Israel Hayom has gained access to documents showing the strategic recommendations of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar in the years leading up to the October 7 massacre. These documents, published for the first time, contradict the findings of the public inquiry and Bar's own statements since, which suggested the Shin Bet did not play a role in economically strengthening Gaza, separating Hamas from the Palestinian Authority, or pursuing a containment strategy.
Documents paint a detailed picture
In the battle over the narrative between the political echelon and the ousted Shin Bet chief, these documents hold critical importance in outlining the full picture. They reflect Bar's conception, step by step, up to the night before the attack. Each year, the Shin Bet chief issues the "Directive of the Head of Shin Bet" for the upcoming year. In the 2022 directive, Bar wrote as a "recommendation for national strategy" two key points: strengthening the Palestinian Authority, preserving the separation from the Gaza Strip, and providing economic support to the West Bank; and "containing the Gaza Strip through gradual rehabilitation."
For 2023, Bar presented five questions with his answers, three of which are cited here within security constraints, illustrating his stance in the year before the massacre. When asked, "Are there shades within Hamas?" his response was negative. On "Does economic investment lead to regional stability?" he answered affirmatively. And to "Will long-term economic stability erode Hamas's power?" he again responded yes.
Economic focus over military action
Bar asks whether economic investment in the strip would help create lasting calm with the Palestinians. His answer is yes. Will economic stability erode Hamas' power? His answer is yes. He recommended that Israel focus its national security strategy on severing the axis of resistance – comprising Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran – by creating divisions, isolating Hamas, and neutralizing events that could spark an outbreak or unification. He also advocated strengthening the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and its appartuses to shift trends in the West Bank, alongside economic support. Notably absent from his national strategy recommendations were calls for assassinations; instead, he suggested neutralizing "events." At this stage, Bar did not view Hamas as an enemy with military capability akin to an army.
In contrast to the public inquiry, an internal command investigation, as reported by Israel Hayom, pointed to a failure in assessing Hamas as deterred. "We assessed that Hamas had an interest in maintaining calm in the Gaza sector, and over time, after Operation Guardian of the Walls, it continued to grow stronger, shifting its focus to the West Bank," the internal review stated.
Two days before the massacre
Fast forward to a discussion led by Bar within the Shin Bet on October 5, 2023, two days before the massacre. Bar outlined two strategic options for Israel: a short-term "calming" process without conditions tied to ongoing negotiations for the return of captives and missing persons from Hamas, or directing terror from Gaza to the West Bank; or a long-term approach involving significant relief and development of Gaza, contingent on a captives deal and reducing terror directed from Gaza. He emphasized humanitarian relief, stating, "Providing humanitarian concessions to Gaza as 'goodwill': humanitarian relief, increasing the number of workers by an additional 1,500, water, and transferring medicines."
These revelations starkly contrast with Bar's letter to ministers on the eve of his dismissal, his recent statements, and leaks attributed to him. In his letter, he claimed, "Within the framework of the process regarding the desire to end my tenure, which I hope will be conducted lawfully, and in light of the claims in the proposed decision, I will present a full detailing of offensive actions and recommendations for strategic discussions, derived from my security and strategic perception, which I brought for the approval of the prime minister, both before October 7 and after, and most of which were not advanced by him."
Two narratives
Bar's response to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's announcement of his intended dismissal further distanced his earlier stance. "The Shin Bet under my leadership conducted a thorough investigation that identified intelligence failures and internal processes on October 7. The need to investigate all factors, including government policy and the Prime Minister, and not just the IDF and Shin Bet, which thoroughly investigated themselves, is essential for public security," he wrote.
A screenshot taken of the footage showing the kidnapping of IDF female field observers on Oct. 7 by Hamas terrorists | Photo: Hostage and Missing Families Forum
The public Shin Bet inquiry denied underestimating Hamas, stating, "The investigation did not find that the Shin Bet belittled the enemy. On the contrary - there was a deep understanding of the threat, initiatives, and a desire to thwart the threat, especially Hamas leaders." Yet, it identified Qatari money as a factor in Hamas's empowerment, omitting Bar's repeated economic recommendations aimed at achieving calm.
The Shin Bet responded to the Israel Hayom report with the following statement: "Regrettably, we are again encountering the phenomenon of selective leaks of biased excerpts from classified documents, as part of an attempt to present the public with a partial picture that does not faithfully reflect the Shin Bet's assessments and recommendations prior to October 7. The Shin Bet will continue to act with integrity, not through leaks of classified materials to the media, and calls for all circumstances related to the outbreak of the war to be investigated by an inquiry committee to reach the truth."
