At 4:30 p.m. on October 16, 2024, the eve of Sukkot, Yahya Sinwar took his last breaths. The Hamas leader in Gaza lay buried under the ruins of a house in Rafah's Tel al-Sultan neighborhood, only his upper body visible. The gray keffiyeh that had wrapped his head was lost in the surrounding dirt piles, his combat vest torn by tank shells that had struck his hiding place. With his left hand, Sinwar clutched a fragmentation grenade to his chest in a final act of defiance. He knew his story had ended.
With fading strength, he attempted to use his right hand – already wounded by an Israeli M16 rifle bullet – to pile broken concrete over his exposed body. Israeli armor soldiers observed him through the twilight, their tank cannon targeted from approximately 33 feet away. Unaware of his identity, they saw merely a dying terrorist and deemed additional ammunition unnecessary.
"Good riddance," Major Hod Shreibman reported over battalion communications while standing nearby. Shreibman, who had married his beloved Yuval just a month earlier, had no inkling he'd participated in eliminating Hamas' Gaza leader. Within weeks, Shreibman himself would be killed while leading his soldiers in Jabaliya.
Only the following morning would IDF soldiers approach Sinwar's buried corpse. Despite the shells that had nearly demolished his hiding place, his face remained relatively intact except for a large metal fragment that split his forehead. His identity was immediately apparent. The commander of Battalion 450, whose forces had eliminated Sinwar and his entire surrounding cell, stood over the body that Sukkot morning, examining it carefully. "At that moment, I thought primarily about the bereaved families and hostages," he recounted. "I said to myself: 'This is the mastermind behind everything, evil incarnate, and we killed him.'"
The Lieutenant Colonel pulled his mobile phone from his vest, brought it to Sinwar's pallid face, and captured an image that would become the closest thing to a victory photo the IDF achieved in this war. "No," he said modestly. "I don't consider it a victory photo. We haven't won yet. But that will happen too."
"The privilege of catching him"
While Sinwar's elimination stands as one of the war's most significant military achievements, circumstances fostered a narrative suggesting the encounter was merely accidental – that Battalion 450 stumbled upon him among Rafah's ruins and killed him without recognizing his identity. This narrative, investigation reveals, substantially distorts reality.
Though Hamas' strongman was indeed eliminated with some element of luck, his death resulted from a determined, sophisticated operation that invested considerable resources and employed groundbreaking combat techniques. These factors made possible the final scene in Tel al-Sultan, where he was forced to emerge from secure tunnels onto the surface, becoming vulnerable to Battalion 450's soldiers. "Sinwar had been fleeing for a very long time," the Battalion Commander explained. "We simply had the privilege of catching him during our shift."
This investigation, based on conversations with IDF and Shin Bet sources alongside exclusive materials being published for the first time, traces the pursuit of Sinwar from the war's outbreak until his death in Rafah a year later – revealing how the hunt progressed for the man who transformed the Middle East's geopolitical landscape.
Deep in the tunnel maze
From the war's earliest moments, the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet established eliminating Hamas leadership – particularly Sinwar – as a central objective of the Gaza ground operation. The intelligence mission naturally fell to the Shin Bet. "Targeted eliminations have always been their domain," a security source explaind. The agency, which had closely monitored Gaza's terrorist leaders before October 7, attacked the mission zealously, partly to avenge the humiliation inflicted by Sinwar and his operatives. "The Shin Bet dedicated substantial resources to locating Sinwar and other senior officials," a source noted.
Early in the conflict, the Shin Bet's operations division established a specialized command center receiving intelligence regarding Hamas leadership from the service's southern region, Military Intelligence, Southern Command, and additional bodies. The center's analysts, who had previously relied primarily on technological intelligence, now received interrogation transcripts from captured terrorists alongside seized documents containing information about Sinwar's suspected location – or as the Shin Bet called him, "The Ace." Some intelligence derived from Hamas leadership meeting summaries conducted during the war. "Everything was cross-referenced in the Shin Bet's special command center," the security source confirmed.
While information continued accumulating throughout the conflict, during the war's initial days, the Shin Bet could only generally indicate Sinwar's location: Khan Younis. It wasn't coincidental that he chose to hide in his hometown and residence – the place where he felt most secure and knew intimately. Retrospective analysis revealed he descended into tunnels beneath his home on October 7, together with family members, and remained in proximity for months afterward. Sinwar likely remained in Khan Younis until absolutely necessary because he believed the IDF wouldn't attempt a ground operation in Gaza's second-largest city. As subsequent events would prove, he had reasonable grounds for this assumption.
Within Khan Younis's protected depths, Sinwar was accompanied not only by his wife and children but also by Mohammed Deif, Hamas' military wing commander, who apparently relocated from Gaza City after October 7. Together with Rafah Salameh, Khan Younis brigade commander, this exclusive group of wanted individuals hid deep within the city's extensive tunnel network. Until a certain point, Sinwar's brother Mohammed also remained with them.
While Sinwar's command group continued managing both the fight against the IDF and hostage release negotiations from their hiding place, they maintained strict isolation and compartmentalization protocols. Sinwar rarely employed electronic communication that might enable tracking, instead managing external contact primarily through trusted couriers.
The Hamas leadership's isolation extended even to Israeli hostages. Contrary to some media assessments, Israeli intelligence possesses no definitive information indicating Sinwar surrounded himself with hostages at any point during the war. Although released hostage Yocheved Lifshitz reported meeting Sinwar in the tunnels, an IDF hostage administration source stated that throughout the conflict, no intelligence regarding the Hamas leader's location emerged from hostage information.
This source believes Sinwar's decision to avoid proximity to hostages likely stemmed from concerns about location exposure. "What we learned from the last release round is that most kidnapped individuals who believed they'd met senior officials actually encountered masked figures they couldn't positively identify," he explained. "In any case, we received no intelligence suggesting Sinwar remained near hostages. I believe this is because he didn't want anyone nearby who might overhear him and later provide intelligence information – especially after most hostages acquired Arabic during captivity."
The Shin Bet would have preferred deploying forces into Khan Younis at the ground operation's commencement, but despite intelligence identifying the city as Sinwar's refuge and despite the Cabinet's prioritization, the IDF's operational plan began with northern Gaza Strip maneuvers. The physical pursuit of Sinwar had to wait. "For the first two months, he rested on his laurels," a security source noted.
The toughest nut to crack
Sinwar's security was about to be shattered by Division 98. In November 2023, this elite division under Brigadier General (now Major General) Dan Goldfus received the challenging mission of capturing Khan Younis. When briefing his officers, Goldfus emphasized that their primary objective was eliminating Hamas leaders hiding within the city. The division constructed their operational plan accordingly.
Previous military operations in northern Gaza had employed an outside-in approach, with forces advancing gradually from urban outskirts toward central targets. This methodology allowed many terrorists to escape before forces arrived. Division 98 implemented the reverse strategy: its seven subordinate brigades received orders to move at maximum speed directly into central Khan Younis, exploiting the element of surprise. Following this rapid advance, forces would quickly enter underground areas and secure tunnel entrances in the city's heart. The operational logic aimed to surprise Hamas leadership, trap them underground within a confined area, block all escape routes, and then methodically approach them through the tunnels.
But these plans collided with a profound intelligence gap. Since Khan Younis hadn't been prioritized by the IDF in pre-war planning ("no one imagined the IDF would maneuver there," a military source explained), intelligence on the city's tunnel network remained severely limited. The IDF had minimal understanding of what awaited beneath Khan Younis. Compounding this challenge, Salameh's local brigade was considered among Hamas's most disciplined, well-equipped, and determined fighting units. At this juncture, both Sinwar and Goldfus would likely have agreed on one point: Khan Younis represented Gaza's most formidable operational challenge. Recognizing this, Goldfus requested reinforcements for his division but was denied.
Meanwhile, Division 98's intelligence personnel worked frantically to narrow these knowledge gaps. Retrospective analysis would later reveal these gaps were substantial. The division was surprised to discover during operations that Hamas leadership had concealed themselves in relatively shallow tunnels approximately 15 meters (49 feet) deep, not the expected 60-70 meters (197-230 feet). Further, they found the tunnels were nearly completely interconnected, enabling continuous movement throughout the underground network – another critical detail largely unknown to Israeli intelligence. These information deficits significantly hindered Division 98's ability to capture Hamas leadership during the Khan Younis operation.
Despite incomplete intelligence and insufficient forces, Division 98 pressed forward. Previously undisclosed details about the Khan Younis campaign of December-February 2024 reveal a brilliant, persistent military operation featuring the IDF's first comprehensive underground pursuit of Hamas's entire leadership structure. Sinwar would ultimately escape this manhunt by the narrowest of margins.
"Blind man's buff" in Khan Younis
On December 1, 2023, immediately following the first hostage exchange agreement, Division 98 launched its Khan Younis operation. While the division's intelligence officers couldn't pinpoint Sinwar's exact location, they had developed workable assessments. They identified five distinct areas in central Khan Younis that ground forces were tasked with rapidly securing before descending underground. Due to resource constraints, they ultimately decided to target only three of these five zones.
Following the operational blueprint, forces advanced toward these three areas at maximum speed, securing them within just six hours. Two hours later, troops had already descended into the tunnels and established blockades. This rapid, precise maneuver – completed in only eight hours – successfully surprised Hamas' command group, who found themselves increasingly cornered. The noose around Sinwar began, for the first time, to tighten.
As Division 98 soldiers penetrated deeper into the Khan Younis tunnels pursuing Sinwar, they gained confidence. One unexpected advantage emerged during underground operations: Hamas operatives generally avoided direct firefights with advancing IDF units. Israeli soldiers maintained significant tactical superiority in tunnel combat thanks to night vision equipment, while most Hamas terrorists relied on basic flashlights. Consequently, whenever Israeli forces approached, Hamas operatives typically fled without engaging: abandoning their underground complexes and escaping through connecting tunnels to adjacent sectors. During these retreats, they would detonate explosives to collapse tunnel segments behind them, protected by blast doors. These collapses delayed pursuing forces, allowing the operatives to escape repeatedly.
This underground version of "blind man's buff", unprecedented in military history, continued throughout December 2023 beneath Khan Younis. During this period and afterward, some Israeli personnel spent days without seeing daylight, necessitating specialized equipment for extended underground operations. According to a source who participated in the Khan Younis campaign, the early weeks featured several instances where IDF fighters occupied tunnels directly above or adjacent to passages harboring Hamas leadership, sometimes separated by mere meters of earth.
The octopus method
The battle of wits between the IDF or Shin Bet intelligence and Sinwar had reached a stalemate. Even with sophisticated technology supporting Israeli efforts, Sinwar and his associates remained frustratingly elusive. Pursuing forces felt like cats futilely chasing a mouse's tail.
After a month of unproductive pursuit, Division 98 strategists recalibrated their approach. They redirected significant resources toward the comprehensive mapping of Khan Younis's underground entry points, gradually populating division maps with dozens of suspected tunnel shafts and passages. Eventually, intelligence officers identified 17 critical access shafts through which they could control the restricted area where Sinwar was believed to be hiding.
The revised strategy abandoned the single-channel "cat" pursuit in favor of an "octopus" approach: from these 17 points, coordinated "tentacles" would advance methodically underground, gradually converging on Sinwar from multiple directions simultaneously.
Some concepts contributing to Division 98's innovative tunnel warfare methodology – which would later prove successful in locating hostages and recovering remains – originated from junior intelligence officers. According to an intelligence source, this approach of encouraging and implementing creative solutions from lower-ranking personnel represented a significant departure from pre-October 7 military intelligence practices.
Returning to January 2024 operations in Khan Younis: of the 17 shafts marked by intelligence, field forces located only 14. One of the three undiscovered shafts was concealed beneath a house that Division 98 forces entered and searched. Unable to locate the hidden access point, the soldiers eventually evacuated the building. Later intelligence would reveal that directly beneath this house, Sinwar, Deif, and Brigade Commander Salameh had been hiding the entire time – close enough to hear Israeli soldiers' footsteps directly above them. "Finding that shaft would have ended their story," a source noted.
While soldiers searched for the entrance from inside the house, Division 98's remaining "octopus tentacles" continued their methodical underground advance. Eventually, one team reached the very underground complex where Sinwar and Deif were hiding – successfully locating the concealed shaft from below. However, by this time, the Israeli force that had been searching the house above had already departed. During the brief window between the ground force's withdrawal and the underground team's arrival, Sinwar, Deif, and Salameh escaped the tunnel disguised as women. In his hasty retreat, Sinwar abandoned documents and hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash. Forensic evidence collected later, along with surveillance footage, confirmed that he, Deif, and Salameh had indeed occupied the location.
IDF forces discovered the underground complex shortly after the group's escape and found Hamas leadership's meal still set out on plates. "The coffee was still hot," as Division Commander Goldfus later described to media.
"Burning ground protocol"
Evidence from the abandoned complex, combined with additional intelligence flowing to command centers, indicated Sinwar was fleeing toward western Khan Younis. The Shin Bet accordingly redirected IDF operations in this direction. "This marked the point where Sinwar's hourglass began running out," a security source explained. "Until then, he had maintained a static position, minimizing opportunities for mistakes. But once you force him to move, he must improvise, inevitably leading to errors. At this moment, he transitioned from hunter to hunted.
"Wanted individuals must take various evasive actions when pursued, exposing them to mistakes," former senior Shin Bet official Shalom Ben Hanan elaborated. "When the army sweeps an area, the target enters 'burning ground protocol' – constantly relocating and seeking new shelter. This forces improvisation, unplanned movements, and reliance on less-trusted associates."
Nevertheless, Sinwar avoided critical errors during this phase. By early 2024, he had minimized his intelligence signature, ceased communication with his network, and effectively vanished. Mediating countries in Hamas-Israel negotiations classified him as "out of contact" – the first time since talks began that he became completely unreachable, halting all negotiation progress.
A retrospective intelligence analysis revealed that around May 2024, Sinwar successfully escaped Khan Younis and moved southward to neighboring Rafah. At this stage, the IDF had not yet begun operations in Rafah, allowing Sinwar to return to the relative safety of its tunnel network. Further intelligence indicated Sinwar arrived in Rafah without Mohammed Deif. After their joint escape from the Khan Younis house, the two separated, with Deif remaining in Khan Younis – possibly due to mobility limitations. Deif and Brigade Commander Salameh would remain in the city for several more months until their joint elimination by airstrike on July 13.
Even before Sinwar's final encounter with Battalion 450, the IDF had launched its long-delayed Rafah operation in early May 2024, assigning Division 162 to the mission. Throughout months of fighting, intelligence fragments flowing to both Shin Bet and Military Intelligence increasingly confirmed Sinwar's presence in the city, eventually narrowing focus to the Tel al-Sultan neighborhood on Rafah's northwestern outskirts.
These intelligence assessments gained support from battlefield reporting. "Throughout the war, we understood that areas with unexpectedly fierce resistance likely held high-value targets," a security source explained. "Some places saw terrorists surrender immediately, while others featured determined resistance. Heightened resistance suggested an important location. Tel al-Sultan absolutely fit this pattern."
Hamas defended Tel al-Sultan with exceptional ferocity not only to protect Sinwar but also because intelligence suggested numerous Israeli hostages were held there. By August, military leadership had directed Division 162 to concentrate efforts on Tel al-Sultan's tunnel network – smaller and less complex than Khan Younis's labyrinth.
Division 162 employed a fundamentally different approach than Division 98's earlier "cat" and later "octopus" methods in Khan Younis. The new "elephant method" involved massive force – using bulldozers and explosives to systematically destroy extensive tunnel sections, deliberately forcing Hamas operatives above ground. This strategy gradually denied Hamas nearly all underground movement in Tel al-Sultan, leaving Sinwar and his small security detail no choice but to venture onto the surface.
Footage broadcast on Al Jazeera shows Sinwar during August-September 2024 moving through Tel al-Sultan's rubble-strewn landscape. These images capture him in civilian clothes, using a walking stick, and wrapped in a camouflage blanket. One segment reveals a military jeep passing near his hiding place while gunfire sounds nearby – confirming Sinwar was operating within IDF-controlled territory. Another shows him studying maps in a room with Hebrew graffiti on the walls, evidence of previous IDF presence. Tel al-Sultan battalion commander Mahmoud Hamdan appears alongside him.
Though Sinwar moved through the ruins with apparent nonchalance, his situation grew increasingly precarious. Having destroyed most tunnels and forced combatants above ground, Division 162 continued aggressive pursuit operations. They developed a sophisticated containment strategy – deploying heavy, noisy forces in specific sectors while deliberately leaving narrow escape corridors leading to pre-designated areas.
Many terrorists, channeled into these corridors and forced to move above ground, were identified and eliminated. Using this method, infantry units located and eliminated Tel al-Sultan's battalion leadership in a September 2024 airstrike. Though the IDF believed Battalion Commander Hamdan died in this strike, he would later reappear.
The mounting panic among remaining Hamas tunnel occupants manifested in at least two significant incidents: in late August 2024, Division 162 troops discovered hostage Qaid Farhan al-Qadi abandoned alone in a tunnel after his guards fled.
Days later came one of the war's most tragic events – Hamas operatives, hearing approaching IDF forces, murdered six hostages in a tunnel before escaping. While this atrocity shocked Israel, it provided a critical intelligence breakthrough in the Sinwar hunt. Forensic evidence collected from the tunnel indicated the Hamas leader had been present shortly before. While the Shin Bet couldn't determine whether Sinwar and the hostages had simultaneously occupied the tunnel, this represented the closest proximity to him since the February operation in Khan Younis over six months earlier.
Following these developments and the near-complete destruction of Tel al-Sultan's underground infrastructure, IDF leadership considered the Rafah operation largely complete. Though Sinwar remained unlocated and evidence of his presence wasn't definitive, Division 162 had accomplished most objectives and received orders to prepare for operations in Jabaliya. However, Shin Bet officials worried that completely withdrawing from the neighborhood would allow Sinwar to escape, likely to Khan Younis. "This prompted the Shin Bet's insistence on maintaining presence in the area," a security source explained.
"Command DNA"
The Shin Bet's request to maintain forces in Tel al-Sultan, particularly along the Khan Younis border to block potential escape routes, received support from key military leaders. Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman shared a strong intuition that Sinwar remained in Tel al-Sultan, while Military Intelligence analysts sensed the hunt approached a breakthrough. Nevertheless, Division 162 had completed its primary Rafah missions and received orders to prepare for Jabaliya operations.
Military leadership ultimately decided that Division 162 would withdraw from Rafah, but the city wouldn't be completely evacuated. Instead, forces from the Gaza Regional Division would maintain a presence. Division Commander Brigadier General Barak Hiram committed to continuing offensive operations, focusing particularly on Tel al-Sultan. Though lacking specific intelligence on Sinwar's location, Hiram knew senior Hamas figures likely remained hidden in the neighborhood and concentrated efforts on destroying remaining infrastructure while conducting intensive search operations.
For this mission, Hiram deployed the 828th Brigade – typically a training unit that prepares squad commanders but converts to combat operations during emergencies. Its fighting force comprised trainees from the squad commanders course, with course instructors serving as platoon and company commanders.
"This brigade is exceptionally effective because it consists entirely of soldiers with leadership qualities," a military source explained. "It's a highly disciplined unit with superior personnel quality. Since commanders are instructors from the squad commanders course, they bring exceptional experience and capability."
The specific unit deployed to Tel al-Sultan was Battalion 450. It's commander led three companies: Kfir infantry, paratroopers under Major Hod Shreibman (now deceased), and a tank company from Armor Battalion 198, Brigade 460 – another training unit that develops tank commanders. This battalion's distinctive "command DNA" would prove decisive in the final encounter with Sinwar.
I meet the Battalion Commander at the Counter-Terrorism Training School, where training grounds simulate Gaza's urban combat environment. Joining our conversation are his former subordinates: Lieutenant A., who commanded a Kfir platoon; Staff Sergeant A. (now reservist), who served as radio operator for Shreibman's paratroopers company; and Staff Sergeant Y., a gunner in the armor company commander's tank. Armor Company Commander Major A. participates via phone. Together, they reconstruct the Tel al-Sultan operation chronologically, from neighborhood entry through Sinwar's final pursuit.
Battalion Commander R., a promising 35-year-old officer visibly respected by his soldiers, is married with three children and built his career in the Kfir and Paratroopers brigades. He assumed command of Battalion 450 shortly before the war, never expecting combat deployment. "We mobilized October 7 and completed three Gaza rotations before this," he explained. "Our fourth rotation beginning September 2024 took us to Tel al-Sultan. We concluded Rosh Hashanah with battle procedures and entered the sector on Yom Kippur. We knew we'd mark the war's anniversary inside Gaza but never imagined closing the circle this way."
During his preliminary sector tour, R. visited the Tel al-Sultan tunnel where six hostages had been murdered. "First, you comprehend the nightmare they endured," he reflected. "Then comes the immediate conviction that we must complete this mission."
The intelligence briefing R. received before entering Tel al-Sultan made no specific mention of Sinwar's suspected presence. While it noted "Hamas senior officials" in the area, R.'s operational focus remained primarily northward toward Khan Younis. "Our orientation was primarily outward, not inward."
Accordingly, on October 16, R. ordered planning for an offensive into western Khan Younis – territory the IDF hadn't yet entered. The operation was scheduled for midday, but at 10 a.m., amid preparations, R. received what seemed a routine report of a suspicious figure in the sector. "Initially, I wasn't concerned," R. recalled. "We'd had soldiers mistaking a horse's tail for a hostage waving for help. Nevertheless, I suspended Khan Younis' preparations to investigate further.
"One of my platoon soldiers entered a guard position in a neighborhood house and suddenly spotted someone dressed in black running into a building 300 meters [984 feet] away," Kfir platoon commander Lieutenant A. explained. "He couldn't determine if the figure was armed, but it was highly unusual – this area should have been cleared of civilians."
Lieutenant A.'s team received authorization to investigate the suspicious building. Despite tank support, the approach took several hours, and when they finally reached the location, they found it empty. What initially seemed like another false alarm – "just a horse's tail" – prompted further investigation. Battalion 450's deputy commander deployed specialized "Hebrew trackers" – soldiers from Judea and Samaria trained in the "Desert Book" unit that recruits many "hilltop youth." These specialists methodically searched the premises until discovering a critical piece of evidence: a fresh sports shoe print inside the building, confirming someone had recently occupied the structure.
This discovery at 1 p.m. transformed the day's operational focus. Battalion Commander R. immediately proceeded to the building, established an observation post on its second-floor balcony, and began directing infantry and armor units under his command. "At this point, I completely abandoned the planned Khan Younis operation and redirected all resources to this new mission," R. explained.
The search intensified when forces located a prepared sniper position in a nearby structure. Shortly afterward, the deputy battalion commander – who had continued tracking the footprints with his specialists – reported hearing movement in an adjacent building.
"Moments after receiving this report, I heard a soldier shout 'terrorists,' release his safety, and open fire," R. recalled.
The deputy commander's force had identified several suspicious figures and fired at them, missing but causing them to flee – directly toward R.'s observation position. Within seconds, R. spotted four figures approximately 295 feet away, their backs pressed against a building wall. Recognizing they were attempting to evade detection while assessing IDF positions, he readied his M16 rifle equipped with a Trijicon telescopic sight.
"I observed them through a narrow field of vision," R. described. "The lead figure moved left to right covered by a black blanket, with another following closely behind wrapped in a brown blanket." These blankets – later documented in Al Jazeera footage showing Sinwar using identical camouflage – were designed to blend with Gaza's rubble-strewn landscape. Despite recognizing this tactic, R. initially held fire, seeing no weapons and conscious of the earlier tragic incident where another battalion had mistakenly killed three escaped Israeli hostages. Battalion 450 had internalized those painful lessons, exercising restraint until positive identification.
The situation changed dramatically when a third figure entered R.'s sight. "I then clearly identified someone wearing a military vest, carrying a Kalashnikov, with a gray keffiyeh," he stated. "I declared 'terrorists' and opened fire alongside my radio operator." Following this engagement, R. observed the armed terrorist sustain a right-hand wound – later confirmed to be Yahya Sinwar himself. All four figures immediately scattered among the ruins. "I remained calm," R. said. "We had drone support, substantial forces including armor in the sector, and I understood we faced four desperate operatives. I was confident we would neutralize all of them."
"Look how similar he is to Sinwar"
The initial engagement occurred around 3 p.m. Following positive identification, R. immediately called for armor reinforcement. "I remember the battalion commander reporting 'four dirty ones' [code word for terrorists] over the radio," S., a tank gunner who responded with his company commander A., recalled. "Something in his voice conveyed unusual urgency. We arrived within three minutes." Simultaneously, Major Hod Shreibman's paratroopers company mobilized. "The moment we received word of the contact, Hod immediately ordered force preparation," his radio operator A. remembers.
After the initial exchange, the suspects vanished from sight. Ground forces believed all four had entered a structure code-named "the Gray House." Lieutenant A.'s platoon established a perimeter and began clearing operations. During their approach, the infantry came under fire from the building – later determined to contain only two of the four suspects. The exchange resulted in a Kfir soldier sustaining a serious chest wound, while the armed terrorists escaped.
"We identified an active firefight with shots coming from 'the Gray House' and responded with several tank shells," S., who provided fire support from his armor position, explained. "When we learned the Kfir force had a casualty, we positioned our tank between them and the source of fire. During the engagement, they brought the wounded soldier to our rear compartment with an open chest wound, actively bleeding. Our loader maintained physical contact and verbal communication to prevent shock while we urgently evacuated him to the battalion aid station." The critically wounded soldier received emergency treatment, was transferred via Humvee to a landing zone, then evacuated by helicopter to a hospital where surgical intervention saved his life.
The soldier's injury didn't halt the pursuit operation. Shreibman's paratroopers company received orders to secure a building adjacent to "the Gray House," code-named "the Red House," which offered strategic observation over the area. The forces entered without expecting to encounter terrorists inside, but after securing the ground floor, a soldier heard distinctive footsteps above. Later analysis would confirm this was Yahya Sinwar himself, who had managed to apply a tourniquet to his wounded arm after being hit by Battalion Commander R.'s earlier fire. Sinwar had become separated from his security detail and was alone in the structure.
Though wounded and without his Kalashnikov, Sinwar remained armed with a pistol and multiple grenades, determined to resist capture. When the paratroopers' platoon commander exited the first floor to investigate the suspicious sounds, he discovered a fresh blood trail on the staircase. Looking up, he spotted a figure throwing two grenades – both of which failed to detonate. Multiple grenades thrown during the engagement proved defective, likely explaining why Sinwar deployed two simultaneously, knowing the high probability of malfunction.
After confirming that an armed terrorist occupied the upper floor, the paratroopers immediately withdrew from "the Red House," and tanks were directed to fire several shells at the building's second story. Company Commander Shreibman, positioned outside with his radio operator A., deployed a drone to locate the suspect's precise position. "After the tank fire and through the smoke, we sent in the drone," A. recalled. "We identified a figure wearing a combat vest hiding near a window, seated on the floor, throwing stones at the drone. We directed the tank to target that specific room with two additional shells." The historic footage from this initial drone flight was never preserved. "We neglected to activate recording," A. acknowledged with embarrassment, noting that only he, the drone operator, and Shreibman witnessed these initial images.
Following the second artillery barrage, the drone reentered to assess the situation – this time with recording activated. This footage, published for the first time on Israel Hayom, shows Sinwar sitting on a sofa, concealed in a niche, apparently in pain but still alive and making no attempt to engage the drone.
With confirmation that the suspect remained alive, additional shells were fired, followed by a third drone insertion that captured the now-famous sequence showing Sinwar throwing a stick at the drone, his face partially concealed by a keffiyeh. After a final artillery barrage, the drone's fourth entry made it clear to A. that the threat had been neutralized. "The screen showed he was completely incapacitated," A. said. The time was 4:30 p.m., October 16, 2024.
An hour later, footage showing the "incapacitated" terrorist with his exposed face reached Battalion Commander R. "I looked at the image and joked to my radio operator: 'Look how similar he is to Sinwar,'" he recalled with a smile.
"The pursuit of Sinwar was extensive"
Despite noting the resemblance, R. never seriously considered they had encountered Sinwar himself, which explains his measured approach. Seeing the suspect holding a grenade in the final footage, he decided against approaching the body in darkness, concerned about booby-traps, preferring to wait until daylight. "At this point, I confirmed one terrorist eliminated, but we had initially identified four suspects," he explained. "Our mission required accounting for all four."
Implementing tactical deception, R. withdrew his tanks during the night to create the impression that IDF forces had vacated the sector. He positioned concealed infantry teams in surrounding buildings to establish ambush positions. One such team identified two suspects who had escaped from "the Gray House" attempting to flee under cover of darkness. Following strict engagement protocols despite the high-pressure situation, they fired only on the armed individual, neutralizing him while his unarmed companion escaped into the night.
At first light on October 17, forces examining the neutralized combatant's body discovered a passport and significant cash. This information, relayed to intelligence units, quickly returned startling news to R.: the terrorist was connected to Yahya Sinwar. "This marked the first mention of Sinwar's name throughout the entire operation," R. noted.
Events accelerated rapidly. Realizing the significance of their operation, R. immediately examined the body in "the Red House." Close inspection left little doubt in his mind. He photographed the face and transmitted the image to headquarters, but Shin Bet analysts requested additional close-up images of specific identifying features – teeth patterns and a distinctive mole – for conclusive identification. Upon receiving these images, a Shin Bet specialist hurried to the scene for personal verification, declaring: "It's Sinwar." A mobile forensic laboratory collected fingerprints and biological samples, and by evening, confirmation was official: Gaza's Hamas leader had been eliminated.
The operation continued despite this breakthrough. Battalion 450 had confirmed only two of the four original suspects neutralized, leaving the mission incomplete. That night, Lieutenant A.'s platoon – the same unit that made the initial suspicious sighting – conducted another ambush operation, eliminating the third suspect. This proved to be Tel al-Sultan Battalion Commander Mahmoud Hamdan, whom the IDF had mistakenly believed killed a month earlier.
On October 19, four days after initial contact, Lieutenant A. captured the fourth suspect hiding in a building identified through tracker-followed footprints. The terrorist refused surrender, throwing two grenades that landed between A.'s feet but failed to detonate, and opening fire that slightly wounded one soldier before A. neutralized him. "This wasn't an Air Force or naval commando operation," R. emphasized. "This was infantry and armor executing their mission."
Hours after Sinwar's confirmation, then-Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi personally visited "the Red House" to view the body of October 7's architect. When asked if the Chief offered special recognition – perhaps the traditional champagne for successful operations – R. responded: "No. He simply said 'well done' and we immediately returned to combat operations. The national celebration over Sinwar's elimination occurred without our awareness since we lacked communications. We only understood the significance after returning from Gaza to resume training."
When asked if they received any recognition for eliminating Sinwar, R. answered plainly: "No. Our persistence produced the result, but we weren't the only ones. The pursuit of Sinwar was extensive – we simply fired the final bullet."
