The Swords of Iron War has exposed extensive parts of the Iranian "Axis of Resistance" that had been operating far from the Israeli public's eye. Among the forces that have entered our radar are the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. This article examines who these militias are, the moves Iran is advancing to strengthen its power in the neighboring country with the aim of turning it into a partner in the "Unity of Fronts" plan, and the latest developments in the arena.
When discussing pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, the reference is primarily to al-Hashd al-Shaabi ("Popular Mobilization Forces" or PMF), an organization that brings together more than 60 militias – the vast majority Shiite and pro-Iranian, with a few Sunni, Yazidi, and even Christian ones – allegedly comprising nearly a quarter-million active members.
Among the dozens of militias under the "al-Hashd al-Shaabi" umbrella, one can find the Imam Hussein Brigade established by the Iranian Quds Force, the Kata'ib Imam Ali militia, the Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq organization that fought alongside Hezbollah against Israel in the Second Lebanon War, the Hezbollah al-Nujaba Movement supported by Hezbollah in Lebanon, Kata'ib Hezbollah established to expel US forces from Iraq, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and others.
Since the October 7 massacre, the various factions have been involved in firing more than one hundred missiles and UAVs into Israeli territory, particularly at ports and airports, more than two hundred attacks against American forces in Iraq and Syria, operations against the Kurds in Syria, and additional forces associated with the pro-American axis.
For years, Iraq served as the main artery through which ammunition was transferred from Iran to Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian militias in Lebanon and Syria, particularly through the al-Bukamal border crossing between Iraq and Syria, whose western side is currently under Kurdish forces' control. Meanwhile, the PMF has been receiving military equipment and government funding since 2016, but significant changes have occurred in this aspect. To understand them, we need to go back a bit.
The first significant expression of Iranian involvement in Iraq could be seen during the Second Gulf War. Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Iranian Quds Force has led Shiite militias in Iraq, primarily Jaish al-Mahdi, which fought against the Americans and later – after Saddam's fall – against Iraq's armed forces, which were rebuilt with American assistance. Several years of brutal civil war and military operations by the new Iraqi government with American support against the organization led its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, to declare the cessation of most of its military activity.
Then came ISIS
In June 2014, the Islamic State organization captured Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city. The appearance of this new and threatening player in the arena prompted al-Sadr to quickly reestablish the military wing of the organization, this time with a more peaceful name, Saraya al-Salam ("Peace Brigades"). The new-old organization merged into al-Hashd al-Shaabi, and facing the common enemy in the form of ISIS, the militias began cooperating with the Iraqi army, a scenario that seemed completely imaginary just a few months earlier.
In 2018, after Islamic State forces in Iraq were defeated, al-Sadr called on Shiite militias to disarm and return power to the Iraqi government. The vast majority of Saraya al-Salam operatives complied, and the organization – riding on the bravery it showed in the war against ISIS and the statesmanship it displayed by choosing to disarm – won most of the votes in the elections, and its members integrated into the Iraqi political system and security forces. The organization's members who fought shoulder to shoulder with PMF members and even belong to the same religious stream with most of them – became a powerful political factor.
Since the formation of the current Iraqi government in October 2022, the status of the militias has strengthened, with the support of Saraya al-Salam people and PMF supporters. If in 2022 the organization's budget stood at about $2.2 billion, in 2023 the amount rose to $2.6 billion, and last year it soared to a record of more than $3.4 billion. In addition, the organization received control of several military bases belonging to the Iraqi army, and its manpower increased from 122,000 soldiers to 238,000, although it is likely that some are fictitious and designed to justify the high budget.
Fearing Israel and the US
With Donald Trump's return to the White House and the events of the past year, which included severe blows to the Iranian Axis of Resistance by Israel and the United States, PMF fears attacks on its senior officials. And they have good reason for this.
Since its establishment in 2014, al-Hashd al-Shaabi has repeatedly attacked American forces and collaborators with the American axis, coupled with the fact that it is an Iranian proxy, controlled by the Revolutionary Guards. Initially, the Americans somewhat tolerated PMF aggression due to the shared interest in the war against ISIS, but as time passed, Washington began to classify more and more groups within it as terrorist organizations, the latest in June 2024.
Moreover, the current PMF chairman, Faleh al-Fayad, has had sanctions imposed on him by the Americans due to severe human rights violations, and the head of the organization's operations division, Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi (known as "Abu Fadak"), is a senior member of Kata'ib Hezbollah, which last January attacked American bases, causing the deaths of three soldiers and injuries to 47 others. In response, the US Air Force attacked 85 targets of pro-Iranian elements in Iraq and Syria; almost all facilities were destroyed or disabled, and dozens of operatives from terrorist militias and the Revolutionary Guards were eliminated.
Recently, a bill with the innocent name "PMF Service and Retirement Law" was raised in the Iraqi parliament. The bill raised in the Iraqi parliament was ostensibly intended to deter the US and Israel from attacking PMF forces by replacing militant commanders with those perceived as more moderate, but supporters of the old guard in al-Hashd al-Shaabi claimed that it was actually a political move driven by those who pretended to replace them. The most discussed section included retirement at age 60, which would push out the current chairman, Faleh al-Fayad, who will celebrate his 69th birthday this week, and about 180 other senior officials in the PMF. According to reports in Iraq, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is acting in accordance with the interests of the veteran leaders.
Eventually, after the bill stirred echoes in Iraq, it was ultimately withdrawn and will not be put to a vote. It can be assumed that other proposals dealing with the structure of the militias and their future will arise in the near future in the local parliament.
The worst scenario for the American axis in general and Israel in particular is the continued creeping empowerment of the militias until one bright day Iraq becomes another link in the "Unity of Fronts" scenario in the regional conflict, and not just a transit station or logistical rear between Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Replacing Faleh al-Fayad and the old guard, which strives to adopt more and more power at the expense of the Iraqi government, with new leaders who will be committed to the country's sovereignty, alongside changing the definition of PMF's authority in Iraq by law, so that the militias lose their power – is a Western interest.
Much is discussed about the application of maximum American pressure on Iran and its possible effects on the ayatollah regime and the nuclear project it is racing toward. Intensifying sanctions on Iran's proxies will also make it difficult for them to play their part in the Iranian destruction machine. In the context of the militias in Iraq, sanctions can be imposed on the entire economic wing of the PMF and groups under it, including personal sanctions on entities involved in the field.
