In recent days, the IDF operated in Syria. Troops from the IDF's 474th Brigade targeted terrorist infrastructure near the town of Tasil in southern Syria, while the Israeli Air Force struck the Tadmur and T4 airfields to thwart Turkey's growing entrenchment in the country. Turkey has been relentlessly working to strengthen its influence in Syria under the new regime. But beyond boosting its own presence, Ankara is also actively involved in efforts to establish a new Syrian army.
In early February, just days after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Syrian ruler Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani), Turkish security sources revealed Ankara's secret plan to rebuild Syria's military, as reported by the Turkish news outlet YetkinReport. The site, known for its credibility and managed by veteran journalist Murat Yetkin, often takes a critical stance toward Erdogan.
According to these sources, the joint Turkish-Syrian plan aims to establish control by the "Second Syrian Transitional Government" (SSTG) – the new governing body led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and al-Sharaa – over Syria's military and civilian institutions, restoring their functionality. During this phase, Turkey has reportedly pledged extensive logistical and political support to assist the new regime in carrying out this task.
Simultaneously, Syria is expected to assess its defense needs and relay them to Turkey. The same sources told YetkinReport that Ankara is willing to meet all Syrian requests, ranging from military training and advisory services to the establishment of facilities and weapons provision.
Al-Julani's challenges
One of the key challenges facing HTS rule in northern Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime is unifying and managing the myriad armed factions operating in the region. Efforts toward centralized governance have focused on two main areas: the Interior Ministry – which functions relatively cohesively – and the Defense Ministry, which faces significant difficulties in bringing all armed factions under a single chain of command.
The lack of full control over the armed forces has led not only to widespread violations by these groups but also to operational complications for the Interior Ministry, which lacks legal authority over military units nominally subordinated to the Defense Ministry.
Despite attempts to build a unified military structure, international sanctions on Syria have prevented significant investment or external resource inflows to the Defense Ministry, which remains in dire financial straits. Without the means to pay regular salaries, the central regime lacks effective levers of influence over the independent armed groups and cannot offer incentives for them to surrender their autonomy – apart from threats of military action.
While no single faction is powerful enough to directly challenge HTS rule, the mere existence of autonomous armed forces severely undermines the central authority. In practice, al-Sharaa's regime does not control large swaths of the country. Some of these forces have recently been involved in sectarian violence against Alawites, particularly along Syria's coastal region, while others use their military strength to pressure Sunni communities and other minorities in areas under their control.
Few soldiers, many units
The emerging new Syrian army comprises a mix of long-standing HTS units, restructured NLF factions, Syrian National Army (SNA) units, and new brigades formed under the Defense Ministry. While some of these frameworks are largely declarative, others are already engaged in operations, signaling a real organizational structure. The force distribution primarily follows geographical criteria, resembling the pre-2011 Syrian Army model.
The most prominent example of a unit formally under al-Julani's regime but operating independently is the SNA, established under the auspices of the Turkish Defense Ministry. The SNA includes no fewer than 41 groups. It enjoys Turkish backing and also benefits from revenue generated through illicit trade in northern Syria and adjacent Turkish border areas, making it financially independent from Syrian funds. While Turkey supports the establishment of a new army, the militia coalition representing its interests maintains autonomy.
This powerful coalition is formally subordinated to al-Sharaa's Defense Ministry but wields enough clout to dictate its terms. Its independence is especially evident in the context of human rights abuses. When the new regime's internal security units attempt to restrain such activities, they are often met with defiance: "We are not under your authority." The ministry has so far failed to enforce its directives.
The National Liberation Front (NLF), which unites former Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions and Islamist groups, presents a different model of cooperation. These groups submitted to HTS control in 2018-2019 after rounds of internal fighting in Idlib. In exchange for giving up political aspirations, they were allowed to retain limited military autonomy and integrated into HTS operational and training frameworks, as well as into the Defense Ministry. As a result, NLF factions display higher trust in HTS. Many of these factions were absorbed into the regime forces under new names, now operating within the Defense Ministry and alongside Interior Ministry units.
Interior Ministry units include the HTS police and the regime's security apparatus. Locally, these units report to the "district governor" (mudir manatiq), a position traditionally held by senior figures from the police or administration in Idlib. Their proximity to the leadership has enabled the Interior Ministry to maintain relatively effective control over its forces, which show a higher degree of professionalism compared to the military units.
At the end of January, the new Defense Ministry, headed by HTS Gen. Marhaf Abu-Qasra, issued a call for all armed factions to disarm and merge into a unified military force that would form the foundation of the new Syrian army. Around a dozen factions – including HTS itself – declared their disbandment, though in most cases this move was merely symbolic. The internal command structures of these factions remained largely intact, masked by a new chain of command that ostensibly placed them under the ministry. In practice, most armed groups have avoided formally joining the Defense Ministry and certainly have not dismantled their original organizational frameworks.
Currently, the regime maintains significant forces primarily in western Syria – from north to south – including Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Tartus, Homs, Damascus, and Daraa. In addition, divisions under al-Sharaa's control operate in eastern Syria and the vast Syrian Desert, which stretches across central and southeastern parts of the country.
Syria's new security architecture continues to evolve amid ongoing negotiations between various factions and the Defense Ministry. So far, HTS has succeeded in integrating some factions into the unified structure, but several powerful groups remain independent and continue to challenge its authority – most notably the Kurds, the Druze, and other factions. In the coming months, it will become clear whether the Defense Ministry can establish an effective central command or whether Syria will persist as a patchwork of semi-autonomous armed forces, posing a lasting challenge to stability within the country and beyond.
