Gaza. Operation Strength and Sword, which has been conducted in Gaza over the past two weeks, had one central goal: to restart negotiations regarding the hostages. The idea was to deliver Hamas a painful blow and threaten that this blow would turn into a series of strikes, so the organization would quickly calculate profit and loss and prefer words over more rockets.
This decision was preceded by a realization that permeated Israel that Hamas was in a state of "contentment." The fighting had stopped (meaning the threat to its rule was removed), the quiet allowed it to move and operate freely (meaning rebuild military capabilities), humanitarian aid flowed into Gaza (meaning pressure from the Gazan public was reduced), and it continues to hold 59 hostages (meaning Israel would be required to make concessions in the future). An ideal situation from its perspective, a very problematic situation from Israel's perspective, which committed to destroying Hamas and returning the hostages, and is failing to accomplish both.
Israel has the ability to bring everyone back. It appears in stages B and C of the agreement it signed. This is an agreement largely based on the framework Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu drafted last May: three stages, the first of which was completed, the second includes returning living hostages in exchange for stopping the fighting, and the third includes returning bodies in exchange for rehabilitating the Strip.
Israel had to decide between two options: return to fighting or return to negotiations under previously agreed terms. Hamas politely rejected the new proposals raised by the American mediator Steve Witkoff. There was one called "Big Witkoff," which included the release of 10-11 living hostages as well as bodies, and then a second proposal called "Small Witkoff" that included the release of five living hostages, as well as bodies (a similar framework to this proposal was raised this week by Egypt, and is supposedly currently on the table).
Hamas proposed in response to release the hostage Edan Alexander, who holds American citizenship, as well as returning the bodies of additional Israeli-American hostages. Israel flatly rejected this proposal, and rightfully so: it did not want to discriminate between hostages, and it also feared that releasing American hostages would sharply decrease the administration's interest in releasing additional hostages in the future.
This week I asked Alexander's grandmother, Varda Ben-Baruch, about this Solomon's judgment that briefly stood on the agenda. She admitted that the family's heart was divided: on one hand, the desire to see Edan at home, on the other hand, the understanding that they are part of something bigger – a family of 59 people who all demand a solution. "We are together," she concluded, "until everyone returns."
Israel has the ability to bring everyone back. It appears in stages B and C of the agreement it signed. This is an agreement largely based on the framework Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu drafted last May: three stages, the first of which was completed, the second includes returning living hostages in exchange for stopping the fighting, and the third includes returning bodies in exchange for rehabilitating the Strip.
Netanyahu adamantly refuses to reveal the full agreement that was signed, and his reasons are his own. His people will claim: sensitive security matters. His opponents will claim: he fears being embarrassed when what he signed is revealed. Netanyahu also refuses to say why Israel is not fulfilling the commitments it took upon itself. For example, to begin talks on stage B on day 16 of stage A (which ended long ago). For example, to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor.
Israel hoped Hamas would yield to Witkoff's pressure and allow stage A to be extended and return a few more living hostages (and bodies). Hamas refused. As mentioned, it is in a state of "contentment." It was decided to try to shake it up. This began with a surprising nighttime attack that hit dozens of its senior officials, and continued with air strikes and focused ground raids that intensified this week. As part of this, the IDF destroyed dozens of pickup trucks of the type that starred in the October 7 attack. The reappearance of these pickups in the hostage release ceremonies apparently annoyed someone in Israel, and it was decided to take revenge on them. One can of course wonder if a year and a half in Gaza wasn't enough time to do this at leisure, but better late than never. The main thing is that they don't appear in the next round.
Meanwhile, Hamas is not cooperating with the Israeli plan. Militarily it is still functioning, governmentally there is no threat to it, and it has food in abundance. Anyone who thinks it is upset by one and a half demonstrations of desperate Gazans hasn't learned anything: after already sacrificing 50,000 civilians, it won't change policy because of a few juicy curses on the street. It's true that the Middle East has known surprising upheavals that arose from desperate citizens, yet it's still recommended to wait on the peace agreements.
Hamas is counting on three matters. One – the hostages. As long as they are there, the IDF won't truly be able to open the gates of hell. No matter what, they will always be a consideration, unless it's decided to sacrifice them as some of the ministers in the government that was responsible for abandoning them when they were taken hostage, and responsible for abandoning them since, suggest.
The second matter is the internal reality in Israel. After Oct. 7, there was wall-to-wall consensus in Israel that fighting was necessary. The public supported it unconditionally, and reserves were mobilized at unprecedented rates. Since then, several things have happened: the sense of urgency disappeared, and in its place came the understanding that under the war, the government is advancing controversial agendas. For instance, the judicial revolution. For instance, the dismissal of the Shin Bet head and the government's legal advisor. For instance, harming the media. For instance, coalition funds. For instance, the draft-dodging law. And when you add to this the objective difficulty for reserve soldiers – at home, with family, in businesses, in studies – you get a war about which there will be not a few question marks.
The third matter is the international reality. While the Trump administration indeed supports Israel, it's not clear if it will allow it to go too far in the humanitarian realm, or even in permanently denying territories. In the background, the usual criticism in Europe and the Arab street is expected, as well as various complications – for example, with the Houthis – that could exact a diplomatic and economic price from Israel.
Meanwhile, Israel is signaling in every way that it is continuing with its staged plan. If Hamas didn't understand when it received one blow, we'll give it a second, and a third, and if necessary even a thousand – until it understands. Blessed is the believer that this method, which has already been tried in the distant and recent past, will succeed particularly now. Albert Einstein already said what he thought about trying to do the same action each time and expecting a different result, and one can suspect that this time too – as long as the hostages are there, and as long as the government isn't dealing with the day after – we'll be left with the feeling that we were a step away from "total victory."
Hostages. This week too, hostages' families asked to speak with Netanyahu, but the subscriber was not available. Varda Ben-Baruch, who was mentioned earlier, talked about the listening ear and warm shoulder they receive from the administration in Washington (the previous one and also the current one), and about the obtuseness they encounter in Jerusalem. Ayelet Samerano, mother of Yonathan, also said she's been waiting for months for a meeting that doesn't materialize. And not just Netanyahu: his right hand on earth, Ron Dermer, also gives families an infuriating sense of obtuseness.
Netanyahu explained his appointment of Dermer to head the negotiating team for releasing the hostages by saying that the previous team – led by Mossad chief Dadi Barnea and dismissed Shin Bet head Ronen Bar – didn't bring the hoped-for results. This is a strange argument, because the previous team actually brought an agreement, the first part of which was implemented, and since it was replaced nothing has happened, meaning by the test of results, the one who failed is actually Dermer.
Dermer was appointed precisely because he is Dermer: Netanyahu's man. This is legitimate, of course, only that it's better to give up the masks. Barnea and Bar were dismissed because Netanyahu doesn't want an agreement; if he did, he would have continued to the next stages of the agreement he already signed. Still, it's difficult to break free from the alienated attitude toward the families. Netanyahu and Dermer don't have to agree to all their requests: they must not ignore their distress.
After the new Southern Command Chief Yaniv Assor prioritized war with Hamas over hostages, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir ordered the order to be reversed in commands and presentations. From his perspective, what the IDF is currently doing in Gaza should bring home as many hostages as possible, as quickly as possible. Hamas's day will come later.
This week, media research company "Yifat" published that engagement with the hostage issue decreased by 76 percent since last week. This is a direct result of the distractions occupying Israel – from the dismissal of the Shin Bet head and the Attorney General, to the budget and the draft-dodging law. Political commentators claim this is exactly what Netanyahu wanted: he achieved what he wanted in all items, and also pushed aside the headache of the hostages.
Unfortunately for him, this won't hold. The hostages are here, and they will remain here. Those who were released in recent weeks were shocked to discover that not all the Israeli public is fighting for them, and especially that the government is not fighting for them. That from its perspective, there are quite a few more burning things, and that their brothers who were left behind can wait. The video produced by Hamas with the hostages Elkana Bohbot and Yosef-Chaim Ohana distilled the matter very well: they directed their cry to Ohad Ben Ami who sat with them in the tunnel, and called on him to tell everything.
Hamas's transparent manipulation to create pressure on Israel through the hostages is not the main issue. More important than it is the reality of 20-24 living hostages who are subjected to conditions of violence, humiliation, and hunger, and in constant danger to their lives from their captors, and now also from the IDF. Netanyahu owes them an answer if they are in first place in the order of priorities, or second. This is a critical matter for them, which will determine if they will be released soon or six after the war.
The IDF has already decided on this issue. After the new Southern Command Chief Yaniv Assor prioritized war with Hamas over hostages, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir ordered the order to be reversed in commands and presentations. From his perspective, what the IDF is currently doing in Gaza should bring home as many hostages as possible, as quickly as possible. Hamas's day will come later.
Revolution. This week we revealed in Israel Hayom the exchange between National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Shin Bet head Ronen Bar. In short, Ben Gvir called Bar a "criminal who belongs in prison," and Bar replied: "Yesterday you threatened to put me on trial, today you're threatening to put me in prison, tomorrow you'll threaten to execute me."
It turns out Bar didn't exaggerate in his assessments. MK Yitzhak Kroizer from Ben Gvir's party announced that "we won't be satisfied with his (Bar's) dismissal, we'll demand to put him on trial for attempted coup." Anyone who thinks these are empty threats doesn't live in Israel. The coalition intends this not only as a punishment tool, but also as a deterrence tool: let Bar's replacement know that he works for us. If he strays from the path we set for him, he too will end up in prison.
Netanyahu began interviewing candidates to replace Bar, if the Supreme Court approves his dismissal. Meanwhile, four seem to be emerging: M', Bar's previous deputy; Shalom Ben-Chanan (Shakht), who served in the Shin Bet in the past; Eyal Tsir-Cohen, who served in the Shin Bet and moved to the Mossad; and Yair Shagi (Roli), who retired from the Shin Bet after losing to Bar in the battle for leadership of the organization. Even the current deputy, B', is supposedly a candidate, but it seems his chances are lower.
Each of the four has advantages and disadvantages. In terms of command experience, M' and Shagi bring a richer resume in the Shin Bet (Tsir-Cohen left the organization as a division head, and Ben-Chanan commanded less central departments – training department and the non-Arab department). In terms of "captain's time," Tsir-Cohen has the most Netanyahu hours from his last position in the Mossad, where he accompanied him on various journeys and mysterious meetings. In terms of skills, M', Shagi, and Ben-Chanan grew up in the core operations of the Shin Bet, and Tsir-Cohen in the core of operations. After two heads who grew up in the operations department – Bar and Nadav Argaman – it's worth wondering if, against the background of its professional failure in understanding Hamas, it wouldn't be right for the organization to bring back to the forefront the basic professions of handlers and desk officers.
Netanyahu will determine that the candidate who is selected – any candidate – is "the best for the Shin Bet and Israel at this time." The real question that will stand for immediate test is how good the selected candidate will also be for Netanyahu. Because while the test of a Shin Bet head in the public's eyes is in thwarting terrorism, his real test is broader than this and must also include the ability to tell the truth, and to say no, and especially not to flatter and not to capitulate.
Netanyahu began interviewing candidates to replace Bar, if the Supreme Court approves his dismissal. Meanwhile, four seem to be emerging: M', Bar's previous deputy; Shalom Ben-Chanan (Shakht), who served in the Shin Bet in the past; Eyal Tsir-Cohen, who served in the Shin Bet and moved to the Mossad; and Yair Shagi (Roli), who retired from the Shin Bet after losing to Bar in the battle for leadership of the organization. Even the current deputy, B', is supposedly a candidate, but it seems his chances are lower.
Argaman and his predecessor, Yoram Cohen, hinted at this in separate interviews they recently gave. It was implied from them that Netanyahu raised unreasonable requests to them, including regarding the use of tools against political opponents. The reality they knew then also exists today, just on steroids: both in terms of Netanyahu's imaginary world where every protester is funded and every political rival is a threat, and in terms of the relentless attack against the Shin Bet and its head.
Bar is not the type to blink or be afraid by nature, and since October 7 he also had nothing to lose. He fought for Israel's security, and for the organization, and for democracy. One can claim that he should have gone home long ago because of his responsibility for the disaster: a similar claim can be directed also at Netanyahu and his government, which continues even now to deny its responsibility while it tries to carry out a regime coup in Israel.
Bar's replacement will encounter this reality from his first day. Certainly in its operational context: Gaza isn't going anywhere, and neither are Judea and Samaria and all the other fronts. Still, his test will be different: in his decisions regarding Qatargate (and whether to open an investigation into the next Qatargate), and in matters of extreme right-wing terrorism, and in matters of demands for secret investigations and arrests of political rivals and protest leaders, and in matters of security for Netanyahu's family members – and there's more, as is fit for a king (and queen, and prince).
One must hope that whoever enters the office will be smart enough to understand that from the moment he sits in it he is a protected flower, and he is independent to make decisions. And that he will be strong enough to make and implement them, against all pressures. This is exactly what Zamir seeks to broadcast in the IDF. That he doesn't work "for them," but "for us." After the unsuccessful handling of the matter of outgoing IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari, Zamir this week drew a clear line for Defense Minister Israel Katz, who mistakenly thought the Chief of Staff is his foot soldier.
Katz indeed continued in full force with another announcement, but hurried to fold when he announced that the defense minister and the Chief of Staff "are working together in full cooperation for Israel's security." Like every announcement that seeks to broadcast that "everything is fine," it taught that nothing is fine, and that the next chapters are already being written now (in the announcement). Because whoever promotes a draft-dodging law, and prioritizes fighting over hostages, and blocks a state commission of inquiry, and generally tries to stir in every matter and mix between the sanctity of security and the secular nature of politics – will end up colliding with the army, and with the large public that stands behind it.
