomes a narrative, and the Israeli system springs into action only at a later stage.
A strategic influence effort must operate according to a different logic. It requires a continuous, long-term, cumulative presence in the spaces where opinions are formed, not only in government offices but among researchers, professional communities, institutions, opinion leaders and younger generations of future leadership.
The second return would be the creation of strategic value for Israel's allies themselves. If Israel becomes one of the first Western countries to build advanced capabilities for detecting hostile influence campaigns, mapping networks and narratives, understanding the use of AI for manipulation, measuring influence and developing defensive mechanisms suited to a democratic state, that knowledge will be relevant far beyond Israel's own needs.
The US, Europe, Japan and other democratic states will face the same questions, even if at different levels of intensity. Israel could approach them not as a country seeking assistance with its own problem, but as a country possessing experience, technology and a doctrine they themselves need.
The values-based alliance with the US and the Western world has been and will remain a central component of Israel's national security. The mistake would be to assume that this alliance can carry the full weight of the relationship by itself in a world that is changing the way it assesses its partners.
Israel must reinforce that values-based alliance with an additional layer of utility, contribution and mutual dependence. It should aspire to a reality in which its allies not only want to stand beside it, but also regard Israel as an asset they need in order to confront their own challenges.
